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Abstract 
This research studies how cultural consumption draws cultural distinctions in the most developed megacities 
in China. This research examines the pattern of music consumption to examine distinction—which types of 
music are used, how they are used, who are using them, and what are the sources of those tastes. Although 
some theories, such as the cultural omnivore account, contend that the rise of contemporary pop culture 
implies a more open-minded pursuit of taste, this research argues that popular culture draws distinction in 
new ways. Based on a 1048 random-sample survey and 21 interviews on music in China, this research shows 
how the penetration of foreign music into China has allowed it to become a form of cultural capital—high-
status cultural knowledge and dispositions that can be leveraged for social distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). This 
research pioneers in cultural capital research the use of MIRT, a latent trait method from psychometrics, to 
reveal the pattern of music taste. Those with high levels of cultural capital had more exposure to certain types 
of music such as classical music and selective foreign pop music, which requires knowledge and research to 
consume, accumulating in "tastes" which they deploy to measure others. Those with low cultural capital tend 
to follow the mainstream or are uninterested in these music types. In turn, the meaning of cultural capital in 
China is examined to show how taste is influenced by not only current socioeconomic differences but also the 
past, most notably the privileged childhood of those growing up in advantaged families. The rise of taste in 
China is traced to rising inequality under Reform and Opening which led to a diverging upbringing in the 
newest generation of Chinese. This research updates Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital, which has 
traditionally focused on elite highbrow culture, by demonstrating how the influx of global culture in a 
contemporary society has enabled the continuation of cultural distinction.   
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Part I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1. Distinction, taste, and cultural capital 
This thesis examines the distinction of cultural consumption in Chinese megacities, to analyze the hierarchy 
of music taste, how it is stratified, whether it is utilized for distinction, and what are the underlying causes 
that enable distinction in China. The research is informed by the debate between the theories of cultural 
capital and cultural omnivores. Bourdieu argued that differences in the level of cultural capital, which is 
cultural knowledge, preferences, and dispositions, as the reason for distinctions in cultural consumption 
(Bourdieu, 1984). However, with the decline of high culture and the rise of popular culture, his theory on 
cultural capital has been increasingly challenged by accounts that argue for cultural eclecticism and the 
openness of the privileged (Peterson, 1992; Peterson and Kern, 1996). The debate has been concentrated in 
cases from Western societies, with little research in China thus far. 
This study argues that social distinction is observed in China. Taste is increasingly formed by differences that 
are rooted in intergenerational inequalities—in support of the theory of cultural capital. This study makes an 
empirical contribution to the pattern and extent of cultural stratification in China by comparing preferences 
toward different types of music amongst different people. Due to the lack of relevant data on this research 
topic, I conducted a purposely designed survey with a 1048 random sample followed by qualitative 
interviews. By analyzing the pattern of cultural distinction in urban cities in China, my research contributes 
to the understanding of how cultural capital functions under popular culture, as well as in non-Western 
settings. The unique formation of cultural capital in China has a different social context and development 
trajectory compared to Western countries. This study describes how cultural capital has developed in China 
since the 40 years of Reform and Opening, rooted in intergenerational inequalities in the Chinese context. 
This chapter introduces the main theories on cultural distinction in the West, to discuss how existing theories 
on cultural stratification in the West might or might not be relevant to China. Then I outline my research 
approach and the key points of my dissertation, before outlining the subsequent chapters.  
 Distinction and cultural consumption in China 
Differences in cultural consumption between people have been researched in China (Goodman, 2008b; Lei, 
2003; Miao, 2016: 24; Osburg, 2013: 11), but many of those researches have focused on observable and 
objectifiable differences between people, focusing on phenomena such as the conspicuous consumption of 
the rich and stigmatization of the underclasses. The underlying causes for the disparity in tastes are either 
deemphasized or assumed to be the material present—attributing it to current economic disparity, material 
ownership, and the lifestyles afforded. There is a lack of attention to the cultural aspects of the differences—
how the individuals differ in their values and perceptions that led to differences in cultural consumption. 
There is a lack of inquiry on the root sources of distinction—how tastes are formed and influenced the life-
trajectory of the individual. 
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Cultural aspects of distinction have a long history of research in sociology. Veblen argued that the wealthy 
signal their status through a taste for expensive luxuries (2007). Weber developed the concept of status 
culture, in which the elite groups adhere to their own cultural tastes and styles to reinforce their shared 
connections (2013). Herbert Gans distinguished culture into popular and high culture according to the 
patron’s social position (1974). The angle on the mechanisms of distinction discussed in this research is 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital and the surrounding debates, which offers a useful conceptual 
framework to understand the construction of social distinction.  
Bourdieu’s perspective is helpful in China in shifting the research focus from the discourses, narratives, and 
circumstances of material consumption and material distinction to understanding the deeper sources of 
taste. Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital sees distinction as more than just material differences on the 
surface, but as differences in dispositions residing in the habitus. The habitus is a concept that refers to 
subconscious dispositions internalized by their social environment, such as the taste for the necessity of the 
underprivileged (Bourdieu, 1984: 169–72). The habitus influences one’s taste, behavior, and values, but is 
shaped by upbringing and childhood environment, which are hard to change later in life (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Thus, cultural inequality is deeply rooted in the inequalities of the past. Cultural inequality is even more 
appalling than wealth disparity because it implies an inequality beyond material differences, ingrained into 
internal differences that are difficult to change by personal ability or achievement. Taking the cultural 
approach allows us to move beyond examining observed incidences of distinction in China, to better 
understand the deeper causes and the formation of social exclusion. Next, I will more fully outline Bourdieu’s 
theory of cultural capital, later developments as well as the challenges to his theory. I will also analyze their 
relevance in the Chinese context. 
The Bourdieusian perspective 
Bourdieu’s “Distinction,” published in French in 1979 and translated to English in 1984, is recognized to be 
one of the ten most influential sociological work in the twentieth-century (ISA, 1997). His book offers one of 
the most influential accounts in contemporary sociology on taste and cultural capital. Based on a study of 
French society in the 1960s, he argued that people in society are stratified by not only economic capital but 
also by social and cultural capital. Cultural resources such as knowledge, preferences, and manners are 
considered cultural capital which draws social distinction, conferring advantages for the privileged while 
discriminating against the underprivileged. Cultural capital includes cultural resources such as education but 
also knowledge of culture which confers advantages in society—“institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high 
status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for 
social and cultural exclusion” (Lamont and Lareau, 1988: 156). This is complemented by concepts such as 
fields, which are the arenas of conflict where actors struggle for positions (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu’s work 
affirms “the primacy of relations” over theories that favor structure or agency (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 15–19). His view that cultural divisions are more fundamental and more revealing of divisions in 
society has also led to the cultural conception of class, which is increasingly challenging the traditional 
occupational-centric notion of class (Atkinson, 2016; Crompton, 2008; Devine et al., 2005; Savage et al., 
2013). Bourdieu’s framework views cultural distinction not as a byproduct of other inequalities but as a core 
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part of the social hierarchy. Class, then, is not reducible to any measurement, but is realized through 
interactions mediated by culture. The different resources are not fixed positions but are enacted in social 
situations.  
Bourdieu also differentiates cultural stratification between objectified forms to embodied forms, where 
objectified cultural capital is distinction based on what is consumed, and embodied cultural capital is how 
they are consumed (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural distinction is both a cause and effect of class formation, 
instead of an effect (Devine and Savage, 1999; Savage, 2000). Therefore, cultural capital is seen to be a 
mechanism of intergenerational inequality, as cultural habits residing in the habitus are hard to change later 
in life. The appearance of “natural” qualities reflects underlying social inequalities. Cultural habits formed 
earlier in life are acted out in social interactions. Groups assert themselves through hierarchical and 
relational differences (Bourdieu, 1998). In turn, the differences reproduce the structure of entitlement and 
reproduce social inequality (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 14–15). Bourdieu famously argued that the 
highbrow taste of the elites is symbolic violence used toward distinction and social reproduction of the social 
dominant. Taste is therefore in close homology with one’s social position (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Popular culture and the cultural omnivore challenge 
Bourdieu’s argument that cultural consumption is linked to social inequality and social stratification has 
been under challenge due to the rise of popular culture. His account is based on French society of the 1960s, 
where traditional highbrow culture was in a dominating position, therefore cultural capital and legitimate 
culture were interchangeable for Bourdieu (Lamont and Lareau, 1988: 157). However, the cultural scene has 
changed significantly. Societies in France and elsewhere have since become post-industrial. With the rise of 
popular culture and erosion of high art, Bourdieu’s account is looking dated. Popular culture has proliferated, 
along with the erosion of high art and increasing globalized media, raising a challenge to his account. 
One of the most influential accounts under the proliferation of pop culture is the cultural omnivore thesis 
raised by Richard Peterson and his colleagues which described the change in the pattern of division in 
cultural consumption (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and Simkus, 1992). They discovered that 
traditional high culture is no longer as exclusive as before in the US. His research published in 1996 
compared the change between 1982 and 1992 to show that cultural eclecticism has been on the rise. High- 
status persons were no longer marked by exclusive preference toward high culture, but by the breadth of 
cultural preferences compared to other social groups. Instead of a sharp cultural division between elitist 
“snobs” who solely preferred highbrow music and the “slobs” who abstain from “culture,” those in the higher 
social strata were instead “omnivores” who like a variety of music versus the “univores” who were less 
culturally engaged. The tendency for elites to be happily consuming both highbrow and lowbrow culture was 
interpreted as the breakdown of cultural barriers, explained as the increased tolerance and openness of the 
elites. After this study, a series of publications has reaffirmed the cultural omnivore phenomenon in several 
other countries, making it a widely-observed account of taste in contemporary society (Chan, 2010; Chan and 
Goldthorpe, 2007b; Coulangeon and Lemel, 2007; DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004; Sintas and Alvarez, 2002; 
Van Eijck and Knulst, 2005). 
Chapter 1. Distinction, taste, and cultural capital  
 14 
The debate between Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital and the challenges from the culture omnivores 
account is ongoing in cultural sociology (see Hanquinet and Savage, 2015). This debate is the theoretical 
focus of this thesis, which will be more thoroughly discussed in the later chapters. Furthermore, this thesis 
extends the debate which has primarily centered around developed Western countries to China, a country 
with a markedly different social context. 
The relevance of cultural capital in China 
China has important differences that complicate whether Western theories on cultural distinction, including 
the cultural omnivores account, apply to China. China differs in its cultural, social, development, and 
historical differences. For Bourdieu, the concept of cultural capital is based on legitimate culture (Lamont 
and Lareau, 1988: 157), which for music was the traditional canon of Western classical and opera. However, 
legitimate culture is much more complicated in China. Even as empires fall and governments change in 
Europe, the classical canon has remained stable and continuously favored by elites for hundreds of years. 
Despite the variations within the West, such as the weaker influence of legitimate culture in the US compared 
to Europe (Lamont, 1992) and their recent erosion by popular culture (Bennett et al., 2009; Gans, 1974), 
contemporary studies in the West still frequently regard Western classical and opera as the legitimate 
highbrow (DiMaggio, 1982a; DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985; Kraaykamp and Van Eijck, 2010; Levine, 1988; 
Rössel and Schroedter, 2015; Van Eijck, 1999). Though weaker than before, Western classical music and 
opera have retained a high status among the elites, allowing the music canon to function as a cultural capital 
worthwhile to be passed on to the next generation.  
Legitimate culture has a much more complicated history in China, as the canon in China has been redefined 
multiple times. Rounds of political upheaval in modern China resulted in the consecration of different forms 
of music in different periods, following the changes of Chinese politics in recent history. The historical 
Chinese high culture of the gentry class fell along with the Qing dynasty (Mackerras, 1973). The Western 
classical canon entered China first in the late 19th century and reentered again after Reform and opening, 
carrying immense prestige as the international legitimate culture from the dominant West. But under Mao’s 
communism, the cultural capital from the previous eras became cultural “liabilities” as their patrons and 
performers were punished and denigrated for their bourgeoisie taste. The cultural revolution particularly 
uprooted traditional high culture, further complicating the meaning of highbrow culture in China. 
The scene of popular culture in China is also unlike that in the West. After Reform and Opening, popular 
culture from outside Mainland China gained massive popularity (Fung, 2007a). Non-Western countries are 
in a weaker position under globalized pop culture, resulting in different patterns of music hierarchy 
compared to the findings from studies that have focused on the developed West. The rare pieces of 
quantitative research on cultural stratification in China are two masters dissertations analyzing the same 
dataset. Both studies examine 5 music items to conclude that elites are cultural omnivores, a conclusion that 
I challenge (Li, 2014; Yu, 2014). Also, the cultural omnivore argument for openness and freedom in 
consuming popular culture is also problematic in  China. Discrimination and stigma toward those with lower 
social status have long been observed in China. A prevalent discourse used by the upper strata as well as the 
state is the suzhi discourse, which blames the circumstances of the underprivileged on their lack of suzhi 
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(cultivation and internal quality), reinforcing the discriminatory cultural stereotype (Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 
2004; Sun, 2017). The ideals of respect and tolerance that describe the shift in the West seem to have limited 
relevance in China.  
A further difference between China and many countries in the West is the sheer rapidness of social change 
and the extent of social inequality. The shift from industrial to consumer society—such as new goods, 
marketing, values of possession, materialism, lifestyle, creation of demand—occurred gradually over four 
centuries in Europe (Campbell, 1987), whereas the development from agrarian to industrial and postmodern 
society was compressed within one generation in China (EJ Croll, 2006). The rapid rise in inequality 
questions how cultural capital can exist to promote intergenerational inequality in the way Bourdieu 
described when economic inequality was insubstantial before Reform and Opening.  
All these issues question whether and how Bourdieu’s theories might apply to China. They challenge whether 
highbrow art is liked by those with high levels of cultural capital in China, and whether there is “highbrow 
art” in the first place, as the class-based transfer of cultural preference was interrupted both in terms of the 
music canon and in terms of intergenerational privileges. The debates on cultural boundaries and legitimate 
culture have primarily taken place in Western societies—with very little research being done in China. This is 
partly due to the different research interests in China more concerned with economic development and 
developmental inequalities. Surveys that cover cultural consumption comparable to the scale and timespan 
of Western studies are non-existent, to my awareness.  Given the paucity of research and data, this research 
contributes to the understanding of cultural inequality in China where the different historical, 
developmental, and cultural context challenges some of Bourdieu’s Western-centric assumptions. 
Main contributions 
The main argument of this research is that cultural distinction has been rising in China, along with the 
development of cultural capital that has enabled differentiation by taste. While some sociologists have argued 
for the irrelevance of social hierarchy in the divisions between cultural consumption, I argue that the 
differences in taste between people from socioeconomic backgrounds not only exists in China, but is also 
leveraged as a distinction to differentiate the privileged from others, and to justify the superiority of the 
privileged. The types of social privilege in the context of cultural distinction is also examined. The thesis 
argues that taste distinction identifies not only the current socioeconomic position, but also intergenerational 
privileges accumulated since childhood.  
This thesis contributes to sociological research through two main aspects. Firstly, Bourdieu’s theory on 
cultural capital has been challenged due to the decline of high culture in the West and the proliferation of 
popular culture over the last half-century. This research argues although society has changed since Bourdieu 
conceptualized his theory of cultural capital, the theory remains helpful in understanding cultural 
consumption in a world of contemporary popular culture. Cultural capital is embedded in social contexts, 
which changes along with changing forms of entertainment.  This research finds that high-status culture is 
being constructed in China along with increases in inequality. Furthermore, the “high culture” is not limited 
to traditional highbrow music but is increasingly Western music—both Western classical as well as selective 
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Western pop music. Western culture has penetrated the coastal elites, while local culture continues to be 
dominant among the underprivileged. This research argues that the emerging form of cultural capital is 
observed in China (Prieur and Savage, 2011). The influx of global culture in China has been 
disproportionately embraced by the privileged, causing foreign culture to occupy a position of status, 
allowing culture to be drawn for distinction.  
Secondly, this research examines the form of cultural capital in China, how it is deployed for distinction, and 
how its formation connects with historical developments in China. By establishing the connection between 
cultural distinction in the present to differences in cultural capital, which can be traced back to parental 
inequalities and differentiated environment of upbringing, I argue that distinction today is rooted in 
privileges from the past. This research examines cultural tastes in China to discover not only there are 
differences in taste between people from different strata, the formation of those tastes—which represent 
deeper differences in habits, values, and mentality—can be traced back to childhood privileges and parental 
upbringing. The influx of Western culture in China has played an important role in boundary drawing and 
the development of cultural capital, as it is Western music that has taken the high-status position and used to 
draw social distinction against the locals. It is frequently Western music that dominates the music hierarchy 
as the high-status music in China, due to the better ability of the privileged to access, afford, and consume 
foreign culture, allowing foreign music to become the high-status culture in China. This suggests that the 
distinction and discrimination observed in everyday settings are rooted in inequalities of the past. With 
China’s growing inequality and enlarging differences in upbringing, the value of cultural capital has grown. 
Demonstrating that inequalities are persisting into the new generation provides a new perspective on social 
discrimination and cohesion in contemporary China. 
 Research approach 
This research moves beyond typical studies in China that study the specific circumstances of discrimination 
toward understanding the deeper causes of distinction, by examining whether different social groups have 
different levels of cultural capital in society. To do this, this research analyzes the pattern of music 
preferences in the Chinese megacities using survey and supplementary interviews, to understand the 
differences in cultural consumption between social groups and the underlying sources of distinction. 
Music taste 
Distinction from cultural capital can be drawn from various cultural preferences and practices. Cultural 
disposition has been measured as cultural participation (Katz-Gerro, 1999; such as Katz-Gerro and Shavit, 
1998) or cultural preferences (such as DiMaggio et al., 1996; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and Simkus, 
1992). Previous research has examined various forms of cultural consumption such as attending concerts, 
visiting museums or galleries, or preferences toward music, paintings, books, or TV programs. Music is 
chosen in this research because studies that examine multiple forms of cultural preferences have found 
music to be the most stratifying—a field that most strongly links with social hierarchies (Bennett et al., 2009; 
Bourdieu, 1984; Le Roux et al., 2008; Peterson, 1992). Music also enjoys widespread popularity among all 
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strata of the population, making it most suitable for survey research that samples from all segments of the 
society. In this research, music is used broadly to include art forms with a musical component—which also 
includes musical drama with a performative component that can also be listened alone (e.g. opera).  
Music preference is chosen instead of music participation because of its deeper connection with the 
internalized nature of cultural capital. Participation is more closely related to economic income, whereas 
preferences better reflect internalized dispositions (Le Roux et al., 2008; Silva, 2006; Yaish and Katz-Gerro, 
2012). Art forms, particularly those that require physical participation, tend to have a substantial barrier to 
access and lack widespread participation across all strata of society (Coulangeon and Lemel, 2007; Robette 
and Roueff, 2014). This is likely to find engagement versus disengagement (Le Roux et al., 2008), which is 
more attributed to economic differences between social strata—another well-researched area in China. In 
contrast, preferences better capture embodied attitudes, whereas behavior conflates with time, economic and 
situational constraints (Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009). Participation is easier to operationalize as it is more 
quantifiable, but participation is less suitable for understanding cultural taste. Preferences are less 
influenced by economic or pragmatic factors, so more strongly reflect cultural dispositions related to one’s 
cultural upbringing. 
Music taste as a cultural capital would be enacted not only through cultural participation, but more notably 
through communicating and displaying the internalized dispositions (Holt, 1997: 99). If one were to hold a 
snobbish attitude toward classical music, it is more readily captured through one’s attitude toward it rather 
than the hours of listening that are claimed. Access to live music in China also depends on one’s physical 
distance from the city center, which is strongly linked to economic factors rather than taste. The amount of 
time devoted to listening is also influenced by occupation and life stage changes, which vary without an 
actual change in taste or factors relevant to distinction. Furthermore, surveying music participation brings a 
false sense of precision, as “hours of listening” or “listened in the past n weeks” is difficult to recall and prone 
to errors in memory. 
The conceptual approach toward music  
This research chooses music preference as the angle for investigating cultural capital because of its multiple 
strengths that allow a deeper understanding of dispositions. The focus of this thesis is on the division of taste 
by social background, which stratifies cultures into different status standings depending on the 
socioeconomic positions of their patrons. Threfore, this research regards a music item to be high-status when 
its consumers are high in socioeconomic positions, without relying on a priori definitions of music status.  
This thesis is primarily concerned with cultural divisions from the perspective of the consumers instead of 
the producers of culture. Music is used in this research as a convenient angle to evaluate taste, which is a 
reflection of cultural capital in individuals. This research is not concerned with the aesthetic debates on the 
intrinsic superiority of different forms of culture, nor does it take a position on this debate. This thesis 
considers different music forms and tastes equally and neutrally, distancing from “culture wars” where 
advocates of high culture attack popular culture for its intrinsic inferiority or harmful effects (Adorno and 
Simpson, 1941; Gans, 2008: 3–5). This research is also not ethnomusicology, as it does not examine the 
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cultural context of particular types of music and its meaning and symbols. This thesis looks at music 
preferences across many music items to see whether and how the tastes are stratified by social privileges—
the causes of stratification of taste cultures, and the consequences of the stratification.  
Bourdieu’s account of the homology of cultural capital has been criticized to be overly deterministic in 
attributing the relationship between taste and social positions. Studies have found the connection between 
music preferences and the mood of the moment, such as the connection between bad moods to energetic and 
joyful music (Knobloch and Zillmann, 2002), and between romantic deprivation and love songs (Gibson et 
al., 2000). Psychological factors have also been found to influence music taste, such as the linkage between 
soul music and depression (Miranda and Claes, 2008). Music preferences are related to one’s personality 
(Nave et al., 2018). For example, personality is found to strongly influence music dimensions such as 
sophisticated, Campestral, intense, mellow, and urban (Rentfrow and Gosling, 2003). Studies even argued 
that personality traits account for musical preferences more so than age, sex, and education (Greenberg et 
al., 2016). Gender differences in taste have also been found, which was explained as gender roles and 
developmental psychology (Schwartz and Fouts, 2003). This research recognizes that music preferences are 
influenced by many factors aside from social positions, such as mood, personality, psychology, and gender 
differences, and makes no attempt to claim that social position is the only or the predominant source of 
differences in taste.  
Rather than treating the linkage between taste and social positions as deterministic, I follow Gans’s concept 
of taste cultures to explain the relationship. Taste cultures are shared aesthetic values and standards of tastes 
between groups of people, applied toward practices, goods, and ideas of art and symbolic products of leisure 
and consumption (Gans, 2008: 5–6, 94–95). People in different taste cultures are not formalized organized 
groups, yet the divisions relate to underlying factors such as socioeconomic level, age, gender, geography, 
psychological preferences, and so forth. People do not necessarily formally organize to participate in certain 
forms of art for the conscious purpose of snobbery, discrimination, or exclusion. Yet consumers of an art 
form tend to share similarities, one of which is similarities in socioeconomic level, which allow the art form 
to serve as an identification for the group—enabling its deployment for social identification and distinction. 
Although social positioning is only one of many influencers of taste, it is the focus of this research as it is a 
salient force in distinction. The influence of other factors such as mood, psychology, and gender are left to 
other researches. 
 Outline of subsequent chapters 
Part I is the introductory part with 3 chapters. This chapter introduced the main debates, my research 
approach, and my main arguments. Chapter 2 describes the shortcomings of existing researches and explains 
my survey design, the execution, as well as the supplementary interviews. A new survey with a large number 
of specific music items is used to overcome the shortcoming of existing quantitative research that typically 
finds cultural omnivores.  This research also innovates in the use of multidimensional item response theory 
(MIRT), a latent trait method that is more commonly used in psychology but uncommon in cultural 
sociology. MIRT is used to derive the fundamental underlying traits which give rise to differences in 
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preferences, which is an ideal quantitative method for understanding the habitus conceptualized by 
Bourdieu. 
Chapter 3 examines the music landscape in China—from its historical development, the history of music 
hierarchy, to the main types of music in contemporary China, using the 6 taste-factors found by MIRT. The 
chapter shows the divisions between traditional versus popular music and the divisions in popular music by 
region of origin. The 53 items of music asked in the questionnaire are also introduced here to introduce the 
music scene. 
Part II focuses more on the current pattern of music distinction, whereas Part III analyzes the historical 
Chinese context and its formation. Part II consists of 2 chapters that cover the music hierarchy and its role in 
distinction. Chapter 4 examines the pattern of music distinction in China. First, the cultural omnivores 
argument is examined to reveal that while it is empirically confirmed in China, it is dependent on the 
selection of music items, and fails to reveal other forms of distinction. Then ANOVA (analysis of variance) 
examines the results from MIRT to show that people’s tastes for different music indeed differ by social 
groups. The result reveals the different roles that different music play in drawing distinction.  
Chapter 5 focuses on how embodied cultural capital is leveraged toward social distinction, enabling the elites 
to navigate social relations through popular music. The use of popular music for social distinction represents 
the deployment of embodied cultural capital, and also represents an emerging form of cultural capital based 
on popular foreign culture. I argue that the consecration of selective music items is due to HCCs’ inquisitive 
attitude toward music appreciation, which contrasts with LCC’s pursuit of popularity. Although popular 
music is always changing, with different favorites in different age groups, I describe how the HCCs navigate 
changing popularity in the music through a process of “upgrading” to move toward high-status music. 
Interviews supplement the findings by demonstrating how the music hierarchy is known by those with high 
levels of cultural capital, but less known to others, therefore represent symbolic violence as HCCs are able to 
navigate the music hierarchy, but leaves LCCs exposed to differentiation. 
Part III moves onto the meaning of cultural capital in the context of China and its formation. Chapter 6 uses 
survey data to show how cultural capital in China is rooted in parental as well as childhood privileges. 
Chapter 7 uses interview data to explain how childhood upbringing fostered interest in high-status culture. 
The ability of children of the privileged to access and learn about Western culture has caused it to become an 
exclusive taste for those raised in privileged families since Reform and Opening. Both chapters demonstrate 
how taste is rooted in parental privileges, and how Western culture establishes itself in a dominant position 
in China—despite the heavy censorship and management of foreign culture by the government.  
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter that argues for the need to understand cultural capital in the unique 
Chinese context, particularly how the influx of foreign, particularly Western culture led to the creation of 
local cultural capital that reflects the global hegemony. It also summarizes the contribution of this thesis to 
theories on cultural distinction, including emerging forms of cultural capital, embodied forms of cultural 
capital, and their role in the Chinese social context. 
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In this research, the term “elite” is used to broadly include anyone who is relatively privileged in their social 
standing, whether by economic income, educational attainment, urban background, etc. Elites are not 
limited to the small percentages of the most privileged, nor restricted to any specific definition of class. This 
research focuses on cultural consumption and distinction in contemporary Mainland China, excluding Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. In this dissertation, Mainland China is sometimes more simply referred to as “China” 
when the context is clear (e.g. Reform and Opening in China, instead of Reform and Opening in Mainland 
China). The practitioners of music are referred to as “artists” in this research, as other terms do not suitably 
describe the entire group. While most of the artists are singers, they also include songwriters, pianists, bands, 
and band members who take various (including non-vocal) roles. Names of artists prioritize the use of their 
known English names or aliases if there is one (e.g. G.E.M.). Otherwise, Chinese names are transliterated 
using the preferred Mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan romanization based on the origin of the person, 
with the surname first for transliterated first names and the surname last for English-style first names (e.g. 
Jonathan LEE from Taiwan, LI Yuchun from Mainland China). Despite the complication, this is the most 
likely way for those names to appear in general English literature.  
Distinction in China—the rise of taste in cultural consumption   
 21 
Chapter 2. Research Design 
This chapter outlines my research design and analytical approach. Current debates in cultural distinction are 
marked by a chasm between the quantitative researchers who tends to find rising cultural eclecticism of 
elites, and Bourdieusian researchers who tend to find the continuation and transformation of cultural 
divisions. Bourdieusian scholars have been criticizing quantitative approaches for their fixation on what is 
consumed, advocating the use of qualitative or mixed approaches that examine how culture is consumed 
(Friedman et al., 2015; Holt, 1997; Jarness, 2015). My research demonstrates that quantitative approaches 
can be enhanced through innovations in survey design and quantitative methodology. This research also 
looks beyond the widely researched rural-urban gap to focus on urban megacities as new sites of inequality, 
offering an indicator of future China as it continues to urbanize.  
My research innovates not only in extending the inquiry of cultural capital into China, but also through the 
use of a new survey design, which is then analyzed with an innovative method called MIRT—a method 
common in psychology but has not been used in cultural socioecology to the best of my awareness. I used an 
innovative research design consisting of a self-designed survey comprising of an unprecedented 52 items of 
music—wide enough to cover music types relevant in China, but also specific enough to recognize the 
distinction in specific music types. The survey was commissioned in 4 cities in China targeting people age 16-
44 with a valid sample size of 1048, using RDD (random digit dialing) telephone interviews. My quantitative 
research is also supplemented with qualitative interviews conducted in Beijing and Shanghai that show the 
sources of taste and how they are deployed in practice. 
 Introduction 
The methodological divide in cultural stratification research 
The debate between cultural omnivores and Bourdieusian homology of taste is a contested topic in cultural 
distinction today, as introduced in Chapter 1. This debate is marked by a chasm in the method employed. 
Researches that support the homology between taste and socioeconomic positions have favored interpretivist 
approaches—either qualitative research, or the quantitative but inductivist method of multiple 
correspondence analysis (MCA). This includes major works such as Bourdieu’s Distinction, and subsequent 
studies in the US, Europe and other countries like the UK (Bennett et al., 2009), Denmark (Harrits et al., 
2010; Prieur et al., 2008). Bourdieusian researchers favor MCA because it is more compatible with 
Bourdieu’s worldview, as it is “a relational technique of data analysis whose philosophy corresponds exactly 
to what, in my view, the reality of the social world is… positions are objectively defined, in their existence and 
in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and 
potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose 
possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 96–97). A key differentiation between the approaches is that, unlike regression results that rely on 
hypothesis testing and takes significance testing as evidence, MCA is often used without significance testing 
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as it is used as an inductive method—a visualizer that lays out the pattern for inductive interpretation, often 
supported by interviews. “MCA graphically represents cultural tastes and practices and, by inspecting the 
resulting figures (and the accompanying statistical information), allows their clustering and fracturing can be 
interpreted (sic). This provides a visualization of the organization of the cultural landscape” (Silva et al., 
2009). MCA is also a niche method in social sciences, primarily used within the circle of Bourdieusian 
scholars. 
Meanwhile, mainstream quantitative social scientists have long moved onto increasingly complex statistical 
methods. Positivistic researchers relying on statistical methods, representative surveys, and quantitative 
models tend to find support for cultural omnivores (Alderson et al., 2010; Bukodi, 2007b; Chan and 
Goldthorpe, 2007b; Kraaykamp et al., 2010; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Torche, 
2010). These researches have supported the cultural omnivore account and challenged Bourdieu’s argument 
for the homology of taste (Alderson et al., 2010; Chan, 2010, 2019; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b).  
Bourdieusian scholars responded to those arguments by advocating more qualitative research—arguing that 
surveys use fixated questions on cultural objects which overlook distinctions on how they are consumed 
(Friedman et al., 2015; Holt, 1997; Jarness, 2015). Bourdieusian scholars criticize mainstream quantitative 
methods as reducing phenomena to variables, flattening relationships into singular variables that fail to 
capture the complexity of distinction based on aesthetic dispositions (Meuleman and Savage, 2013). This 
close “homology” between method and finding is a reason for the persistent division in findings in cultural 
consumption, creating barriers in the understanding of cultural stratification. 
I recognize that quantitative approaches tend to overlook deeper divisions in culture, however, I believe that 
the shortcomings can also be addressed with innovations within quantitative approaches. My research agrees 
with traditional Bourdieusian research that the relationship between preferences for highbrow, the 
consecration of highbrow music, and socioeconomic inequality are in a complex relationship that links 
toward the perpetuation of each other, and is not reducible to simple tests for causality. Yet there is an 
opportunity to employ more detailed questionnaires and advanced models, to update the research method 
with the tools and expectations of mainstream quantitative researchers. This is particularly important as the 
field continues to be polarized by method and conclusion, where cultural capital is supported primarily by 
interviews and MCA, with skepticisms raised by positivistic approaches. This research attempts to break the 
impasse through innovation in the survey design and analysis technique described in the next sections. 
The paucity of research on cultural capital in China 
Elements of cultural distinction in China have been covered across scattered pieces, but so far, they have only 
described them separately without associating with deeper distinction in society or cultural capital. 
Researches informed by cultural capital is predominantly based on studies in Western countries, primarily 
countries in Western and Northern Europe, and the USA. There has been little research on developing 
countries or China. Research in inequality in China often elaborates on the large rural and urban gap, 
whereas research in cultural capital or the stratification of culture is scarce (Zhang and Cui, 2017). I will 
begin by reviewing the rare pieces of research on the topic in China. 
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(1)  Coverage of the status of specific music types 
Here I briefly overview the scattered researches and news reports on the status of specific music types in 
China. Media platforms such as the Douyin (called Tiktok in English) and kuaishou apps appeal to grassroots 
in lower-tier cities and rural areas, who follow video clips or live-steams of grassroot “artists.” They are 
frequently scoffed in mainstream media and everyday conversations as platforms for those with “vulgar” 
tastes (Shen, 2018; Zuo, 2018). Similarly, Hip-hop music, marked by the “gangsta” style rapping and violent 
language, has been growing among the underclass in China but also deemed “vulgar” (Quackenbush and 
Chen, 2018). The local music subcultures of hanmai (喊麦) and shehuiyao (社会摇) are also popular among 
the young labor class with low income and education in the Northeast, who were previously ignored by 
society. Hanmai consists of rapping to a fast beat, while shehuiyao was described as meaningless repetitive 
body movement often danced on the street, plaza or public buses (Li, 2018). The government has largely 
sided with the elites against the rise of lowbrow tastes, issuing bans on “actors who are tasteless, vulgar, and 
obscene…actors with tattoos, hip hop culture, sub-culture (non-mainstream culture) and dispirited culture 
(decadent culture),”(BBC News, 2018; Quackenbush and Chen, 2018). This led to waves of censorship that 
led to the temporary disabling of live streams, removal of 33,146 accounts, deletion of “vulgar” content in 
2018 as well as in 2019 (Jao, 2018; Wu, 2019).  However, these coverage of music status have not linked with 
wider cultural aspects of inequality or cultural capital in China. 
(2)  Research on music based on EASS 2008 
The 2008 wave of East Asian Social Survey (EASS 2008), conducted in Mainland China, Taiwan, Korean, 
and Japan, contained 5 questions on music. In Mainland China, it was conducted by a market research firm 
as part of the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS 2008) commissioned by Renmin University. Although 
the 2049 samples are nationally representative, a serious limitation of this data is that it has only 5 questions 
on music taste. The music questions asked about preferences toward 1) classical, 2) rock, 3) jazz/blues, 4) 
popular music, and 5) traditional xiqu (i.e. traditional Chinese opera). Two pieces of master’s dissertation by 
different authors were published in the same issue of a Chinese language journal.  
Li Na replicated the methodology of a piece of research on music in England (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b) 
to adjudicate among the homology, individualization, and omnivore-univore theories of taste (Li, 2014). 
Latent class analysis found 4 latent classes based on 5 music categories: disengaged, univores of Chinese 
xiqu, univores of Western music (jazz/blues and rock), and omnivores. The main finding of the research is a 
“disengaged class”— those with low levels of education and lower social status are more likely to be in this 
class. However, the “omnivores” and “univores” are indistinguishable—the probability of belonging in either 
class is not significantly different for those with higher levels of education or social status, a result which is 
not explained. Her research concludes that “there is a certain relationship between people’s social status and 
cultural taste” and therefore the homology argument is supported, yet there are many limitations in the 
research. 
The second piece of research used the same data and appeared in the same issue of the journal (Yu, 2014). 
This paper applied factor analysis to the 5 categories of music to determine 2 factors: a factor with 4 music 
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(classical, rock, jazz/blues, and popular music) that is labeled “Western music”, and a factor with just xiqu 
that is labeled “Chinese music.” The research tests hypotheses on who tends to like Western music or Chinese 
music. The paper concludes that “Western music” (with classical, rock, jazz/blues, and popular music) is 
liked more by the young, the educated, and those who live in higher-tiered cities (as opposed to rural). The 
finding for “Chinese music” (xiqu) is the opposite. 
While those pieces of research ventured into an empty space on the stratification of music taste in China, 
there are significant limitations to their findings. Both studies are brief papers published in Chinese journals 
that replicated methodologies uncritically. The survey data only has 5 questions on music. The application of 
factor analysis or latent class analysis based on only 5 types of music is questionable, which produced 4 latent 
classes and 2 factors—one of which is loaded by 4 music types. Furthermore, the uncritical conclusion on 
cultural omnivorism based on only 5 music types is questionable. A broader criticism that applies to these 
articles, as well as other quantitative researches that support cultural omnivores, is that the music categories 
are unbelievably broad.  
Both studies find evidence that the lower strata are disengaged with music, which is unsurprising for a survey 
that covers both rural and urban areas of China, as the chasm between urban and rural population is already 
well established. Given the known disparity between rural and urban China in wealth, the opportunity for 
education, development, life chances, and lifestyle differences, the confirmation that music preferences also 
differ is important but hardly unsurprising.  
(3)  Book reading as cultural capital 
A piece of research published in the journal Modern China finds that reading preference is highly related to 
the level of education and social class (Wang et al., 2006). The quantitative data came from a 1999 survey of 
couples in 4 urban cities, randomly selected based on occupation: 20 managers, 20 professionals, 20 
officials, 20 workers, and 20 private entrepreneurs in each city for a total of 400 couples, or 800 individuals. 
The research finds that the highly educated and the elite classes read more genres, read more authors, read 
more “highbrow” books (derived from PCA, which are religious, reportage, classic masterpieces, biography, 
philosophy, and so forth), and read more authors of contemporary novels (also derived from PCA: Su Tong, 
Wang Xiaobo, etc). The research concludes that there is a cultural divide in cultural capital between working 
classes and elite classes (particularly officials, enterprise managers, and professionals). 
This research establishes that book reading habits differ by education and class. However, it does not provide 
much explanation on possible reasons for the empirical outcome, such as the meaning of those genres and 
authors, the context of social differentiation, intergenerational advantages, or even the role of schooling. It 
also lacks socio-economic details of the respondents such as hukou, parental information, and other 
contextual backgrounds which could aid in the interpretation.  
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 Survey Design 
The lack of suitable data sources in China 
Cultural taste is an emerging research area in China. Data on cultural consumption are extremely scarce. To 
my awareness, CGSS (Chinese General Social Survey) was the only available data source that covered music, 
and only in the 2008 wave as part of EASS 2008. Furthermore, that data source is severely limited by the 
number of music items. Alternatives to surveys have been considered but they are not satisfactory. I know of 
no existing data source in China that covers cultural taste and socioeconomic background adequately. It 
would be difficult to evaluate the dominant empirical claim of cultural omnivores from a small sample of 
interviews alone. Collecting data from other sources is also impractical. A history of rampant piracy limited 
the sale of non-pirated records in physical stores. Nowadays, young people frequently obtain music (legally) 
from one of several major free online music services (Street et al., 2015), but those sources do not have 
detailed socio-economic profiles such as the parental background. For these reasons, conducting a new 
survey is the most appropriate method to achieve research goals. 
Shortcomings in existing surveys 
Survey research is a common research method in the sociological analysis of cultural taste. Many influential 
researches in the sociology of culture in the West also rely on survey data (such as Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio 
and Mohr, 1985; Peterson, 1992; DiMaggio et al., 1996; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b; Bennett et al., 2009). 
However, these data sources have a shortcoming in having a limited number of music questions and asking 
broad and imprecise genres. 
(1)  The limited number of cultural items in national surveys 
Many of these are based on quantitative data from existing national surveys. Despite the strength in sample 
size and national representativeness, these sources of data have several limitations. A serious shortcoming is 
that most national surveys tend to be omnibus surveys not designed for cultural analysis. They are often 
designed for other or multiple purposes, with a subsection that briefly covers cultural items, which severely 
limits the number of cultural items that can be asked, causing the items to be overly broad labels of genre 
rather than specific. Asking a large number of specific music types also present a problem in large scale 
research, as it would produce a large number of “unaware” or missing responses, which are difficult to handle 
with common multivariate methods. Researchers could only ask well-known thus broad music genre, and 
quietly drop any missing responses. 
(2)  Broad genre labels that overlook refined distinction 
Peterson’s research is based on surveys conducted by U.S. Bureau of the Census for the National Endowment 
of the Art asked 10 music genres (classical, opera, easy-listening, musicals, big band, country, bluegrass, 
gospel, rock, blues) (Peterson and Kern, 1996). A piece of research about music in England based on the UK 
Office for National Statistics data covered 4 genres (opera/operetta, jazz, classical, pop/rock) (Chan and 
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Goldthorpe, 2007b). The research in China based on the Chinese General Social Survey covered 5 music 
genres (classical, rock, jazz & blues, pop, traditional Chinese opera) (Li, 2014; Yu, 2014). A relatively large 
study was conducted in the UK which covered 8 musical genres plus 8 musical work, in addition to questions 
on a variety of cultural consumption (Bennett et al., 2009). The problem with broad genre labels in analyzing 
music has been discussed as follows: 
“… genres are extremely broad and ill-defined categories, so measurements based solely 
on genres are necessarily crude and imprecise. Furthermore, not all pieces of music fit 
neatly into a single genre. Many artists and pieces of music are genre defying or cross 
multiple genres, so genre categories do not apply equally well to every piece of music. 
Assessing preferences from genres is also problematic because it assumes that 
participants are sufficiently knowledgeable with every music genre that they can provide 
fully informed reports of their preferences. This is potentially problematic for comparing 
preferences across different age groups where people from older generations, for 
instance, may be unfamiliar with the new styles of music enjoyed by young people. 
Genre-based measures also assume that participants share a similar understanding of the 
genres. This is an obstacle for research comparing preferences from people in different 
socioeconomic groups or cultures because certain musical styles may have different social 
connotations in different regions or countries.” (Rentfrow et al., 2011: 4) 
Peterson himself is aware of this potential bias, but defends that “We do not claim that these genres comprise 
a representative sample of all genres in the twentieth-century United States. We do, however, argue that the 
sample is sufficiently large, and the genres sampled sufficiently diverse, to illuminate patterns in genre forms 
and trajectories” (Lena and Peterson, 2008: 699).  
The shortcomings of existing surveys have resulted in a chasm in research findings. Researches that support 
cultural eclecticism are often based on quantitative surveys with the limitations mentioned above, while 
qualitative researches have refuted claims of cultural tolerance from surveys. Some researches have argued 
that qualitative research or mixed methods is the only solution (Friedman et al., 2015; Holt, 1997; Jarness, 
2015). However, I argue that these issues can be resolved by designing a customized survey that avoids broad 
genre labels and has a sufficient number of items to reveal distinctions. 
New survey design with 52 items of music 
Given the shortcomings of existing surveys, and the lack of data sources in China, this research makes an 
innovative attempt to conduct a fresh survey. The new survey was conducted using a questionnaire 
specifically designed for studying the stratification of music. The survey addresses multiple shortcomings in 
existing research to gain a new perspective on cultural capital in China, and to bridge the divide between 
qualitative research that finds cultural divisions whereas quantitative research often finds the breakdown of 
boundaries. 
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The main part of the survey asks 52 items of music—in order to understand subtle distinction beyond broad 
labels of genre. The music field in China consists of a mixture of music from foreign countries, Chinese music 
from outside the Mainland, Mainland pop music, as well as local folk varieties. This diversity of music is 
captured through 52 items of music in the questionnaire. The music items are carefully selected and trialed, 
to ensure that topics of theoretical interest—such as potentially emerging forms of cultural capital, the 
various possible forms of historically consecrated music, and the use of refined music genres—can be better 
explored in this research. The list of genre and artists in this research tries to be specific to be able to 
differentiate these dimensions: artist/music from different nationalities, instrumental/songs, solo/bands, 
eras, styles, and level of recognizability—not recognizing an artist is equally telling in the analysis. Given that 
the survey consists of a long and specific list of music artists and genre, recalling measurements of listening 
would be difficult for respondents, further justifying asking about preferences rather than participation. This 
research also asks for the number of participations in live music events, as well as various socioeconomic 
variables including parental status, to allow for the analysis of the stratification of the cultural scene. To my 
awareness, no other comparable research cover as many music items. This decision to cover a larger number 
of items turns out to be a useful approach for researching cultural distinction, as it dissects music boundaries 
that were otherwise overlooked by other studies that examined only broad categories of music. 
The questionnaire design and trials 
The questionnaire was especially designed for this research. It consists of two main parts. The first part asks 
respondents to rate their preference toward music; the second part asks for their socioeconomic background. 
The structure of the questionnaire is modeled after similar research on cultural consumption in the West 
(e.g. Bennett et al., 2009), which asks respondents for their preference toward cultural items along with 
socioeconomic variables such as income, occupation, education, gender, and also parental background (see 
Robette and Roueff, 2014).  
The music items were chosen by widely selecting music items and testing them with respondents in China to 
narrow down the list. In the first step, online music stores and general media were surveyed to understand 
existing music types, categorization, terminology, and representative artists. An extensive list of potential 
genres, artists, and music types were first written down on a list. For example, a typical music app uses music 
categories such as hot songs, new songs, rising songs, Chinese songs, Euro-American, Japanese Korean, 
nostalgic classics, Internet hot songs, Billboard charts, night club dance songs, etc. The items were selected to 
ensure that every category is represented by an item or artist as much as possible. However, music apps 
primarily advertise popular music, catering to the young, and mostly those that are currently popular, so 
additional books and resources are surveyed to ensure other music items that are widely known in the 
population are also included. Items that fall in this category include many of the operas, folk singers popular 
in the older generation, and older artists (e.g. Red music). 
An important consideration for this questionnaire is that this would be asked to a random sample of the 
general population, which includes a spectrum of young and middle-aged, from various social backgrounds, 
with an uneven degree of music exposure. Care is taken to ensure population-wide awareness of the music 
and artists on the list is reasonable. I have balanced the difficulty of the questionnaire to avoid having too 
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many niche items that are too unrecognizable for certain population subgroups (such as the older and less 
privileged ones) to avoid excessive non-response from those groups, as respondents would hang up if they 
barely know the music items asked. Yet I also avoid making the questionnaire too easy—prime examples 
being existing surveys that only ask genres that are recognized by all respondents, which risk being not 
differentiating enough. The questionnaire needs to cover a diversity of music present in contemporary China, 
but the items should not be a list of only the most popular music or artists, otherwise it is unlikely to be 
broad enough to be used for social differentiation. The goal is to have representatives of a diverse set of 
music with varying degree of recognizability, but still be recognizable by the public overall. The questions are 
intended to be a survey on music items that are relatively recognizable to the population at large, rather than 
a challenging trivia on music knowledge. 
Figure 2-1. Music categorization in a typical app in China 
 
 
The early questionnaire with up to 119 music items was trialed by me in summer 2017 in China through face 
to face interviews. The feedbacks were used to improve the clarity of the questions, the selection of music and 
SES items asked, and to ensure there is no ambiguity which may be misunderstood by the respondents. The 
survey was tested with about 20 correspondents from various social groups in China, followed by an open-
ended discussion on the items. In the trials, I read them the survey as if conducting a telephone interview, 
but they were free to verbalize comments or suggestions. The qualitative feedback helped refine the wording 
and balance of the final questionnaire. I also asked them to provide names of any important artists or 
musical types they deem omitted. Most of those suggestions were either similar to existing artists on the list, 
such as another contemporary famous artist, or very specific “personal favorites” that were too niche to be 
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recognized when I asked them in subsequent trials. The list of items was progressively revised based on 
feedback, and narrowed down to the final list of 52 items. 
The trials also influenced several decisions in the final questionnaire. First, a decision was made to ask pop 
music primarily through the names of artists, because genres of pop-music tend to mean different things in 
different contexts. Examples of popular music genre were perceived as ambiguous were “lighter music / easy 
listening” or “Chinoiserie / Chinese-style” (zhongguo feng). Artists are more specific, with more consistency 
in the style. For similar reasons, genres relating to one’s emotional mood were too ambiguous to the 
respondents as they wonder which type of music is meant by the question. However, my attempt to reduce 
“ambiguity” later turned out to be an important method of distinction—Western musical was not included in 
the final list of 49 music because many in the trial were confused or misunderstood what it was. In 
retrospect, this would have been very useful to include as, unknown to me at the time, this perceived 
ambiguity is precisely part of the mechanism of cultural distinction. In the interviews, the HCCs were able to 
recognize “musicals” and could tell me about the famous works of Andrew Lloyd Webber, while the confusion 
from others would be picked up as a differentiating sign for the HCCs. 
A second decision was to ask non-pop music primarily through music types instead of artist names, because 
associated artists are too niche to be recognizable to the target respondent—a random sample from the 
population. The trial questionnaire tried to ask non-pop music using specific names of artists, such as 
specific performers of Western opera or Peking opera. That worked for a narrow niche of the most highly 
educated and culture-oriented respondents, but was too challenging for the general respondent—e.g. the 
“three tenors” in China who frequently perform in popular media and thought to straddle into popular 
culture received low recognition in the trials. A potential explanation is that those non-pop music forms 
represent a holistic musical style or movement that, unlike the culture of pop-music, do not iconize specific 
artists except within very niche circles. Asking artists of non-pop music would be suitable for differentiating 
within the upper strata of society, but for this survey that randomly samples the population it would be too 
difficult. If response rate is not a concern, and if I could the survey again with full hindsight, asking artist 
names for non-pop would have been highly differentiating. 
Third, a decision was made to not ask for preferences toward specific pieces of songs. The general population 
tends to recognize artists’ names (or melodies) much better than the names of specific songs. To ask specific 
names of songs would make the questionnaire much longer to read out, requiring more time to think, making 
it more like a trivia test which would further reduce response rates. 
The items were narrowed down to a more manageable list by eliminating items whose preferences correlate 
too much with each other, keeping a representative instead. This primarily applied to massively popular 
music artists, as preferences toward them are not strongly differentiating. This resulted in widely 
recognizable artists such as Jay Chou not making it to the final list. Other popular artists overlap with other 
artists on the final list such as Faye Wong, Eason Chan, and May Day. The narrowing down also applied to 
some genres as well. Musically, the styles of Revolutionary Opera (yangbanxi), Chinese folk singing 
(minzuchangfa), campus folk song (xiaoyuanminge), and Western musical are distinctly different to most 
people, but the responses toward those them highly correlate. Thus they were dropped to keep the interview 
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length under control. The consideration was to balance the music items represented based on the region of 
origin, the gender, age and era of the artist, and the diversity of styles. 
Another improvement was that the respondents interpreted “do not recognize” in different ways. More 
“humble” respondents were frequently selecting “do not recognize” when they believe they are not experts on 
the music item, while some respondents avoided selecting “do not recognize” even though they were only 
aware of the item nominally rather than auditorily. This led to the addition of an explanation that “do not 
recognize” means “not recognizing the item or unable to recall what that music sounds like.” This way the 
threshold for selecting “do not recognize” is kept more consistent for the respondents. 
The final 52 music items 
Fifty-two items of music are asked in 3 sections: responses toward pop music from certain regions, different 
artists, and various music types. No further subgrouping is done. The order of the items is designed for a 
natural flow and kept consistent for each respondent without randomization. Questions 1 to 5 ask about pop-
music by location. This is asked first to gather the respondent’s general impression of location, before 
prompting them with specific artists and music types, which may influence their impression. Question 6-33 
ask about specific artists. Questions 34 to 49 ask about music types. Unlike music in the West which is 
largely grouped by genre, genre is relevant mainly for imported Western music styles. This section includes 
Western genres, operas, and various categories of music that are not names of artists. Different local forms of 
opera are asked in question 48 depending on respondents’ city. Rather than introducing the music items 
here, they will be discussed in chapter 3 as part of the overview of the music landscape in China, after 
applying MIRT. 
The following table lists the music items in the questionnaire. The attributes on the right are not revealed to 
the respondents, but are provided to the reader to help understand the context of the music item. To 
reiterate, this research does not prescribe any existing music taxonomy and wants to avoid influencing the 
respondent, thus questionnaire does not pre-group the music items by genre, the region of origin, or pop 
versus non-pop.  
Table 2-1: Music items asked in the questionnaire 
Questionnaire Attributes (not revealed to 
respondents) 








M1 Western pop Non-China Pop 
M2 Japanese and Korean pop Non-China Pop 
M3 Cantopop HK Pop 
M4 Mandopop from HK and 
Taiwan  
HK-Taiwan  Pop 
M5 Mandopop from Mainland 
China 






M6 Teresa Teng Taiwan Pop 
M7 Jonathan Lee Taiwan Pop 
M8 Coco Lee *Taiwan Pop 
M9 May Day Taiwan Pop 
M10 Jolin Tsai Taiwan Pop 
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Questionnaire Attributes (not revealed to 
respondents) 
artists? M11 Alan Tam HK Pop 
M12 Ka Kui Wong HK Pop 
M13 Jacky Cheung HK Pop 
M14 Eason Chan HK Pop 
M15 G.E.M. *HK Pop 
M16 Liu Huan Mainland China Pop 
M17 Lu Han Mainland China Pop 
M18 Cui Jian Mainland China Pop 
M19 Faye Wong *HK Pop 
M20 Dao Lang Mainland China Pop 
M21 Chopstick Brothers Mainland China Pop 
M22 Phoenix Legend Mainland China Pop 
M23 Qu Wanting *Mainland China Pop 
M24 Li Yuchun Mainland China Pop 
M25 Yan Weiwen Mainland China Non-pop 
M26 Han Hong Mainland China Non-pop 
M27 Li Yundi Mainland China Non-pop 
M28 Wulantuya Mainland China Non-pop* 
M29 Mai Kuraki Non-China Pop 
M30 Psy Non-China Pop 
M31 Adele Non-China Pop 
M32 Justin Bieber Non-China Pop 







M34 Western Classical Non-China Non-pop 
M35 Western Opera Non-China Non-pop 
M36 Hiphop and Rap *Non-China Pop 
M37 Techno *Non-China Pop 
M38 R&B *Non-China Pop 
M39 Plaza Dance Music Mainland China Pop 
M40 Rock *Mixed Pop 
M41 Trendy Net Music Mainland China Pop 
M42 Red/Communist Music Mainland China Non-pop 
M43 Traditional Folk Songs Pre-modern China Non-pop 
M44 Traditional Guqin Instruments Pre-modern China Non-pop 
M45 Kunqu opera Pre-modern China Non-pop 
M46 Peking opera Pre-modern China Non-pop 







Bangzi opera (asked in BJ) 
Sichuan opera (asked in CD) 
Canton opera (asked in GZ) 
Shanghai opera (asked in SH) 
Pre-modern China Non-pop 
M49 Suzhou Pingtan Pre-modern China Non-pop 
The right two columns are not revealed to the respondent. They are provided here as context, but keep 
in mind that they are grossly simplified and there are many more dimensions to the items than can be 
listed in a table.  
*Categorization is imprecise and open to interpretation. 
The final questionnaire also has two important features in 1) avoiding the categorization of items, and 2) 
avoiding the randomization of item order. 
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(1)  No reliance on a priori music categories 
This research does not depend on any pre-existing music typology. This research is not trying to simplify or 
frame the music scene into a standardized music taxonomy from music producers, consumers, musicology, 
or any pre-existing definitions of highbrow or lowbrow. This research is not selecting certain music items to 
operationalize on some concept of music, or as a basis of forming a hypothesis on music typology to be tested 
or rejected, nor is it a statistical sample of music “in the population.” The 52 music items are more 
appropriately considered to be 52 separate items of a diverse list of music deemed appropriate to examine to 
determine whether they are deployed for social distinction. The 52 items are not selected with the aim of 
being a representative sample of all the music in China, nor are they meant to be the most popular music 
items in China—those are not the goal of this research. This is in line with other research on cultural 
stratification, in which the items are chosen using qualitative considerations to test diversified cultural items. 
Music items have layers of complexity which cannot be forced into any simple classification scheme. The 
geographical origin, the historical roots, the style or genre, traits of the specific artist, the era of the music, 
political and other contextualization of the music all have a role in the meanings attached to the music item. 
Respondents may also have a different conceptualization of music than cultural producers, music authorities, 
or academics. The research interest is in the pattern of stratification of taste. This research looks for patterns 
that relate to social hierarchy, which does not rely on any pre-defined standard of music categorization. 
In the questionnaire, the 52 items were asked one by one to the respondents without telling them any music 
categorization. Attempts have been made to see if music items can be asked in smaller sub-sections for easier 
survey execution, but ultimately it was not feasible to divide the items into any acceptable smaller 
subsections. There were always exceptions that did not fit any attempt to categorize, because groups are not 
mutually exclusive, and the boundaries are unclear. For example, the idea of a category for “the operas” 
would leave Western classical, Chinese instruments and pingtan stranded in an odd category that does not fit 
into “opera” or “pop.” A category for “traditional music” could include all the above, but “Communist music” 
and “Western musical2” would be orphaned. Forcing them into “traditional” would be contentious. Likewise, 
grouping by era, gender, style, location, pop or non-pop is also difficult and requires forcing ambivalent and 
fusion art forms into pigeonholes which the respondent may not agree with. In the end, the music items are 
not grouped by categories, and are only divided based on whether it is a location, an artist, or a music type. 
(2)  No randomization of item order 
The final 52 questions are simply asked in fixed order without randomization, with the knowledge that fixed 
order keeps the relative appeal of the music items the same for all respondents, but decreases comparability 
between music items. Randomization, on the other hand, prevents the popularity of music to be influenced 
 
2 Western musical was not included in the final list of 49 music. 
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by its relative position (Schuessler, 1948: 331). Because this research does not intend to measure absolute 
popularity, but cares about the relative taste of each item between social groups, fixed order is chosen so that 
taste on the same music item can be compared between social strata without the influence of randomization. 
The order of the items in the questionnaire is also designed to maximize the natural flow of the interview. 
The interviewer would ask “How much do you like these types of music?” then proceed to read out item 
names one by one without repeating the question, and only repeat the question twice at the beginning of the 
other 2 sections. The music items are also ordered to have a natural flow, for example, the list of artists 
proceeds from HK and Taiwan, to local, and to Western artists, and generally from older to newer artists for 
neighboring artists, giving the respondent a sense of progress in completing the questionnaire. Total 
randomization would disrupt the sense of progress, and leave the feeling that the items just go on-and-on. 
The order is also designed to minimize ambiguity for the typical respondent according to conventional 
understanding. For example, asking “Mainland Mandarin Pop” first might require the interviewer to clarify 
its meaning—the intent is to exclude Cantonese artists who are active in the Mainland. In the actual 
questionnaire, “Cantopop” and “Mandopop from HK-Taiwan” were asked first, so by the time “Mainland 
Mandarin Pop” is asked, it is naturally clear from the context that it refers to music not asked already. 
Questions are ordered so that respondents would be least likely to raise clarifying questions, and similarly, 
least likely to desire to go back to change an answer answered previously. The order of the 52 items was 
carefully designed and worked smoothly during the trails and the actual survey execution. 
 Survey execution 
The choice of urban megacities  
Although the gap between rural and urban is extremely large in China, existing research in China has already 
elaborated on the rural-urban differences. It is known that residents in the top tier cities in China enjoy 
various privileges compared to those in smaller cities, towns, and villages (Zhou et al., 1998). “Inter-city 
inequality make up a major portion of the overall inequality level” (Wang, 2008: 100). Studies have already 
established the large gaps between the urban and rural in education and cultural taste (Kipnis, 2013; Lei, 
2003; Li, 2014; Sato and Shi, 2007; Yu, 2014, 2014). Furthermore, the urban and rural are each bounded 
geographic entities, separated by “invisible walls”(KW Chan, 1994). Differences in the level of development, 
culture, and way of life, akin to different countries, are already well known. Reaffirming the existence of taste 
differences between the separate entities of urban and rural China would be unsurprising. 
Focusing on megacities has allowed this study to contribute that cultural distinction not only exists between 
the richest and poorest areas of China, but is also drawn within the richest and most developed areas in 
China. Urban cities in China are shared spaces where people from different backgrounds interact and where 
differentiations are instantiated. The richest and the politically most powerful in China reside in major cities 
(BBC News, 2016). Urban migration also concentrates in major cities (Cox, 2015), where migrant workers are 
marginalized from mainstream culture, unable to integrate into the life of urban residents (Xu and Xu, 
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2007). Migration and exchange concentrate in the megacities of China, where people from different social 
strata and backgrounds come into contact, where cultural stereotypes form and come into action. 
Megacities are prime locations to look into the effects of global culture because cosmopolitanism is found to 
have the strongest influence on the most economically developed societies (Norris and Inglehart, 2009). 
Urban cities are key nodes in the movement of money, people, and ideas in under globalization (Sassen, 
1991). Cities in China are found to be stratified in status, with the coastal megacities occupying the top of the 
hierarchy (Hanser, 2008: 141–143). Urban cities also give indications of the future of China as the country 
continues to develop and urbanize. The megacities chosen in this study are also among the most developed 
cities in China, with population and level of development comparable to countries in the EU, so they are 
important indications of the shape of cultural capital in the future of China.  
Figure 2-2. Urban population in Chinese cities in 2017 
 
Map from Guardian (Haas, 2017), with the cities selected in this study superimposed in black labels 
The number of cities selected is four—small enough for any significant regional differences to be visible 
within the 1048 sample, but large enough to go beyond a case study of a specific city to give an overall 
indication about urban megacities in China. The 4 cities selected for this study are Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Chengdu. The survey was conducted in all four cities to cover the main megacities, 
because covering multiple cities through telephone surveys incur minimal additional costs. The 
supplementary interviews were conducted in Beijing and Shanghai to focus on the most cosmopolitan cities. 
These cities represent the major cities in four geographical regions of China—North, East, South, and West, 
respectively. They are 4 of the 5 largest cities in China by urban population, with 22, 25, 21, 18 million people 
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respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012)3. The four selected cities are also cities receiving the largest 
number of urban migration, adding 6, 7, 3 and 3 million residents between 2000 and 2010 respectively 
(China Statistical Yearbook, 2015; Cox, 2015). They also among the most economically developed areas of 
China, with GDP per capita by PPP at $32,995 and $32,684 USD respectively in Beijing and Shanghai in 
2016 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016), for comparison, close to Slovenia and the Czech Republic 
at USD 32,215 and 33,529 respectively in 2016 (International Monetary Fund, 2017).  
The megacities in coastal regions of China are international cities of international trade and culture 
(Gaubatz, 2005). Beijing, historically known as Peking (e.g. Peking opera), has historically been the capital of 
China for much of recent history, and is currently regarded to be the political, educational and cultural center 
of China (Lee et al., 2013: 16). Early port cities of Shanghai and Guangzhou were the first cities in China 
exposed to foreign consumerism where the earliest urban middle and upper classes showcased consumerist 
distinction (MacPherson, 2013). Shanghai was perhaps the earliest cosmopolitan city in China in the early 
20th century, a city for expats and local immigrants, until the cease of commerce under Communism (Abbas, 
2000; Farrer, 2010; Shen, 2009). Shanghai is now regarded to be the center of economic and modernizing 
China (Lee et al., 2013: 16). Guangzhou, historically known as Canton, is the capital of Guangdong province, 
geographically near and shares a common Cantonese language with Hong Kong (Bruche-Schulz, 1997). 
Guangzhou is heavily influenced by the Hong Kong pop cultural scene though physical movements as well as 
receiving the broadcast of censored Hong Kong TV programs (JM Chan, 1994). Chengdu is less international 
but complements the other 3 cities as a leading megacity with a large urban population and an important 
transportation and communication hub in non-coastal, Western China (Lee et al., 2013: 16). 
Random digit dialing of mobile phones 
Due to the requirement in research design and the lack of existing data, random digit dialing (RDD) of 
mobile phones is chosen as it provides a relative high degree of representativeness under a reasonable cost. 
Response rates from telephone RDD have been falling but continue to be well suited for short surveys 
requiring higher quality than non-random web surveys (Keeter et al., 2006, 2006). Web surveys are cheaper, 
but the self-selected quota sample is less representative than RDD. Surveying participants from an event or 
members of an organization only allows for targeting a specific social group in a certain city, which would be 
insufficient for comparing taste between social groups. The research questions are better answered by 
sampling from the population despite a lower response rate, than to have a high response rate from a narrow 
membership group (such as distributing surveys in a class). With the emergence of new data sources from 
new technologies, research has argued for the use of non-probability samples such as unrepresentative web 
surveys (Couper, 2000, 2007; Lee, 2006) and transactional data (Adams and Bruckner, 2015; Beer, 2011). 
 
3 Chongqing has a slightly larger urban population than Chengdu, but with a much larger rural population, as 
Chongqing is much closer to a province in its size. For a rough comparison, the size of Chongqing is 82,000 
km2, larger than Scotland 80,000 km2.  
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Snowball interviews would be even less representative and unfit for analyzing the pattern of taste across the 
population. 
The target population in this study is the population in the four megacities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
and Chengdu. The sampling frame is the mobile phone users in those cities, which provides a low coverage 
error between the sampling frame and the target population. Data availability and reliability have been an 
issue in surveys in developing countries (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993). With the increasing availability of 
inexpensive mobile phones, mobile phone surveys have been used to obtain data in developing countries that 
were previously unavailable (Dabalen, 2016). China also has the advantage of having a higher penetration of 
mobile phones than fixed lines, with a mobile phone penetration rate of 94.5% which reaches over 100% in 
several regions (China Daily, 2015; Steeh, 2008: 222). Studies have found that mobile phone survey data do 
not differ from landline or face to face interviews (Ballivian et al., 2013; Garlick et al., 2016; Lynn and 
Kaminska, 2013). As this survey takes place in the most developed regions of China, if there is any issue with 
penetration rate it would actually be excessive rather than inadequate mobile phone penetration—that those 
with multiple phones have a higher chance of inclusion in the survey. However, the impact is deemed to be 
small relative to other errors and the effort needed to mitigate it (such as by asking how many local numbers 
one has and underweighting the sample accordingly). 
Mobile numbers in China can determine the registered location of the user, which makes stratified random 
dialing by city straightforward. Although it is possible for a user based in a city to use a phone number 
registered to a different city, this is deemed to be uncommon exceptions, as China requires registering mobile 
numbers by legal identification, and the benefit of using localized plans. At least, the user is very likely to 
have lived in those megacities cities for some time, even if they have kept the number after leaving the city. 
The benefit of an RDD survey of mobile phone numbers is that it produces a probability sample of the target 
population—everyone in the city with a mobile phone has a chance of being included in the survey. Overall, 
the RDD survey is cost-efficient for accessing the general population (Steeh, 2008). The drawback of RDD is 
that it is inefficient, as many numbers randomly dialed are non-assigned or non-working numbers. Also, 
smartphones have apps that can screen unknown numbers and mark numbers from survey agencies, and it is 
also easier to refuse over the phone (Lynn, 2008). 
A survey with 1048 valid samples was conducted via telephone using RDD (random digit dialing), through a 
survey agency specializing in CATI (Computer-assisted telephone interviewing). The self-funded RDD costs 
about CNY ¥60 per sample. The phone interviews were called from a telephone interviewing center that 
conducts surveys for governments, institutes, and businesses. Each interview took about 10 minutes on 
average. The telephone survey by RDD is a stratified probability sample, stratified by city, gender, and age 
group using census data (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). The questionnaire given to the research center 
has been trialed with test respondents in China to refine the wording, choices, and ensure there are no 
ambiguities. Prior to execution, I went through the questionnaire with the call center to ensure that the 
meaning, context, and purpose of each question is also clear to the interviewers. The survey was conducted 
from Nov to Dec 2016. 
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Response rate 
Table 2-2. Responses from RDD 
Reached a human 23,817 
Refusal and break off (R) 22,403 
Partial Interviews (P)* 0 
Not eligible 298 
Unknown Eligibility, non-interview (U) 68 
Complete Interviews (I)* 1,048 
*Only surveys with 100% completion are considered complete, so they are all grouped under R. 
Response rate calculations have been chaotic, making it difficult to make comparisons, or across time within 
the same country (Lynn et al., 2001: 1–2; Steeh, 2008: 230). Here I use AAPOR’s standard for RDD 
telephone surveys, as in the box below (American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2016). Of the 
total random numbers dialed, 23817 calls reached a human. Out of those, 22403 calls were refusal and 
break-offs (R)—either initially or during the interview, which was not differentiated because a survey of 
music preferences without education, for example, has no partial value. Partial interviews are considered 
refusal and break off (R). 298 calls reached non-eligible persons—those who are not in the target. A further 
68 under unknown eligibility (U) were calls involuntarily terminated due to connectivity. The final sample 
size is 1048. 





The response rate is calculated to be 4.5%, which is the same for RR1, RR2, RR3, and RR4. ‘e’ is the 
estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible. 0.5 is used for e, to account for persons 
being not in the required age group, foreigners, etc. 0.5 results in the same response rate for RR1 to RR4. 
Traditional survey methods are seeing increasing non-response rates in China (Li and Hao, 2004). The 
response rate is comparable to the 3.8% response rate of another RDD telephone interview in Beijing in 2011 
(a 10 minutes interview about non-communicable diseases) (Qi et al., 2013). The response rate is lower than 
the golden standards of well-funded large-scale surveys partly due to the requirement for 100% complete 
responses in the 10-minute interview to be an acceptable sample, and also the nature of low response rates in 
random digit dialing by phone. However, it is important to recognize that researches make the best use of 
available data while being prudent on the degree of the claim that can be supported by the data. Reliable data 
is generally difficult to obtain in developing countries such as China, as can be seen in related published 
research in China below (see Ward, 1993). While recognizing the limitation of the low response rate of this 
data, this data is valuable in providing the first representative (non-quota) survey dedicated to music taste in 
Chinese megacities and the first survey that covers such a large number of items of music in any country, to 
which I am aware. 
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According to Groves’ total survey error perspective, data quality consists of measurement quality which 
includes construct validity, measurement error, and processing error, and representation quality which 
consists of coverage error, sampling error, non-response error, and adjustment error (Groves, 2004; Groves 
and Lyberg, 2010). My innovative questionnaire design should have high measurement quality on music 
taste, and the representation quality benefits from a high coverage of the target population through the 
sampling frame of mobile phone users and a low sampling error from the representative sample through 
RDD. To emphasize, this probability sample is considered to be more reliable than quota samples which do 
not have a response rate or self-selected web samples. Data of various qualities have been used in different 
types of research. See the list below for some related research and their response rates. Unrepresentative 
samples, like quota samples, have also been used in cultural sociology published in reputable journals. With 
the rise of Internet research and big data, scholars have advocated pragmatic use of new data sources over 
insistence on representative samples (Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Burrows and Savage, 
2014; Hahl et al., 2018). As with any data source, it is more important to consider whether the claims can be 
supported by the data. The next sections analyze the characteristics of this data.  
Table 2-3. Response rates from other related researches 
Response rate Title Journal (Author Year) 
5.18% Art and Space: Creative 
infrastructure and cultural 





3.8% Case analysis of telephone 
interview application effect in 
Beijing  
 
Journal of Hygiene 
Research  
(Chinese journal) 
(Qi et al., 2013). 
Not reported The Uneven Distribution of 
Cultural Capital Book Reading 
in Urban China 
Modern China (Wang et al., 2006)  
 
None – non 
representative  
Occupation, Class, and Social 
Networks in Urban China 
Social Forces (Bian et al., 2005) 
None – non 
representative 
The social distinction in having 
domestic versus foreign 
favorite music artists 
Poetics (Meuleman and 
Lubbers, 2014) 
 
None – non 
representative 
A New Model of Social Class? 
Findings from the BBC's Great 
British Class Survey 
Experiment 




The data is a stratified random sample which is stratified by city, age, and gender of the target population 
according to the 2010 census data (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Those with higher levels of education 
are oversampled, which is part of the goal as this research needs to oversample the higher educated to 
examine the taste of people with different levels of education. 
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(1)  Stratified random sample 
The samples are allocated between cities proportionate to the urban population in the target age group in 
each city. The table below shows the census data of the population by city, first across China then narrowed 
down to the target population age 18-45 in the urban areas. The samples in this survey have been stratified 
accordingly based on the relative populations in the cities. 
Table 2-4. Comparing census data and sample (by city) 
  Across China Target Population: 
Urban, Age [18-45) 
Sample 
Beijing 19,612,368 28.30% 15,563,215 31.40% 346 33.00% 
Shanghai 23,019,196 33.20% 17,640,842 35.60% 352 33.60% 
Guangzhou 12,701,948 18.30% 9,687,032 19.60% 210 20.00% 
Chengdu 14,047,625 20.20% 6,610,341 13.40% 140 13.40% 
Target Cities 69,381,137 100.00% 49,501,430 100.00% 1048 100.00% 
All Cities 1,332,810,869 - 218,859,806 - - - 
 
The distribution of age in the sample is close to the distribution based on census data. The table below shows 
the census data of the population by age, first across China then narrowed down to the target population in 
the 4 urban cities.  
Table 2-5. Comparing census data and sample (by age) 
  Across China Target Population: 
4 Cities, Urban 
Sample 
[18,25) 194,005,261 30.60% 8,220,291 30.00% 293 28.00% 
[25,35) 198,152,055 31.20% 10,476,913 38.20% 406 38.70% 
[35,45) 242,779,923 38.20% 8,693,591 31.70% 349 33.30% 
Target Age 634,937,239 100.00% 27,390,795 100.00% 1,048 100.00% 
All Ages 1,332,810,869 - 49,501,430 - - - 
 
The sample is close to the census data but there are slightly more males in the sample because of the unequal 
gender distribution in China, as well as because males are more willing to give out personal demographics 
required for survey completion. The table below shows the census data of the population by gender, first 
across China then narrowed down to the target population age 18-45 in the 4 urban cities. 
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Table 2-6. Comparing census data and sample (by gender) 
  Across China Target Population: 
4 Cities, Urban within age 
[18-45) 
Sample 
Male 682,329,104 51.20% 14,176,560 51.80% 583 55.60% 
Female 650,481,765 48.80% 13,207,134 48.20% 465 44.40% 
All Genders 1,332,810,869 100.00% 27,383,695 100.00% 1,048 100.00% 
 
(2)  Treating education level as between-group design 
In this research, the level of education—a variable that best represents the level of cultural capital—is not 
stratified by population by design. This is to allow for between-group comparisons of music taste by the level 
of cultural capital—i.e. to test whether taste differs by education. Sampling strictly by population would have 
resulted in under-representation of those with high education, and over-representation of those with low 
leveler levels of education. This challenge is also encountered in other research on cultural taste.  It is not 
unusual for those in small subgroups to be oversampled to allow for a more reliable comparison between 
social groups (Bennett et al., 2009; Bourdieu, 1984). It is particularly true for research in cultural capital in a 
developing country because elites are underrepresented in traditional national surveys. 
To compare music taste by education subgroups requires a sufficient sample in each subgroup. An ideal 
experimental design would be to have equal numbers of respondents in each level of education, but this was 
not cost-effective due to the increased difficulty in reaching those with above bachelor’s degree and in 
soliciting participation from those with education middle school or below. The alternative is to oversample 
those with high levels of education to ensure they are recruited in sufficient numbers in the survey. In this 
research it was achieved naturally because those with lower levels of education are less likely to be engaged in 
music and participate in a survey on a topic they are unfamiliar with (Li, 2014; Yu, 2014). The sample 
recruited achieved the goal of recruiting more people with high levels of education than proportionate to the 
population. 
Table 2-7. Survey Sample by education groups 








Middle School or Below 31 9.00% 22 6.30% 13 6.20% 8 5.70% 
High School 63 18.20% 57 16.20% 42 20.00% 18 12.90% 
College 84 24.30% 102 29.00% 56 26.70% 46 32.90% 
Bachelor 127 36.70% 134 38.10% 79 37.60% 56 40.00% 
Above Bachelor 41 11.80% 37 10.50% 20 9.50% 12 8.60% 
Total 346 100.00% 352 100.00% 210 100.00% 140 100.00% 
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Census data on educational attainment with breakdowns by city and the specific age group is not publicly 
accessible. Thus there is no accurate measure to weight the data, to examine the extent that this differs from 
the population. Respondents' level of education will be used in ANOVA to test the between-group effects of 
education on taste. Aside from lacking data for weighting, the use of ANOVA means weighting is not helpful 
in this case, as the comparison is on whether tastes differ between educational subgroups. Weighting is 
commonly used under differential sampling probabilities to measure true values in the population, but this 
research does not aim to give accurate measurements such as the popularity of songs (see Henry, 2008: 91–
93). For the same reason, the order of music items is not randomized in the questionnaire because the 
interest is not in absolute music preferences but in the relative differences across strata.  
(3)  Examining potential bias 
Low response rate only leads to bias if the bias “is a multiplicative function of the nonresponse level and the 
nonrespondents’ distinctiveness” (Curtin et al., 2000: 414). This section examines the possible bias due to 
the perceived low response-rate of the underprivileged. Due to the lack of data on education at comparable 
levels of specificity, it is not possible to directly compare or weight the data to examine or ameliorate any 
potential bias. Therefore I test 6 different scenarios of potential bias to show that if bias were to exist, biased 
against finding associations between social position and taste—it is more likely to be understating cultural 
inequality. 
The first 2 scenarios consider the case when education has no interaction with music preference. Scenario 1 is 
that those who like highbrow music have higher non-response (regardless of education). Scenario 2 is that 
those who like lowbrow music have higher non-response (regardless of education). If “constructs of interest 
are not correlated with the likelihood of participation, then nonresponse would not distort results” (Reis and 
Judd, 2000: 243). Therefore, in both scenarios, examining differences in taste between education would not 
be biased. In these cases, the findings remain unbiased in the between-group analysis by education (scenario 
1 & 2 in the table below). 
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Table 2-8. Examining potential biases in the data 
Scenario 
Likes Highbrow  
Music 















1 Higher non- response - - No bias No bias 










































*Those with lower education has higher non-response rates 
**Preferences for highbrow is socially desirable, and those who like highbrow like to talk about it 
The research would potentially be biased if the result in if the cause of the non-response interacts with both 
education and taste, the risks of which are examined in scenarios 3 to 6. Scenario 3 is when those with high 
education and like highbrow music have higher non-response; scenario 4 is when those with high education 
and like lowbrow music have lower non-response. Neither of these is possible because we know from the 
result that non-response concentrates at low levels of education. Scenario 5 is when non-response is higher 
only for the lowly educated who also happens to like highbrow. This could potentially amplify the found 
association between higher education and highbrow, but this scenario is unlikely because, not only is this 
theoretically unexplainable, the interviews also support that anyone who like highbrow tend to be quite eager 
to talk about it. Finally, scenario 6 that non-response is higher only for the lowly educated who also happens 
to like lowbrow (embarrassment effect), which could potentially amplify the association between higher 
education and lowbrow, understating the level of inequality. This scenario can be stated more simply as – if 
those who are embarrassed about their tastes decline to be studied, it makes social distinction appear less 
severe than it is. While there is potential for inequality to be understated, interviews show that those with 
lower levels of education tend to be less interested in and are also less aware of the music hierarchy to be 
embarrassed, making disengagement the more probable explanation for non-response. 
Proposing the use of MIRT 
This research is intended to bridge the methodological divide between the two sides of the debate in cultural 
distinction by innovating in the survey design and analytical method. Innovation in survey design has been 
discussed in the previous section. This section introduces MIRT, which relies on rigorous quantitative 
approaches of mainstream quantitative sociology, but also uses it in ways that address Bourdieusian 
criticisms of the methods used in the cultural omnivores account. MIRT is a method traditionally used in 
psychology but is new to cultural sociology, which enables better analysis of the landscape of music 
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compared to traditional methods. This method unravels the underlying tastes that lead to differences in 
music preferences, which produces a categorization of music in China based on the similarity of tastes. This 
categorization is based on music preferences alone without regard to social status, and is uninfluenced by 
viewpoints of the researcher, in contrast to some researchers who take a normative position against certain 
art forms (Adorno and Simpson, 1941; Macdonald, 1953). This leads to the discovery of a pattern of Chinese 
music that shows the existence of social distinction and social lubrication. 
The advantages of MIRT 
This research uses Multidimensional Item Response Theory (MIRT), a latent profile analysis, to reveal the 
divisions and hierarchy of taste eluded by previous studies of taste under popular culture. This technique is 
commonly used in psychology, education, and clinical research, but to my knowledge, it has not been used in 
cultural sociology (Hays et al., 2000; Reise and Waller, 2009). Although the discipline of psychology engages 
with the mind and personality which appears unmeasurable, it has come to rely on quantitative techniques in 
its analysis, from which cultural sociologists can draw. MIRT is commonly used in psychology to determine 
underlying personality traits based on responses to personal attitude and preferences—hence the name 
“latent trait.” MIRT is a way of doing latent trait analysis that combines 2 methods: factor analysis, and Item 
Response Theory (IRT) which developed in psychometrics in the 1950s (Reckase, 2009: 63). In personality 
tests, respondents would be asked multiple questions on personal attitudes for MIRT to determine a smaller 
number of factors that explain the variations in attitudes and preferences. The derived factors of latent traits 
can then be analyzed within the widely accepted analysis of variance (ANOVA), commonly used in behavioral 
sciences. 
(1)  Requires no a priori assumption on music hierarchy 
Responding to relational researchers, MIRT retains advantages of MCA in that it makes no a priori 
assumption on the status of music, allowing for a determination of taste factors without assuming 
relationships. No a priori assumption is made about whether a music item is highbrow or lowbrow, unlike 
studies such as Peterson’s assumes that certain music such as classical is highbrow, which is the fundamental 
distinction that must be made in the analysis (Peterson and Kern, 1996). Furthermore, it is not possible to 
make such an assumption on which music is highbrow in China, and no such conceptual assumption is made 
in this research. As a special case of factor analysis, MIRT is also an interdependence technique which 
determines latent factors solely based on variations in music preferences alone, without relying on the 
sociodemographic variables. An interdependence technique does not have a dependent versus independent 
distinction, which contrasts from dependence technique where all variables are pre-specified to be 
dependent or independent (Hair et al., 2013: 98). The MIRT model finds the fundamental underlying tastes 
that give rise to the music preferences, without the assumption that certain music is highbrow, and without 
the use of sociodemographic variables. Sociodemographic variables are used afterward to test if those tastes 
are hierarchical and are not hidden in the assumption itself. 
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(2)  Follows statistical standards of mainstream quantitative research 
Other advantages of MCA are also achievable with MIRT, yet at the same time, MIRT relies on statistically 
robust methods that satisfy mainstream quantitative sociologists. The “cloud of individuals” that provides the 
coordinates of every individual is expressed through the latent taste scores for every individual on each 
derived music factor. The appeal of visualization is not inherent to MCA, as it can also be achieved by 
visualization of other techniques, including MIRT. The factor scores analyzed with ANOVA to see what 
proportion of the differences in taste among individuals is to due specific factors such as age or education. 
However, the advantage of MIRT and ANOVA over MCA is that it allows quantitative data, supported by 
representative sampling and statistical testing which are widely accepted in contemporary academia, to be 
robust and self-standing empirical evidence in themselves, not dependent on scholar’s interpretation. To 
address interpretivists’ concerns, this is not used as a simplistic proof of causality which “oversimplifies” 
complex social phenomenon into variables. Supplementary interviews are used to understand the context of 
those findings. But MIRT allows quantitative data to be examined for statistical reliability, in the same 
language and standards as mainstream quantitative research, whereas MCA remains largely a niche method 
in sociology. 
(3)  Finds underlying sources of preferences  
As a technique from psychometrics, it is also well suited to uncover the personal traits which give rise to 
objectified consumption. MIRT treats expressed preferences on music as the outcome of more fundamental 
underlying factors—called latent variables, which is more compatible with the Bourdieusian conception of 
embodied cultural capital in the habitus and expressed taste. MIRT uncovers the underlying dimensions of 
traits common across individuals that best explain the differences in objectified differences in taste, which is 
another quantitative tool to get deeper into the embodied cultural capital described by Bourdieu.  
The strongest theoretical benefit of MIRT is that it comes closer to uncovering embodied taste in the habitus 
than other quantitative methods. MIRT, rooted in psychometrics, is suited for examining taste as an 
internalized disposition. A common application of the method is in the psychological context, where scholars 
are interested in knowing how much a person possesses certain traits—such as reading ability or degree of 
extraversion—traits that cannot be measured directly, like height or weight. In personality tests, respondents’ 
response to a battery of projective tests is used to derive a small number of fundamental latent traits and the 
latent scores of each individual. This method can also be extended to research on embodied taste.  
In this research, I refer to the questionnaire responses as “preferences,” and use “tastes” to refer to the latent 
traits derived from the preferences. Unlike the straightforward measurement on cultural participation, e.g. 
how many times a month or how many hours a week, embodied taste reflects internalized dispositions which 
are hard to measure quantitatively. Asking for preferences toward music items brings us a step closer. 
However, in traditional approaches, preferences toward the limited items of music are directly analyzed. 
That approach resembles an analysis of, in Bourdieusian terminology, objectified tastes—as the preferences 
that respondents verbalized are directly analyzed, in and of itself, rather than used for its projective 
properties. In contrast, the latent trait approach treats music preferences as batteries of attitude questions 
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that are used to analyze the more fundamental latent traits. Instead of calculating based on responses on 
music, it focuses on underlying traits that give rise to surface preferences. In this approach, it is the latent 
traits—i.e. embodied tastes—that give rise to the preferences toward certain music items. This fundamentally 
shifts the research from analyzing why certain people like specific items such as “classical music,” to the 
more Bourdieusian question of why certain people have tastes for “legitimate music”—which enables them to 
appreciate “classical music” as a specific instance but extends to other legitimate music that might or might 
not be asked in the questionnaire. This notion of embodied taste treats taste for certain forms of art as a 
fundamental, enabling trait, that allows for appreciation of items. 
The technical merits of MIRT 
Due to the large number of music items, MIRT is also applied as a multivariate technique to reduce the 
complexity and highlight the patterns. Multivariate methods commonly used in the sociology of culture 
include MCA, cluster analysis, factor analysis, and latent class. The shared mathematical goal of these 
methods is to determine a smaller number of variables that can explain the dependencies between the 
manifest variables. In the sociology of culture, multivariate methods are frequently used to group the various 
forms of cultural items to a reduced set which accounts for most of the variations. Latent class analysis has 
also been used to group respondents into underlying classes based on their manifest cultural behavior or 
preferences (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2005, 2007b, 2007c). MCA which is preferred by Bourdieusian scholars 
is not a latent variable method, but is similarly in the goal of finding a smaller number of dimensions that 
encapsulate the variations in the variables. 
Examining the methods employed in previous studies reveals that there is a very practical consideration in 
the choice of method—the type of data available. MCA works on categorical data, which suits Bourdieu’s 
questionnaire in “Distinction” where responses are strictly categorical, such as selecting “three favorite types 
of films” from a list of 11 (Bourdieu, 1984: 515). The rationale also applies to many questions in “Culture 
Class Distinction,” a more recent study of cultural distinction which also uses MCA (Bennett et al., 2009). In 
Chan and Goldthorpe’s study, the questionnaire asked whether the respondent has attended 4 types of 
musical events in the past 12 months and whether they had listened to 4 types of music in the last 4 weeks. 
The binary responses make it unsuitable for methods that expect metrical variables (such as factor analysis), 
and with only 8 questions, has no need for further reduction. So rather than needlessly reduce 8 items into 
even smaller groups, Latent class analysis is used to groups the 6 thousand respondents into smaller groups. 
However, all those methods mentioned above have a common shortcoming in the difficulty of working with 
cultural data that has a substantial percentage of “unaware” missing responses. 
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(1)  Easily handles Likert scale data with a large number of “unaware” responses 
Figure 2-3. Summary of survey responses to 52 music items 
 
Ordered by decreasing percentages of highly-like, like and neutrals 
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A large repertoire of music items is needed to reveal the refined distinctions within music categories, and 
multivariate analysis is needed to reduce items into groups to aid the analysis. A variety of methods can 
produce smaller groups, but this data format makes creating subgroups more difficult than it may initially 
appear. Surveys on distinction have been confined to only the most well-known music types, partly because 
common techniques are unable to handle specific items that produce “unaware” missing responses. 
Therefore, research typically asks broad genres which are widely known, and quietly drops any remaining 
responses. This survey asks for preferences toward 52 items of music in the same Likert-scale format: highly-
like, like, neutral, dislike, highly-dislike, or the option of unaware—explained as not knowing the music item 
or not remembering what the music sounds like to be able to give an opinion. The option of unaware is highly 
necessary as this research asks for specific items of music, which unlike broad genres (e.g. “rock”), would not 
be understood by every respondent. The results are presented in the figure above, ordered from highest 
neutral-and-likes, to the highest unaware-and-dislikes. The percentage of “unaware” is as high as beyond 
50% of the responses, which pose a significant problem for traditional multivariate techniques. 
One option is to apply MCA by treating “unaware” as a categorical response along with the Likert scale 
responses from “highly-like” to “highly-dislike.” MCA works on categorical data, which is preconditioned on 
the assumption that the choices are discrete. Some questionnaire data, such as a choice of art forms, works 
well using MCA. The choices from highly dislike, to dislike, to neutral, to like, to highly like, have an 
underlying ordinal order which is the scale in preference. As multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) only 
handles categorical variables, conversion from the 6-level Likert scale (including unaware) into categorical 
variables incurs a loss of useful information. Flattening ordinal scales into the categorical scale treats them as 
independent responses and overlooking the relationship between them. For example, it ignores that highly-
likes and likes are neighboring responses, much closer than the difference between highly-likes and neutral. 
Although Adele (M31) and Phoenix Legend (M22) are polarizing music items, the dominant relationship 
between the two is the selection of neutral for both. Since neutral is to the most popular response across 
music items, it dominates the first axis in MCA, and the subsequent axes groups the other responses. 
Attempts at using MCA resulted in a degenerated solution which groups all the choices together. MCA is a 
method in the family of methods called geometric data analysis (GDA). As explained by Roose, “the input for 
GDA is best served with dichotomous variables. Likert-scale items tend to produce the so-called horseshoe-
effect or Guttman-effect, in which extreme answers (‘strongly agree’, strongly disagree’) are opposed to the 
neutral categories (‘neutral’, ‘somewhat agree’) – from a substantial point of view quite uninteresting” 
(Roose, 2016).  
An alternative is to treat the ordinal Likert scale data as numeric scales4, from which various methods such as 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) or principal component analysis (PCA) can be applied. However, treating 
“unheard” responses as missing presents a serious problem for traditional methods of analysis. Previous 
researches skip over the issue by dropping those cases in calculating preferences (e.g. Bennett et al., 2009: 
 
4 This is common in practice but still debated by statisticians, but that is a debate beyond the scope of this 
research. 
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79–80; Bryson, 1996: 889). That was possible because previous surveys asked about broad genres, to which 
unheard responses are rare, and they only asked for limited items of music which result in a manageable 
number of dropped cases. In this research, music items are designed to be specific—resulting in both higher 
frequency of unheard per music item, and to be more comprehensive—with 52 items that result in a high 
chance that unheard occurs in at least one item for each respondent. The challenge is that while at the item 
level, the unaware responses can be treated as missing values to be omitted from the analysis, across the 
music items at the level of respondents, there is rarely any respondent who has heard of everything. If the 
method is applied, there are almost no usable cases left for such an analysis. With only 155 respondents who 
have heard of all the music items and the mean number of unaware at 7.4 items, most cases must be dropped 
if factor analysis were to be used. The considerable number of missing responses prevents the use of common 
methods on continuous variables such as PCA or factor analysis. Conversion of the responses into a 
numerical scale for PCA or factor analysis is also unfeasible, due to the substantial number of “unaware” 
responses that must be treated as missing. 
MIRT has the power to determine latent traits without requiring all questions to be answered. The power of 
this comes from its power as a latent method that determines the underlying traits that account for 
differences in the responses, thus it does not require every question be answered. This capability is also 
employed in computer-adaptive standardized testing where test scores can be calculated even though test-
takers answer different questions, by accounting for the difficulty of the questions (Carlson and von Davier, 
2017). This allows the problem of unheard responses in this dataset to be overcome without the need to drop 
any case with unheard responses. 
(2)  Differentiates between relative levels of popularity 
MIRT, or more specifically the graded response model (GRM), not only properly treats the Likert scale as 
ordinal, but also differentiates between the scales in different music items, without assuming that an 
identical scale of responses between questions. In practical terms, MIRT recognizes that not all likes mean 
the same thing—liking an item that everyone likes is different from liking an item that others dislike—the 
latter reveals more information about the person. This means those responses are not assumed to be equally 
scaled not only overall but also between questions. .In factor analysis, differences in means and variances are 
unimportant as they are assumed to be removed through transformations, but MIRT takes them into account 
and is thus “a method for modeling the meaningful contributors to the interaction of people with test items” 
(Reckase, 2009: 71). An example where this advanced tool is employed is in standardized tests such as the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and Graduate Record Examination (GRE), where answering a hard question 
correctly means more than correctly answering an easy question (Carlson and von Davier, 2017). This 
advantage makes MIRT a more granular method compared to plain factor analysis and MCA. 
The graded response model (GRM) 
MIRT consists of a family of models, including the classic Rasch, 1 to 4 parameter logistic models (1-4PL), 
graded rating scale model (GRSM), generalized partial credit model (GPCM), and the nominal response 
model (NSM) (Reckase, 2009). The graded response model (GRM) is chosen for this research. The classic 
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Rasch and 1-4PL models from unidimensional IRT lack multidimensional capabilities, producing only a 
single factor of taste. The classic Rasch model has restricted slope, and its extensions the 1-4PL models, do 
not have the multidimensional aspect of factor analysis. As my 52 items have more than one dimension of 
latent taste, those models are not considered. Another consideration is that music preference in the data is 
ordinal (as opposed to binary), so only polytomous models are considered. 
Out of the multi-dimensional models, GRCM is the most restrictive as it assumes all category distances to be 
the same across items—i.e. the like response means the same thing for any music item, whereas GRM’s 
allowance for different slopes per response is more reasonable for this study. Liking a mainstream item along 
with everyone else may not be the same as liking a rarefied music item, which is accounted by GRM. More 
complex than the GRM is GPCM, which removes the order constraints beyond adjacent categories. GRM and 
GPCM outcomes are generally similar but GPCM is sometimes used to test the GRM assumption of order 
constraints (Templin and Henson, 2010). I have tested both models and determined that GPCM is redundant 
for the ordinal data on music taste. GRM is chosen as it is the most parsimonious model that recognizes 
differences between preference for each music item, and suitable for ordinal data. It estimates one slope and 
4 thresholds for each item (one for each boundary between the 5 choices) (Samejima, 1968). The unaware 
responses are marked as missing, or unanswered by the respondent, which is then estimated by the model. 
The most complex model is the nominal response model (NSM), which estimates the most variables as it 
treats the difference responses (of highly-like, like, etc.) as categorical and separately estimates each 
response. That model has been tasted by keeping the unaware responses in its own category to be modeled. 
The result indicates that “unaware” is an outlying score at the edge of “highly-dislike” for the vast majority of 
music items, indicating that “unaware” and “dislikes” are similar indications of distance whereas “likes” 
indicate closeness. In no case is “unaware” closer to “likes,” a result which is also intuitive. Aside from 
“unaware,” the remaining preference responses are clearly ordinal and does not make use of the power of 
NSM. There is no indication that the more cultural capital one has, the more likely that one has 
unpredictable extreme opinions on any item (nor the opposite that more cultural capital results in a higher 
likelihood of neutral opinions). GRM assumes that the choice is ordered, which contains/accumulates all 
previous choices as a latent trait increases. Since the power of NSM is redundant and result in overfitting, 
GRM is chosen.  
The software used for analysis is R, which is a software package as well as a programming language used for 
computational statistics. R is also a common tool for psychometric modeling (Rusch et al., 2013). The MIRT 
analysis is done using the MIRT package (Chalmers, 2012). More than 10 thousand lines of R script has been 
written for this research for exploration and hypothesis testing. As the scripts are exceedingly long, they are 
not included in the appendix, but coding has been a significant part of this research. 
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 Supplementary Interviews 
Finally, twenty-one interviews were conducted in Oct-Dec 2018 with individuals in Beijing and Shanghai. 
They were conducted during my academic exchange to Peking University during the 4th year of my Ph.D., an 
exchange primarily supported by funding from the LSE’s Academic Partnership Office. All the respondents 
were living in Beijing or Shanghai. Some are native to those cities but others came from a variety of cities, 
towns, or villages across China.  
The goals of supplementary interviews 
The semi-structured interviews are conducted after the initial analysis of quantitative data. The survey has 
revealed the key contours of distinction: a division between traditional highbrow forms and popular music, a 
division within popular music between foreign and local music (Chapter 4), and that differences in taste can 
be traced to parental and childhood privileges (Chapter 6). While those empirical findings can standalone, 
other questions on taste remain unanswered by the quantitative analysis.  
Firstly, whether and how the music boundaries are deployed for distinction? Stronger forms of the cultural 
omnivore account insist that anything but exclusionary consumption implies the lack of a Bourdieusian 
homology, and is interpreted to be boundary-crossing and cosmopolitan tolerance (Chan, 2019; Chan and 
Goldthorpe, 2007b). Their claims of tolerance are difficult to evaluate through quantitative research alone. 
Secondly, how did parental and childhood privileges contribute to taste in popular music? Existing accounts 
have discussed the role of institutionalization of high arts on legitimate culture, but the linkage between 
privilege and popular culture has been weak. Research that links privileged upbringing and taste has been 
rare in China. The interviews also hope to contribute to understanding the relationship between taste and 
upbringing. Therefore, supplementing my findings with qualitative interviews would improve the 
understanding of distinction in practice in China. 
Recruitment and interview setting 
To complement the findings from the random-sample survey, the qualitative component aims to have a 
sample of respondents who can elaborate on the findings on taste found in the quantitative survey. Since 
they tend to be the more privileged group, I expect to have more interviewees with higher levels of cultural 
capital, relative to their relative percentage in the population. I exclude professionals in music or theatre-
related industries. All the interviewees discuss music as leisure consumption from the personal perspective of 
a cultural consumer, not influenced by professional or insider judgment. Interviewees are recruited widely 
through direct and indirect contacts, and snowball recruitment with people who are willing to participate in 
research on people’s general music preferences—to discuss what they like and why they like them. All 
respondents are recruited without screening for their background. 
The interviews are conducted in public settings, typically in a nearby coffee shop. They average about 1 hour 
long but are up to about 2 hour. The profile of the interviewees is in the table below, with the names 
anonymized. While cultural capital as a complex accumulation of privileged experiences is not readily 
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quantifiable, a cultural capital score is calculated to allow for a rough comparison—based on educational 
attainment, parental party membership, hukou at birth, whether they were born and raised in Shanghai or 
Beijing (the most and the earliest affluent cities in China), and whether they received education in the West 
(a common aspiration in Chinese families). 
Table 2-9: Profiles of interviewed respondents  












1 Chenyue 34 F Beijing Master Yes Urban Yes Y CC7 
2 Xujing 44 F Shanghai Master Yes Urban Yes N CC6 
3 Yeqin 37 F Shanghai MBA No Urban Yes Y CC6 
4 Wenju 29 F Beijing Doctorate Yes Urban No Y CC6 
5 Yiyin 24 F Shanghai Master Yes Urban No Y CC6 
6 Dingjiao 28 F Beijing Master Yes Urban No Y CC6 
7 Xiaoshu 39 F Shanghai Bachelor Yes Urban Yes N CC5 
8 Changti 31 F Beijing Master Yes Urban No N CC5 
9 Ziguo 26 M Beijing Master Yes Urban No N CC5 
10 Dongkun 23 M Beijing Master Yes Urban No N CC5 
11 Moliu 23 F Beijing Master No Urban No Y CC5 
12 Wumu 43 F Beijing MBA No Urban No Y CC5 
13 Muyao 32 M Beijing Bachelor No Urban Yes N CC4 
14 Tianfan 35 M Beijing Doctorate No Urban No N CC4 
15 Donglu 31 F Beijing Bachelor Yes Urban No N CC4 
16 Baoshang 31 F Shanghai Master No Rural No N CC3 
17 Shiping 33 M Beijing Bachelor No Urban No N CC3 
18 Xiaojing 33 M Beijing Bachelor No Rural No N CC2 
19 Zili 28 F Shanghai College No Urban No N CC2 
20 Mining 23 F Shanghai College No Rural No N CC1 
21 Puchao 26 M Beijing College No Rural No N CC1 
Names have been anonymized 
*Cultural capital score is intended to provide a rough representation on the relative level of cultural 
capital, calculated from the sum of education (college=1, bachelors=2, masters or above =3), at least a 
party member parent (Yes=1), hukou at birth (Urban=1), BJ/SH native (born and raised in Beijing or 
Shanghai=1), and Western education (Yes = 1) 
Interview questions 
The interviews are conducted in a semi-structured format. They are asked to describe the music they like and 
why they like them. They are also asked to describe how they listen to music, the context and the 
environment. As these questions are initially quite open-ended, some respondents focus on the pop music 
collection in their phones, while others talk about attending musicals and operas. If they do not mention the 
social context of music consumption, I also remind them to discuss it, such as whether they listen with others 
and the reactions when they encounter other music. If they only focus on their likes, I also guide them to 
discuss what they do not like and why. 
By this point, most respondents have already spontaneously revealed either their boundaries or 
disengagement, without me having to raise questions that might be perceived as judging or put them in a 
position of defending their taste. The contrast between HCCs and LCCs becomes clear by now as it is what 
they have not said or what they are unable to articulate that draws the most contrast. Most HCCs 
spontaneously cover the main taste divisions found in my quantitative research: traditional highbrow and 
pop, foreign and local, music attendance and personal listening. HCCs also happily provide long analysis of 
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what they like and sophisticated critiques of what they dislike. In quite a few interviews, I have to guide the 
HCCs that I am more interested in their viewpoints, than in the detailed historical facts and analysis that 
they are providing on music. LCCs tend to talk about the most popular contemporary pop music primarily 
consumed through mobile apps, mentioning the foreign but the description is much briefer. I still encourage 
them to tell me more, but they do not offer the thick description and critiques anywhere comparable to the 
HCCs. 
At this point, I mentally sweep through my questions to prompt them to discuss any topic from my survey 
findings that they have not been spontaneously discussed: traditional highbrow and pop, foreign and local, 
music attendance and personal listening, as well as their dislikes. Then I proceed beyond their current 
consumption to ask when they first liked what they like, how have their preferences changed, and how have 
they grown to like what they like? These questions also draw strong contrasts between the HCCs and LCCs. 
Many HCCs elaborate on their stories of their childhood music lessons, extracurricular activities, media 
consumption habits, and philosophies about quality music—tracing the paths that led to a sophisticated 
knowledge about highbrow and selective listening of foreign music. LCCs tend to listen to music as temporal 
popular consumption rather than accumulated knowledge, and are vague about their trajectory of music 
preference. The background information of the respondents would also have been revealed by this point. For 
example, when they describe their childhood music lessons, I ask them about how their parents afforded it; 
when they describe of not learning any music in education, I ask them about the type of school attended. I 
also ask them about other questions of my interest, such as the language barrier in foreign music 
consumption—not just English songs but also the popular Japanese and Korean songs. 
 
Recordings are successfully taken in most of the interviews, which are analyzed to answer to those specific 
research questions—again the ones which are raised to supplement the findings from the quantitative survey 
with more depth from respondents’ experiences. The interview findings are consistent with the quantitative 
findings but provides more context. 
Discussion of potential bias and limitations 
In the interviews, I hope that more respondents with higher levels of cultural capital can be recruited, as the 
goals are to understand if and how they deploy their boundaries, and the accumulation of their tastes. People 
with high levels of cultural capital are the people who are harder to find in a representative survey. Yet I also 
wish to include people with lower levels of cultural capital to compare. As such, the interviews are not 
intended to be representative of the population, of which the survey result would be more qualified. 
However, are the HCCs and LCCs recruited typical of the HCCs and LCCs in the population? I have reasons 
to believe they are representative. 
Recruiting respondents for interviews on distinction is tricky because it is easy for the recruiting criteria 
(such as screening for class and taste) to reveal the research in a way that would bias the recruitment and 
lead the interviewees’ responses. In my interviews, an overarching rule is that all respondents are to be 
recruited without mentioning social background during the recruitment. Respondents should not have the 
impression they are screened by their status. However, through my discretion to choose from whom to 
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snowball recruit, I have some influence in my attempt to have more interviews with the HCCs and LCCs (The 
MCCs are the easiest to recruit, but it is the HCCs and LCCs that facilitate comparison). For all but 2 
interviews, I do not even pre-screen for the type of music they like. According to the survey, interest in 
traditional Chinese music is less common in young people. As I am interested in the role between education 
and interest in traditional Chinese music, I interviewed two Peking University students who are interested in 
traditional Chinese music. Those two interviewees are the only two whose music preferences are known 
before the interview.  
Those with lower levels of cultural capital are the hardest to come by. When I attempt to recruit from those 
expected to be of lower social status, despite my clarifications that this research is about “your music habits,” 
potential respondents often explain that they are not into music and have little to “contribute” to “music 
research.” A possible explanation is that they, aware of the hierarchy in taste, are hesitant to be interviewed 
by a researcher based in the prestigious Peking University, or a doctoral research student from the West. 
(While I do not advertise my privileged position in my message for recruitment, I explain my identity if 
asked, and had any potential interviewee asked my interlocutor about my background it would also be 
known.) While I cannot exclude the possibility my advantaged positionality might have an influence, the 
more likely explanation is that the LCCs are indeed less interested in music—which is the explanation they 
provide, and a disengagement which is also verified by other studies (Bennett et al., 2009; Bryson, 1997; 
Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b; Peterson, 1992). The response rate from LCCs is also lower from the telephone 
interviews which are called from the call center, thus the low response rate from the interviews cannot be 
totally due to the status of the interviewer. My study also finds that those with lower levels of cultural capital 
have higher “unaware” responses in my survey, which would make an hour-long interview on music an 
uninteresting experience for those with little interest in music. Thus, the interviews have not been able to 
recruit the lowest LCCs. By this recruitment design, I did not interview any respondent who represent the 
univores and slobs who are disengaged from music. The LCCs interviewed are still less enthusiastic about 
music, but everyone interviewed all have a certain level of interest in music.  
While the recruitment of HCCs and LCCs are not fully representative comparable quantitative sampling, for 
the reasons mentioned above, I do not think there is significant bias in the result. Through this recruitment 
which is blind to social background, people with a bachelor’s degree tend to like foreign music. Those with 
interest in traditional highbrow are slightly rarer, and they turn out to be those with more privileged youths 
with exposure at an early age. The mechanisms of taste formation and distinction across the interviewed 
HCCs are consistent—with some more snobbish and some more tolerant than others, but the distinction is 
evident. The interview findings are consistent with survey findings where they overlap, and the interviews 
gained more depth into the attitudes of interviewees who are interested in the various types of music. 
Another question is, would my privileged position have influenced the interview results? For the HCCs, it is 
possible that they could have emphasized aspects of music distinction believing that I, an interviewer from a 
privileged background, “would understand.” This, however, would exactly be how mechanisms of social 
exclusion function in society—using music for ingroup identification and to signal a shared high-status. I do 
not concur with any discussion relating to status. More personally, the high status of selective foreign music 
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and the low status of local music in the context of China are both vague to me prior to this project, as I did 
not grow up there. For the LCCs, the opposite effect might be possible—respondents being more hesitant to 
discuss the local music they love and the experiences of being discriminated (by someone privileged like me). 
Hence, an interviewer from their own background could improve the understanding of LCCs. My 
quantitative questionnaire surveyed over the phone addressed that to a certain extent, as the anonymous 
interviewers reveal a widespread disengagement of the LCCs toward the music that HCCs utilize for 
distinction. Thus, my findings on the contrast between the HCCs and LCCs, as well as the mechanisms of 
HCCs’ distinction, should not be hindered by my advantaged position. 
 Summary 
This chapter outlined the design of my research. Research on cultural consumption in the West is divided by 
a chasm in which quantitative research based on mainstream methods often points to the cultural eclecticism 
of the elites, while qualitative research and researches that use MCA often support Bourdieusian conceptions 
of cultural distinction. Furthermore, suitable data on cultural consumption is lacking in China. In response, 
this research innovates through survey design and analytical methods. This survey asked 53 items of music, 
which addresses the limitations of typical national surveys that lack specificity in items of cultural 
consumption. The combination of MIRT and ANOVA has the advantage no requiring no a priori assumption 
on the hierarchy, in line with statistical standards of mainstream quantitative social sciences, but also 
examines the factors that underly differences in taste. After quantitative data analysis, the research is 
complemented by interviews with individuals. The research design brings new data and a new angle into 
understanding cultural divisions in China that advances the debate on cultural capital—a finding that will be 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter 3. The landscape of music in China 
This chapter gives an overview of the music landscape in China from the sociological perspective of 
differences in music preferences between social groups. First, I will introduce the history of music hierarchy 
in China to show how legitimate music has been deeply rooted in ancient China, but various forms were 
consecrated as political power changed hands in more recent history. Second, I analyze the survey data to 
investigate what are the main divisions of music in contemporary China, based on the similarity of tastes. 
The results indicate that music in contemporary China shows a multi-layered division of traditional versus 
popular, with popular music further divided by the region of origin, often with high-status and mass forms. 
The six main types of music include traditional, selective foreign, trendy foreign, classics Hk/Taiwan, trendy 
Chinese, and local music.  
 Introduction 
The history of music hierarchy in China 
The music hierarchy in China is a topic that has mostly been discussed in music history but rarely from the 
sociological perspective. This section introduces the history of music hierarchy in China which connects the 
music with the status of their practitioners. This illustrates a music hierarchy whose cultural context differs 
from the West in its long history as well as the rise and fall of legitimate music which is not seen in the West. 
The historical context illustrates the complexity of music hierarchy and helps understand the sources of 
legitimacy before I investigate the contemporary music hierarchy in the next section. 
(1)  The ancient roots of legitimate music 
The division of culture into the high culture of the elites and the culture of the laypeople is deeply rooted in 
Confucianism. Around 500 BCE, Confucius believed that music should be used to civilize people to 
harmonize social orders as part of the Confucian ritual, as it can adjust temperament and regulate the 
behavior of the people. Confucius compiled the “Classic of Songs,” the “Record of Music” as part of “Record 
of Rituals,” as well as the now-lost “Classic of Music” (乐经)(Thrasher, 1981). Confucius distinguished music 
into the proper “elegant music” (雅乐) of moral individuals versus the vernacular music (俗乐) of the corrupt 
(Lau, 2008: 118), effectively legitimizing “elegant music” through education and state institutionalization 
against the illegitimate forms. Confucius’ “elegant music” was itself rooted in the institutionalized rituals of 
Zhou dynasty, as Confucius sees himself only as compilers and followers of the rituals of Zhou dynasty which 
started in 1046 BCE. Xunzi, a later Confucian philosopher, further emphasizes the political need for music 
education to oppose the influence of “obscene” folk music (Jin, 2011). 
The Zhou social order was already crumbling in Confucius’ times, but Confucianism was revived and 
institutionalized as state ideology under Emperor Wu whose reign started in 141 BCE during the Han 
dynasty. “Elegant music” was institutionalized as imperial high art to be played in royal courts and temples in 
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ancient China. It consists of a selection of ancient instruments, one of which is guqin the seven-stringed 
zither(Melvin and Cai, 2004: 54–55; Wong, 1991). Guqin in an ancient instrument existed since the fifteenth 
century BCE, highly venerated by the elites and culturally significant in Confucian morality (Lau, 2008: 122–
123). Matteo Ricci, an Italian Jesuit missionary to China, describes his encounter with “elegant music” in a 
Confucian ceremony in the 16th century Ming dynasty: 
The priests who composed the orchestra were vested in sumptuous garments, as if they 
were to attend a sacrifice, and after paying their respects to the Magistrate, they set to 
playing their various instruments; bronze bells, basin-shaped vessels, some made of 
stone, with skins over them like drums, stringed instruments like a lute, bone flutes and 
organs played by blowing into them with the mouth rather than with bellows. They had 
other instruments also shaped like animals, holding reeds in their teeth, through which 
air was forced from the empty interior(Ricci and Tregault, 1953: 336). 
Another wave of legitimate culture came as musical theatre emerged as the leisure entertainment of the 
noble elites – notably Kunqu opera (Melvin and Cai, 2004: 55). Originating in Kunshan near Shanghai in the 
14th century, Kunquis considered the most refined form of opera in China, incorporating ancient poetry, 
elaborate choreography, and abstracted minimalist forms. While “elegant music” continued to be the music 
of official ceremonies, Kunqu became increasingly patronized by the imperial literati as entertainment, 
eventually dominating high culture into the 18th century (Wong, 2009). This period in China was perhaps the 
closest parallel to Bourdieusian France in 1960s, where a refined literati culture erected a boundary between 
elites and laypeople. Matteo Ricci also offered an account of Kunqu as elite entertainment in the 16th century: 
These groups of actors are employed at all imposing banquets and when they are called 
they come prepared to enact any of the ordinary plays. The host at the banquet is usually 
presented with a volume of plays and he selects the one or several he may like. The 
guests, between eating and drinking, follow the plays with so much satisfaction that the 
banquet at times may last for ten hours, and as one play leads to another the dramatic 
performance may last as long again as did the banquet. The text of these plays is generally 
sung, and it rarely happens that anything is enunciated in an ordinary tone of voice (Ricci 
and Tregault, 1953: 55). 
Meanwhile, entertainment also spread to the lower strata. Kunqu opera, also known to be the “mother of 
hundreds of operas” (百戏之母), fostered the development of other more populist forms of opera that spread 
across China. An important distinction between Western opera and Chinese opera (also called Chinese xiqu5) 
 
5Note: While traditional Chinese drama and theater are commonly called “Chinese opera” in English, some 
Chinese scholars argue that they should be more properly referred to by the Mandarin term xiqu because it 
has no relation to the “opera” that originated in Europe. While there is some merit to that argument, many 
scholars still believe it is proper to continue to call it “Chinese opera” (see discussion in Stock, 2003: 4–7). In 
this paper I wish to point out the xiqu perspective but use the term “opera” neutrally, akin to “music”—the 
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is that Chinese opera is not a unified art form but is a category with hundreds of subtypes that have 
audiences across the highbrow-lowbrow spectrum (Mackerras, 1975; Tung and Mackerras, 1987). Chinese 
opera only exists in specific forms such as Peking opera, Kunqu opera, Huangmei opera, etc., often denoted 
by their local place of origin. There is not a generic “Chinese opera” that can be performed. This reflects the 
boundaries between the troupes, where tradition and structures such as the disciple system reinforce 
boundaries between the different types of the opera. Historically, each form of Chinese opera has a local 
influence, and no form of opera is popular across all of China—at least until the institutionalization of Peking 
opera as a national art. The more influential forms of opera tend to have a wider influence, while and less 
influential ones more local. More generally, traditional music in China was divided into hierarchies where a 
few types were high art for the literati, and countless others were everyday music of the peasants. The operas 
were generally considered higher status than quyi, which involve singing, storytelling, and instrument 
playing, but not the elaborate costumes, make-ups, onstage performances and acrobatics of the operas. The 
local forms of music were the traditional entertainment for the mass, whereas the influential forms are 
enjoyed by elites and have a higher status (Mackerras, 1975; Tung and Mackerras, 1987). 
The status of “elegant music” and Kunqu opera as legitimate music crumbled near the end of the Qing 
dynasty along with the fall of the Confucian order. Peking opera emerged in this period, which developed 
after opera troupes from Anhui came to Beijing 1790 to perform for the emperor in the courts (Mackerras, 
1975). Peking opera was rooted in Kunqu opera and absorbed some of its refined elements, but was the more 
popular form with percussive music, action-packed stories, and superstar performers and overtook Kunqu 
opera in popularity (Melvin and Cai, 2004: 24). Although Kunqu was more refined, it distanced from the 
general audience and was near the brink of extinction throughout the 20th century, whereas Peking opera 
gained influence near the end of the Qing dynasty (Goldman, 2012). The Republican government 
institutionalized Peking opera the national standard of Chinese high culture, renaming it the “National 
Opera” (Goldstein, 1999; Guy, 2005). Jingkun is a term that is sometimes used to refer to Peking (Beijing) 
opera and Kunqu opera because of their rated roots and related status as highbrow. 
Different types of music have been consecrated as legitimate music in different periods of Chinese history. 
Many of them continue to be relevant today, preserved as intangible cultural heritages that can be 
listened/watched in theaters today. This study has included guqin, Kunqu, Peking, Huangmei, Bangzi, 
Sichuan, Canton, Shanghai opera, as well as Suzhou pingtan which is a form of quyi, to examine their role in 
the music hierarchy today. 
(2)  The arrival of Western music and music under Mao Communism 
Although Western classical music is sometimes claimed to be a universal language that crosses cultural 
boundaries, the arrival of Western classical in Asia was a product of European imperialism. After the first 
 
specific art forms will be signified as “Chinese opera,” “Peking opera,” “Cantonese opera” etc., while the 
Western art form will always be signified as “Western opera.” 
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Concession in Shanghai was established by the British in 1845, the growing population of foreigners desired 
to have their own classical orchestra. The Shanghai Municipal Band Council funded a Band in 1879, which 
recruited professional players from Germany in 1906. The first military band was established in Beijing in 
1920 by a British customs officer. By 1920 the 23 thousand foreigners living in Shanghai were enough to 
support a full-time professional orchestra, leading to the development of the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra 
in 1922— “the best orchestra in the Far East” (Melvin and Cai, 2004: 25–26). The Chinese were not allowed 
to attend its concerts until 1925. Missionary schools have long been providing musical training in the 
Western canon, but formal pedagogical training started in 1927 with the establishment of the National Music 
Conservatory. This marked the beginning of Western classical as the music of the elite Chinese (Kraus, 1989). 
Traditional Confucian hierarchy sees scholar-officials as the noblest, followed by farmers, then merchants 
and entertainers at the bottom (though in reality the wealth of merchants made them quite powerful) 
(Thrasher, 1981). Institutionalization of Western classical music by the government as well as educators led it 
to become the prestigious music in Republican China, elevating musicians to prestigious cultural elites with 
recognized status, salary, and stable career as performers and teachers (Lau, 2008: 35–36). 
Western pop music first entered China in the early 20th century in Shanghai, leading to the rise of an early 
Mandarin popular music industry in Shanghai. The arrival of Western technology and cultural influences 
also brought recorded music into China and inspired the launch of a popular music industry that blossomed 
in Shanghai in the 1930s. Historically, Chinese popular music consisted of various traditional operas, quyi, 
and folk songs, which were live entertainments. The first music recorded in China was the recording of 
Peking opera in 1904 that marked the beginning of recorded music in China (Li, 2011). The Chinese popular 
music enjoyed by the early cosmopolitans in China were quite distinct from the traditional opera and folk. 
Popular music of the time faced criticism and resistance by the conservatives. The themes of romance and 
love in the songs were considered harmful to society and lowly regarded to as “pornographic” (Jones, 2001; 
Lau, 2008: 106).  
The Chinese Communists, rooted in the philosophy of Marxist-Leninism from the Soviet Union, took over 
Mainland China in 1949. Initially, the nationalization of previously commercial music troupes brought 
funding and stability to the arts, distancing them from commercial dependence—an institutionalization 
which elevated the social status of the arts (Latham, 2007: 305; Mackerras, 1975). But as the political climate 
changed, the “feudal” elements of traditional opera were increasingly seen as bourgeois, incompatible with 
Communist efforts to eliminate class. All forms of cultural production were required to praise the Party and 
expose the enemies (King, 2013: 24). Music and entertainment were tightly regulated, as the CPC (Chinese 
Party of China) saw a need to have a grip on culture to serve political needs. A guiding principle on arts under 
Communist China is Mao’s “Talks at the Yen’an Forum on Literature and Art,” where he claims, “There is in 
fact no such thing as art for art’s sake, art that stands above classes or art that is detached from or 
independent of politics.” (Mackerras, 1973: 479). The Party viewed popular culture and foreign media as 
hostile, which ended all forms of music consumption except the political revolutionary music, known as Red 
music—the only music for a generation of Chinese (Ho and Law, 2012: 403). Cultural productions, which 
included music, film, books, and media, must praise the party and expose the enemies (King, 2013: 24). 
Traditional opera was “reformed” as revolutionary opera to fit the Communist ideology (Mittler, 2010). 
Distinction in China—the rise of taste in cultural consumption   
 59 
Revolutionary and patriotic Communist music, known as Red music, were legitimized as the official standard 
(Ho and Law, 2012: 403). It was the music for a generation as it was the only music during radical 
Communist periods. At the apex of the cultural revolution, many artists of traditional art were humiliated, 
tortured, and died along with the purge of old elites, interrupting the lineage of what later became 
consecrated as the intangible cultural heritage. Meanwhile, the center of Chinese popular music moved to 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, which in turn, influenced China again after Reform and Opening (Lau, 2008). 
(3)  The competition between Western and Chinese legitimate music 
The radical period ended after Reform and Opening, which saw the marketization of economy and the 
reopening of China to the world after the death of Mao in 1976. The government has been more relaxed about 
apolitical music as entertainment, yet maintained censorship as to control what can be consumed.  
While Communist music remains the proper standard in formal government, party, and military celebrations 
(Hung, 1996; Kraus, 2004), the global standard of high art has been gaining acceptance in China. The rise of 
the middle-class and the increase in inequality led to the adoption of Western classical in affluent families as 
symbols of the educated and the modernized (Melvin and Cai, 2004), exemplified by the prevalence of piano 
in middle-class families (Kraus, 1989). The government has allocated funding for an increasing number of 
professional Western symphony orchestras, which has now reached 82 in China (Halls, 2019). The increased 
influence of Western classical can be seen in its rising popularity and the younger audience in China 
compared to the West (ibid). Yet Western classical carries an adherent cultural inequality. Despite the 
growth of prominent Asian musicians, they have received relatively little attention in the West, still seen to 
be reproducers of a Western bourgeois canon (Yang, 2007).  
Meanwhile, the various forms of Chinese opera have been resurrected. However, interruption of lineage and 
the rising competition of Western classical, popular music, films, TV, gaming, and Internet activities caused 
them to be losing the young audience, particularly those in coastal Westernized regions (Ho, 2016b: 159). 
The government has increased efforts to protect and consecrate Chinese traditional music as cultural 
heritage in recent years, giving them higher legitimacy than before. Kunqu opera is an example of the re-
institutionalization of traditional culture in recent Chinese history. By the end of the Qing dynasty, Kunqu 
troupes have dwindled and the lineage in the art decayed. For many years, performers disbanded and sought 
other work as there was no audience for the art. The Kunqu revival came in 2001 when it was declared an 
Oral and Intangible Heritage by UNESCO, leading to increased public interest and increased funding, such as 
those from Ministry of culture and Finance, which poured into troupes and performances, museums, 
research centers, and educations in universities, allowing it to regain a high-status in many of the educated 
youths (Keane, 2013: 140–143). Commercial enterprises have also started to promote traditional culture as 
high-end social entertainment for the rich (Liao, 2012). Peking opera was in a better position due to its 
popularity and institutionalization as national opera during the more recent Republican China, promoted by 
China’s Ministry of Education and TV stations (Ho, 2016a). It too was declared an Intangible Cultural 
Heritage in 2010, after which received renewed interest by the educated young elite in theatres (Zhou, 2009), 
a sign that it is regaining its value as cultural capital among the newer generation. 
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The revival of specific highbrow forms of opera also leads to the increasing stratification of opera more 
broadly. With massive support from the government, most prominent forms of traditional opera such as 
Peking opera and Kunqu were becoming gentrified. Government subsidies allow them to perform in 
grandiose halls in China, travel overseas to perform to Western audiences, while less prestigious regional 
forms of operas are losing audiences, relying on rural festivals and countryside performances to support 
themselves (Latham, 2007: 309–310). 
(4)  The penetration of foreign music in China 
Since Reform and Opening, cultural influences from abroad have penetrated China. First was the culture 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan that first influenced mainland China, which was “a hybridized but distinctly 
Chinese culture” that “represents their accommodation of Western influence” (JM Chan, 1994: 84). People 
brought pirated cassette tapes and later CDs into China, which copied and spread. The government 
continued to promote Chinese operatic singing of traditional hymns with a political, patriotic theme (Fung, 
2013), but popular music culture already started to captivate the public. China came under the influence of 
outside culture again, first those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, then Western culture from farther abroad. 
Records and various forms of media were smuggled from Hong Kong; Cantonese media from Hong Kong 
became influential particularly in Guangdong province (JM Chan, 1994). Imported entertainment in China 
had always privileged access to the economically privileged. In 1983, the 20-episode TV drama about a 
patriotic martial artist, “The Legendary Fok (霍元甲),” was the first TV series to be imported from Hong 
Kong, which became hugely popular across at a time when less than 5% of the Chinese owned a TV (Lee et 
al., 2013: 43).  
Cultural imports from America, Europe, and Japan, through both legal as well as informal channels, have 
also been highly influential. Music in China is not just listened but also sang in the KTV, popular leisure in 
China. Lately, popular music in China has been penetrated by music from outside of Mainland China, 
particularly music from Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also Japan, Korea, and Euro-America. A representative 
survey in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Xian in 2006-2007 found that 11% of people’s overall media 
consumption was non-local (Lee et al., 2013). More recently is the Korean wave (韩流) which touched many 
fans in China (Jang and Paik, 2012; Shim, 2006). Sophisticated Internet users are able to cross the Great 
firewall to reach blocked foreign websites, and have collaborated to allow pirated foreign entertainments to 
be downloaded in China almost immediately after the release abroad (Gao, 2018; Gilardi et al., 2018; Liu and 
de Seta, 2014; Meng, 2012). A survey in 12 Beijing secondary schools in urban Beijing in 2012 found that 
Mainland pop songs are the most popular, followed by UK/US, other Western countries, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Japan, Cantopop, and other Asian pop (Ho, 2016b: 152). More recently in 2018, “Informal industry 
estimates suggest Chinese-language music accounts for around 80 percent of the market and K-Pop and J-
Pop for 10 percent, with the remaining 10 percent going to international repertoire” (IFPI, 2018). 
Relative to the size the Chinese economy, Chinese music sales pale in comparison to the West. The top three 
music markets in the world are the US, Japan, and Germany, with sales of $5.9, $2.7, and $1.3 billion USD in 
2017. China only managed to be the 10th, with sales of $292 million(IFPI, 2018). According to an industry 
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expert I interviewed during my background research, due to the prevalence of privacy, ticket sales from live 
concerts to affluent consumers is an important source of profit compared to music sales, as well as stars 
serving as spokespersons in advertising other products (Fung, 2007a). Aside from attending live concerts for 
the few urbanites, overall music consumption in China is primarily through Internet streaming. Until the last 
few years, music streaming in China has been primarily free and primarily supported by advertisement, 
whose revenue was insufficient to support the business model (Tang and Lyons, 2016: 360). This contrasts 
with countries in the West where revenue comes from subscriptions.  
The questions on music divisions in China 
This research takes on a sociological perspective to first look at the divisions in Chinese music based on 
preferences of social actors. Musicians, musicologists, historians, and music fans have different angles of 
describing and classifying music in China—such as by era, style, movements, etc. An influential 
categorization in China today has its root from the 1960s, when musicologists under the Central 
Conservatory classified music in China as new or traditional, whereby traditional consists of literati, 
religious, folk, and court. Historians of popular music in China divides by era, such as based on the 
Shanghai-centered era 1920-70s, post-reform PRC era 1979-1990s, and 21st century (Groenewegen, 2011: 
55–56). The main music apps in China also organize by region/language, era, plus mood or emotional 
descriptions. Most of the popular music in China in this study, aside from Western pop, would fall into the 
“world music” category based on the Grammy classification above.  
In the West, genre has been a common way to discuss and group music. However, the categories of music 
found are not genres, as genre is primarily relevant to popular music from the West. This is relatively under-
discussed in current research, as even researches in China by Western scholars have used a genre-centric 
perspective to navigate China’s music landscape, looking into various music subcultures (de Kloet, 2010). 
While there is no denying that such music subcultures exist, and can be used to distinguish fan ingroups 
from outgroups, those subcultures are far from mainstream compared to Mandopop, especially those by 
Hong Kong and Taiwan artists, which today dominates the popular music scene and is difficult to force into a 
genre-framework (Moskowitz, 2010a, 2010b). However, genre is less important in Chinese music compared 
to Western music. Most of the Grammy Awards, a prominent music award in the US, are awarded by genre, 
such as dance/electronic, rock, alternative, R&B, rap, country, new age, jazz, gospel, Latin, American roots 
(e.g. bluegrass, folk), reggae, musical, and world music in 2019 (The Recording Academy, 2019), whereas 
Taiwan’s Golden Melody Award is awarded by profession (vocal/instrumental/technical), language and 
gender (Groenewegen, 2011: 53–56). 
Given the penetration of global music in China, with the influx of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and foreign pop 
culture along with the spread of Western legitimate music, what are the main divisions of music in China? 
This will be evaluated using MIRT in the next section. Secondly, in the midst of competition between the 
various forms of music, is music in China stratified? This will be discussed with the homology versus cultural 
omnivore debate outlined in the introductory chapter. 
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 Key music divisions in China—traditional vs pop, and region of origin 
This section uses survey data to examine the main divisions of music in contemporary China, to argue that 
the region of origin is a main division of music in China. The music categories are determined based on the 
similarity of taste among the respondents. Details on the MIRT modeling were discussed in chapter 2. 
MIRT derived 6 music factors based on music preferences of the sampled population, which means that 
these 6 dimensions best represent the differences in taste of the people across the music items. The 6 
categories are traditional, selective foreign, trendy foreign, classics Hk/Taiwan, trendy Chinese, and local 
music. The overall finding in this section is that contemporary Chinese music is firstly divided into a 
traditional versus pop. Popular music is further divided based on the region of origin—foreign, HK-Taiwan, 
and local. Furthermore, internal hierarchies exist within them that separates high-status and mass variants, 
which I explain below. 
Interpreting MIRT results 
In this research, respondents provided their preferences toward a diversity of music items. In traditional 
methods, the responses to music are directly treated as the object of analysis in itself—the likes, dislikes, and 
participation are directly disseminated for patterns. In the latent variables approach, the object of analysis 
shifts from the music responses to the individuals’ tastes. Music responses are treated as observable 
indicators of unobservable, internalized music taste. Preferences for Adele and preferences for Bieber are not 
studied as 2 separate likes or dislikes but would be treated as indicators of something more fundamental—an 
aptitude for foreign music. Each trait can thus be seen as internalized dispositions for or against certain 
styles of music. Latent methods calculate based on underlying similarities rather than observed similarities 
(Hair et al., 2013: 103). Latent methods determine the fundamental traits that give rise to people’s 
differences in attitudes toward different music items.  
MIRT came from two roots—item response theory (IRT) which has a root in psychometrics, and exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) which enable the determination of multiple factors. MIRT extends IRT to have 
multiple, in this case, 6 latent traits—which are the music latent taste factors. Because of the dual roots of the 
method, some concepts have dual names, for example, each factor derived is also a latent trait. The 
derivation is mathematical, but the process can be intuitively understood. Tastes for some music items (such 
as Peking and Kunqu opera) are likely similar, so a latent trait such as a “taste for traditional music” could 
possibly be found as the fundamental latent taste that underlies the overall preferences for the operas. MIRT 
also accounts for opposites, such as a dislike of young idols might indicate a taste for traditional music—in 
this case, the music item would load negatively on the latent taste factor. While the preferences for each 
individual item may vary for a variety of individual reasons, the underlying “taste for traditional music” is a 
more reliable measure because it is a composite measure determined from responses to multiple music 
items. If one likes Jackie Cheung, Alan Tam, Eason Chan, etc., the person likely has a “taste for Cantopop,” 
even if one personally dislikes KK Wong for some reason. 
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MIRT produces 2 main outputs. First, it determines the factor loadings—the degree that each music loads 
on each taste factor. The music items that load highly on a trait are the items that reveal more information 
about the trait – e.g. one’s taste for traditional music is indicated more so by Peking opera than Red music, 
therefore Peking opera has a higher loading on the factor for traditional music. MIRT looks at all the 
responses to determine the 6 music factors. It must be emphasized that the factors are not determined by 
grouping music items based on the similarity of responses, as the approach in MCA. Instead of grouping at 
the level of music items, MIRT looks a level deeper at the level of latent traits that form music preferences. It 
determines the underlying traits in individuals that best explains people’s preferences across the music 
items. The latent traits can be thought of as a better representation of the embodied music tastes behind the 
displayed attitudes on music preferences.  
Secondly, MIRT also calculates a latent taste score for each trait of each person—such as a score for the 
latent taste for traditional music, selective foreign music, etc. The factor scores indicate one’s disposition—
how much one has a taste for each type of music. Differences in the factor scores among socioeconomic 
subgroups will be to understand the music hierarchy in the next chapter.  
The six music factors 
Minimum AICc and BIC criteria suggest that six factors are sufficient in modeling the music pattern of the 52 
items of music. SABIC, AIC, and log-likelihood suggest additional factors. The selection of the number of 
factors in models does not have a clear-cut guideline. There are multiple criteria which may not be consistent 
with each other, and different researchers give different advice on the number of factors. Reckase compared 
different methods and concludes that there is no correct answer because technically to totally model all the 
relationships in the data “require as many dimensions as test items” (Reckase, 2009: 202). In this research, 6 
factors are chosen supported by minimum AICc, BIC, and SABIC criteria. 
Table 3-1. Factor determination 
Number of factors AIC AICc BIC SABIC Log 
likelihood 
1 109184.2 109334.5 110398.1 109620.0 -54347.12 
2 107529.4 107757.9 108981.1 108050.5 -53471.70 
3 105900.2 106228.2 107584.8 106504.9 -52610.11 
4 104779.9 105231.9 106692.4 105466.4 -52003.96 
5 104196.9 104801.4 106332.3 104963.4 -51667.44 
6 103852.7 104643.3 106206.2 104697.5 -51451.36 
7 103705.7 104722.2 106272.2 104627.0 -51334.87 
8 103633.3 104923.5 106407.9 104629.3 -51256.66 
The chosen 6-factor solution has been highlighted 
The model determined the loadings of each music item onto each of the 6 factors. The GRM result is 
determined using the quasi-Monte Carlo Expectation-Maximization algorithm (QMCEM), as suggested 
because the number of selected factors is greater than 3 (Chalmers, 2012). The matrix was rotated with 
orthogonal varimax rotation, meaning the resultant 6 factors are not correlated. Following general 
convention, the factors are then rotated with varimax rotation to make the results easier to interpret. As a 
result, most music items load heavily on only one factor.  
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A note that, while the 6-factor solution is not the only possible solution, the 6 factors of taste succeed in 
outlining the main contours of Chinese music, as will be further demonstrated in the subsequent sections. 
For comparison, the 5-factor solution disbands trendy Chinese music (a relatively insignificant factor in 
relation to social hierarchy) into other factors, and the 7 factors solution further separates classics 
Hk/Taiwan music into Hong Kong Cantopop and Taiwan Mandopop. Neither case would change the key 
arguments of this research. The loadings on the 6 factors are shown in the table below. 
Table 3-2. The loading of each music item on the factors 


















M01.PopWest 0.18 0.42 0.28 0.15 0.14 -0.14 0.35 
M02.PopJK 0.16 0.28 0.25 -0.19 0.39 -0.04 0.36 
M03.PopCanto 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.50 0.29 -0.06 0.37 
M04.PopHkTw 0.14 -0.04 0.05 0.44 0.48 0.07 0.45 
M05.PopMainland 0.07 -0.20 -0.01 0.28 0.66 0.18 0.59 
M06.TeresaT 0.23 0.16 -0.14 0.37 0.14 0.38 0.40 
M07.JonLee 0.19 0.21 0.02 0.48 -0.04 0.24 0.37 
M08.CocoLee 0.13 0.39 0.12 0.14 0.28 0.29 0.37 
M09.MayDay 0.04 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.48 0.00 0.34 
M10.JolinT 0.00 0.29 0.20 0.05 0.48 0.21 0.41 
M11.AlanT 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.57 0.09 0.29 0.44 
M12.KKWong 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.69 0.01 0.11 0.51 
M13.JackyC 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.72 0.05 0.22 0.60 
M14.EasonC 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.45 0.37 -0.12 0.43 
M15.GEM 0.03 0.32 0.15 -0.00 0.42 0.18 0.33 
M16.LiuH 0.33 0.13 -0.10 0.21 0.04 0.62 0.56 
M17.LuH 0.13 0.12 0.19 -0.28 0.48 0.23 0.43 
M18.CuiJ 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.35 -0.16 0.41 0.46 
M19.FayeW 0.11 0.36 -0.03 0.35 0.06 0.26 0.34 
M20.DaoL 0.10 -0.08 0.15 0.21 -0.03 0.71 0.59 
M21.Chopstick 0.05 -0.02 0.32 0.16 0.23 0.54 0.47 
M22.Phoenix 0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.16 0.78 0.66 
M23.QuWt 0.05 0.36 0.22 0.13 0.26 0.34 0.37 
M24.LiYc 0.16 0.26 0.16 -0.17 0.36 0.38 0.43 
M25.YanWw 0.42 0.10 -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.59 0.55 
M26.Hanh 0.26 0.21 -0.13 0.21 0.06 0.64 0.59 
M27.LiYd 0.31 0.49 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.31 0.47 
M28.Wlty 0.18 0.29 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.70 0.61 
M29.MaiKuraki 0.25 0.56 0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.28 0.47 
M30.Psy 0.04 0.27 0.43 -0.04 0.22 0.23 0.36 
M31.Adele 0.22 0.59 0.16 0.18 -0.13 -0.02 0.48 
M32.Bieber 0.09 0.43 0.40 -0.01 0.14 0.05 0.37 
M33.Gaga 0.00 0.36 0.46 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.37 
M34.ClassicalWest 0.53 0.41 0.09 0.17 -0.06 -0.02 0.49 
M35.OperaWest 0.62 0.34 0.08 0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.51 
M36.Hiphop 0.16 0.19 0.64 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.52 
M37.Techno 0.10 0.08 0.63 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.43 
M38.RnB 0.32 0.46 0.34 0.19 -0.05 -0.10 0.48 
M39.PlazaDance 0.25 -0.04 0.21 -0.08 0.24 0.53 0.45 
M40.Rock 0.13 0.02 0.63 0.26 0.05 0.12 0.50 
M41.NetMusic 0.01 -0.23 0.29 -0.04 0.41 0.47 0.52 
M42.Red 0.52 -0.08 -0.01 0.11 0.04 0.52 0.56 
M43.Folk 0.58 -0.09 -0.09 0.18 0.05 0.47 0.62 
M44.TraditCn 0.62 0.18 -0.05 0.18 -0.04 0.26 0.52 
M45.OperaKun 0.78 0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.16 0.66 
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M46.OperaPek 0.85 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.76 
M47.OperaHM 0.76 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.64 
M48.OperaLocal 0.71 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.54 
M49.Pingtan 0.77 0.13 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.66 
PVE 12.0% 6.8% 5.8% 6.9% 5.6% 11.5% - 
The highest loading factor of each music item is highlighted. 
The music factors are named based on the music items that contribute most heavily to the factors. Factor 1 is 
labeled traditional music because it includes both Chinese and Western music items that have a long history. 
There are 2 factors related to foreign music. For reasons that will become apparent later, they are labeled as 
selective foreign (factor 2) and trendy foreign (factor 3) because preferences toward them differ depending 
on the respondents’ socioeconomic background. Factor 4 is labeled classics Hk/Taiwan because it consists of 
music primarily from those regions, and represent the classic oldies in popular music compared to 
contemporary trendy music. Factor 5, trendy Chinese music, consists of contemporary mainstream artists—a 
combination of Mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan artists who are popular. Factor 6 is labeled local music 
because it consists of artists and music from the mainland. The last row in the table above is the proportion 
of variation explained, which is the factor's eigenvalue—the sum of the squared factor loadings divided by the 
number of variables.  
The loadings indicate how heavily preferences toward a specific music item contribute to the taste in a 
certain type of music. The signs of the loadings were flipped so that factors have mostly positive loadings and 
can be interpreted as liking a music item positively contributes to the taste in the music factor. For example, 
the loading of 0.42 of Western pop music (M1) on the selective foreign factor means that liking Western pop 
music weights positively toward the selective foreign taste. Western pop music also contributes somewhat to 
trendy foreign, with a loading of 0.28. Negative loadings mean that disliking the music constitutes a taste, 
such as the negative loading (-0.14) of Western pop on local music. The factor that each music item loads 
most heavily is highlighted in the table below, which indicates which music category the item is most closely 
related. The heaviest loading ranges from 0.36 (M19 Faye Wong and M23 Qu Wanting) to 0.85 (M46 Peking 
opera). For Peking opera, this means it is very closely related to traditional music, but is far from all other 
music types since the loadings on all other types are very low (<0.2).  
Some music items load heavily on more than 1 factor. Classical West (M34) has a loading of 0.53 on 
traditional and 0.41 on selective foreign, which means it is an important constituent of traditional music as 
well as selective foreign music. Popular HK-Taiwan music (M4) loads heaviest on the trendy Chinese factor 
(F5) at 0.48, with the second-highest loading on the classics Hk/Taiwan factor (F4) at 0.44. Teresa Teng, the 
singer from Taiwan who is famous for her folk-style songs, loads heaviest on the local factor (F6) at 0.38, but 
also the classics Hk/Taiwan factor (F4) at 0.37. Faye Wong (M19) is one of the most popular artists in China 
and she grew to fame in Hong Kong. She loads heaviest on selective foreign (F2) at 0.36, then on the classics 
Hk/Taiwan factor (F4) at 0.35. Qu Wanting (M23) is a Chinese Canadian singer originally from Mainland 
China. She loads heaviest on selective foreign (F4) at 0.36, then on the local factor (F6) at 0.34. Red (M42) 
loads on both the traditional factor (F1) as well as Local (F6), both equally at 0.52.  
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Next, I will describe the six factors, explaining the labels and the music items that load heavily in them. This 
also introduces the items of music asked in the questionnaire. 
Traditional music  
Figure 3-1. Factor loadings on the traditional factor 
 
 
This factor is iconized by Peking opera (M46), followed by other forms of Chinese opera and traditional art, 
all of which were formulated in pre-modern China. Western opera (M35) and Western classical music (M34) 
also load most heavily in this factor, however, they also load heavily on Selective foreign. Red Communist 
music (M42), which came after the rise of Communism, also loads most heavily in this factor. 












6 Images obtained from Google under licensed for non-commercial reuse whenever possible. This applies to 
all pictures of music in this section. 








Red songs (M42) 
 
 
Western opera (M35) and Western classical (M34) are “highbrow” music categories of the West 
which have spread to China during the end of the Qing dynasty. After the opium wars in 1898, Western 
music entered China, supported by newly founded Chinese institutions such as Shanghai Municipal Council 
Symphony Orchestra, the National Conservatory of Shanghai, the Shanghai National Conservatory of Music 
which institutionally promoted Western music (Li, 2011). The Western canon was interrupted during Mao’s 
period, but resumed its influence after Reform and Opening as the standard of high art (Kraus, 1989, 2004; 
Melvin and Cai, 2004; Yang, 2007). 
Like the West, Chinese music has traditional “highbrow” variants, which had been in decline, particularly 
during the years of cultural revolution. Historically, the Chinese “high culture” equivalents in theatrical stage 
music were Kunqu opera (M45) and Peking opera (M46). They were historically consecrated in 
different periods but are receiving a revival as a new form of status distinction for the Chinese middle class, 
as traditional values became again treasured after China’s economic rise (Ma, 2018). Huangmei opera 
(M47) is one of the youngest forms of traditional Chinese opera that rose from local roots into national 
popularity from the 1940s onwards. Question 48 asks for different forms of local opera depending on the 
city. Bangzi opera (M50), Sichuan opera (M51), Canton opera (M52), and Shanghai opera 
(M53) were asked in Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Shanghai respectively. In many parts of this 
research, particularly in the results of MIRT analysis, the four are aggregated as Local opera (M48). 
Peking opera, the “local” opera in Beijing, has a high status and national recognition due to the status of 
Beijing as the capital, so Bangzi opera was asked—an opera local to Hebei province which in the past was the 
villages and rural areas that surrounds the walled Beijing city (Tian, 2006).  
The following are the non-operatic forms of music. “Traditional Chinese instrumentals” is a broad category 
that includes a variety of highbrow but also grassroots music, therefore guqin (M44) is mentioned as the 
specified traditional Chinese instrumental music to avoid the problem with broad labels. Guqin, traditionally 
called qin, was a highbrow instrument of the ancient literati (Wong, 1991). Western piano, considered a 
highbrow instrument in China, took the name of gangqin, i.e. a steel qin, and the traditional qin is now 
commonly referred to as guqin or the “ancient” qin (Kraus, 1989: 23). Suzhou Pingtan (M49) is one of the 
more famous forms of quyi which came from Suzhou, popular in the Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang regions 
 
7 Picture of a performance by the China National Symphony Orchestra 
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of China. Folk music (M43), min ge in Chinese, refers to traditional ethnic music including those of non-
Han ethnic minorities, such as Mongolian or Tibetan folk. However, folk is a vast category that might also 
include modern singers who style their music in folk, so the boundary is blurry. 
Finally, Red songs (M42) include the Communist, revolutionary, or military brigade music sung in official 
ceremonies but are also popular entertainment for some of the older generation. The picture included 
represents red song singers standing alongside a government official. Red songs have been consecrated since 
the founding of the Communist government and are still a consecrated form of music today. However, those 
with high cultural capital appear to have shifted their preferences. 
Foreign music 
Aside from music within the Chinese cultural region, foreign music has also entered China. While music from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan are becoming mainstream music, some types of foreign music are appealing to the 
HCCs. Within the East Asian circle, Japanese and, more recently, Korean pop music is exerting a strong 
influence in China. Korean drama, songs, and stars have become highly popular in China in the last 10 years 
as the Korean-wave swept through China. Western pop music, largely from the English speaking countries, 
has also gradually reached China since Reform and Opening. The taste for popular music in China is rather 
international, especially among the youth (Wang, 2005).  
Figure 3-3. Factor loadings on the selective foreign and trendy foreign factors 
 





(1)  Selective foreign music 
Selective foreign is a category that relates to foreignness in music rather than a political categorization, as it 
also includes ethnically Chinese artists. The loadings for selective foreign is led by Adele (M31) and Mai 
Kuraki (M29), who are respectively British and Japanese singers. Western classical (M34) and Western 
opera (M35) also loads moderately on this factor. Some Chinese artists associated with “foreignness” also has 
a heavy loading here. The negative loadings are also telling. Oppositions to selective foreign include Chinese 
Net Music (M41) as well as Mainland pop music (M5), indicating that tastes toward selective foreign 
associates with distaste toward younger popular local music.  
Figure 3-4. Pictures of selective foreign music items 
Coco Lee  
(M8) 




Li Yundi  
(M27) 
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Western pop (M1) specifically identify music from those origins. R&B (M38) is more strongly associated 
with musical styles of the West, even though there are also Chinese musicians who are active in it. R&B is 
also foreign in that its Chinese translation “jiezou landiao” is not widely known, and some are more familiar 
with “R&B,” so it was asked as “jiezou landiao / R&B.” Adele (M31) (F, 1988) is an artist from the UK who 
has become famous among those with high cultural capital. Justin Bieber (M32) (M, 1994) is a young 
Canadian pop idol. Both Adele and Bieber had been banned from China for crossing the moral and political 
lines of the party—a topic which will be further discussed on party influences. Mai Kuraki (M29) (倉木麻
衣 F, 1982) is a singer from Japan. 
Four ethnically Chinese artists also appear in this group, likely because of their various associations with 
“foreignness” from association with classical music, musical style, or oversea origin. Qu Wanting (M23) 
(曲婉婷 F, 1983) is a singer-songwriter and pianist raised in China but studied in Canada and is associated 
with a Western-style. She has also released English albums. Li Yundi (M27) (李云迪 M, 1982) is not a 
singer but purely a performing classical pianist, who is relatively well known in the popular media. In this 
regard, he is quite similar to another pianist named Lang Lang. During the questionnaire trail, Li Yundi was 
discovered to be less well-known outside pop music circles in comparison, so he was asked instead of Lang 
Lang. Coco Lee (M8) (李玟 F, 1975) is a Chinese American singer born in Hong Kong but educated in the 
USA. She became famous in Taiwan and sings dance-pop and R&B in Mandarin and has also released 
albums in English (Benson, 2013). Faye Wong (M19) (王菲 F, 1969) is a highly well-known superstar with 
a mixed background. Originally from Mainland China, she launched her professional career and rose to great 
fame in Hong Kong, adopting an HK-friendlier stage name Shirley Wong (王靖雯). She later returned to 
Mainland China and reverted to her previous name as she becomes the superstar across Greater China 
(Fung, 2009). She loads heavily in classics Hk/Taiwan music, as well as selective foreign. 
(2)  Trendy Foreign music 
Figure 3-5. Pictures of trendy foreign music items 
Lady Gaga (M33) Psy (M30)  
  
 
Trendy Foreign is loaded heavily by Hip-hop (M36), Rock (M40), Techno (M37), Lady Gaga (M33), Psy 
(M30), and Justin Bieber (M32). The oppositions to trendy foreign are Teresa Teng (M06) and Han Hong 
(M26), who are older artists.  
The artists in this list include Lady Gaga (M33) (F, 1986) from the USA, Justin Bieber (M32) (born in 
1994) from Canada, and Psy (M30) (鸟叔/朴載相 M, 1977) from Korea famous for his hit song “Gangnam 
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Style” that swept across China in 2012 (Ho, 2016b: 147). All these foreign artists here are primarily active in 
their home country, but their fame spread to Mainland China. This contrasts with most other Mainland and 
Greater China artists who actively develop their professional careers within the Mainland. Both Lady Gaga 
and Justin Bieber had been banned in China—Bieber “purified” for his “misdemeanors” in 2017 (Phillips, 
2017; White, 2017), and Lady Gaga for being “vulgar” in 2011 and again in 2016 for meeting the Dalai Lama 
(Lynch, 2016; Lynskey, 2011; Phillips, 2016). 
Rock (M40) in China is a mixture of both a music style related to Western rock, but more so a Chinese 
music movement centered in Beijing not identical to the Western music genre. It started in the late 1980s as 
a music opposition movement with a political tint but is now increasingly mainstream (Brace and 
Friedlander, 1992; de Kloet, 2005a, 2010; Harris, 2010). The rock musicians also tried to differentiate itself 
from Western rock to create a Chinese identity (de	Kloet,	2005a). The Chinese rock as a subculture has 
received a disproportionately high amount of focus in Western academic research, due to its rebellious 
political identity and connection with Western rock, both of which captivate Western scholarly interest. 
However, rock is not quite as Mandopop or Cantopop and not as representative of the mainstream pop 
culture in Chinese society (Moskowitz, 2010b). Yet the complexity in the meaning of rock and the distinction 
between Chinese and Western rock might only be relevant to aficionados rather than the general public. 
During the questionnaire trial, “rock” is found to be more associated with Chinese rock singers, more so than 
Western rock artists or rock as a Western genre. The term “Chinese rock” is not colloquially used, so it would 
be leading and distracting for the survey to distinguish “Western rock” and “Chinese rock” when the 
distinction do not exist in the mind of all but the most discerning respondents. The music type is simply 
called “rock” in China, so it is asked the way it is popularly known despite the ambiguity. Hip-hop (M36) 
and Techno (M37) are more strongly associated with musical styles of the West, even though there are also 
Chinese musicians who are active in these genres. 
Music from Greater China 
Culture from Hong Kong and Taiwan entered Mainland China through informal channels of intercepting 
border signals and pirated cassettes (Lee, 2003; Stephanie and Keane, 2002). The best example is the music 
of Teresa Teng, who herself never set foot on Mainland China (Lee and Fung, 2003). Her pop music, illegally 
smuggled into the Mainland, contrasted with the music under authoritarian control and introduces 
modernity and fresh imaginations of foreign lifestyle to the public. Her songs, imbued with values of freedom 
and romance, became highly popular and agitated the authorities, thus was unofficially censored from state 
media at the time (Groenewegen, 2011: 70). The modern images of these types of music, as well as having 
access to informal channels, mean that this category of music appealed to the privileged class in the 1980s. 
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Figure 3-6. Factor loadings on the classics Hk/Taiwan and trendy Chinese factors 
 
Hong Kong and Taiwanese artists have become the most dominant popular music in China. It has achieved 
the most commercial success, accounting for 80% of Chinese language music sales in Mainland China 
(Moskowitz, 2010a: 2) and topping the list of favorite musicians in surveys (Wang, 2005). The government 
has always faced tensions with Hong Kong and Taiwan music, but the censorship has usually been 
ambiguous and unofficial. The state was not a unitary actor, with different forces and voices from within 
(Baranovitch, 2003: 227). As China modernized, the tensions between Hong Kong and Taiwan music and the 
authorities eased. By the 1990s, the authorities have learned to utilize Hong Kong and Taiwan music to serve 
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the interests of the state. Researches have pointed to examples of Hong Kong and Taiwanese artists being 
utilized as compatriots (tongbao) to promote the party’s agenda—such as Andy Lau and Jay Chou 
(Baranovitch, 2003: 231; Fung, 2007b, 2013; Lee and Fung, 2003). Singers who angered the Communist 
authorities, such as Taiwanese singer A-mei who performed for the presidential inauguration in Taiwan in 
2000, vanished from mainland media for several years (Groenewegen, 2011: 27). This has been described as 
“co-optation,” in which stars are promoted but are coached on the informal rules (Fung, 2013). As Hong 
Kong and Taiwan music have become more embraced by the authorities, they have grown to become the 
most influential music in Mainland China. Eventually the music became promoted across mainstream media, 
the difficulty of access declined along with the “foreignness” of Hong Kong and Taiwan, leading to decreased 
social distinction for this new generation of artists. 
The combination of Hong Kong and Taiwan music in a shared category reflects a Mainland view of the music 
landscape. Hong Kong and Taiwan are two different centers of music production, producing pop songs in 
different languages, but music from these places are often combined and called Gangtai music in Mainland 
China, a combination of Hong Kong (Xiang gang in Mandarin) and Taiwan, which is a mainland construct 
that centers Chinese music and culture in Mainland China (Moskowitz, 2010b: 236). Hong Kong and Taiwan 
music share a similarity in their shared influence on China after Reform and Opening. 
(3)  Classics Hk/Taiwan Music 
This factor consists of artists from Hong Kong and Taiwan, skewing to the older artists, while more 
contemporary artists from Hong or Taiwan load more heavily on other factors. Compared to trendy Chinese 
music, the items here consist of more mature artists around 60 years old, indicating the status of “classics” in 
pop (jingdian is a typical name for this in music apps). Classics Hk/Taiwan and trendy Chinese music 
represent a division between the older, classical pop artists that are more stratified, and the most popular 
contemporary artists that have a high popularity and low degree of stratification. Classics Hk/Taiwan music 
is most heavily loaded by Jacky Cheung (M13), born in 1961. The top 3 loadings artists are of the same or 
even older generation of Hong Kong singers—which are KK Wong (M12, 1962) and Alan Tam (M11, 1950). 
The 4th is Cantopop itself, with Pop Hong Kong and Taiwan nearby. Taiwanese singers are also represented 
here but less strongly, with Jonathan Lee (M07, 1961) in the 5th loading, and Teresa Teng (M06, 1959) 
nearby. Both KK Wong and Teresa Teng died in the 1990s, thus have not been singing for 20 years. Faye 
Wong (1969), who early in her career was active in Hong Kong and sang many Cantonese songs, loads 2nd 
most heavily on this factor. The music items that load negatively on this factor is Lu Han (1990), a young 
pop-idol from Mainland China, and Japanese and Korean music. 
M03. Cantopop, which specifically asked for popular music sung in Cantonese represents a very influential 
form of music in mainland China, particularly in the 80s and 90s. Now Hong Kong singers are still 
influential but no longer as dominating, and they increasingly sing in Mandarin to cater to the rapidly 
increasing Chinese Mandarin market. Cantonese popular music arose in the 1970s, and at its peak in the 
1980s had a profound influence on East Asian Chinese-speaking communities, including non-Cantonese 
speakers in Mainland China (Chu and Leung, 2013). When Cantopop first entered Mainland China, it was 
seen as foreign and modern, from a British colony that carries the cosmopolitan symbol of capitalism and 
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freedom (Fung, 2013). Chu and Leung attribute the success of Cantopop to its signature hybridity in 
renditioning Euro-American, Japanese, and Mandarin music. Many of the songs were covers and 
adaptations of other foreign popular music with Cantonese lyrics, at a time when both the Mainland and 
Taiwan music industry were more tightly regulated (2013).  
Sales of Cantopop music declined in Hong Kong after 1997, coinciding with the advent of Internet piracy, the 
East Asian economic crisis, and the return of Hong Kong to China. After the downturn, music companies in 
Hong Kong focused their resources on the profitable teenage audience, retreating to mass production of 
popular styles and idol worship, while the once vibrant hybridity in Hong Kong culture was lost as Hong 
Kong became ever reliant on Mainland market. Cantonese music, while still popular, yielded to Mandopop 
which emerged as the leader in popular music, helped by the ever-increasing importance of the Mainland 
Chinese market and the rise in the social status of Mandarin (Chu and Leung, 2013). Hong Kong Cantopop 
singers frequently also release Mandarin versions of the same song to appeal to the Mainland market. 
Figure 3-7. Pictures of classics Hk/Taiwan music items 
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The following artists are in the classics Hk/Taiwan category. Eason Chan (M14) (陈奕迅M, 1974) is one of 
the most popular contemporary singers who sings in both Cantonese and Mandarin. The popularity of 
Wong Ka Kui (M12) (黄家驹M, 1962-1993) is notable because he died more than 20 years ago, which 
reinforces this group as the classics of pop in China. He was the lead singer and guitarist of a band called 
“Beyond,” and sang in a style of rock (not associated with the Chinese rock movement). He only sung in 
Cantonese and never promoted in Mainland China before his premature death in 1993, at a time when the 
Mainland market was largely overlooked, though this probably made preferences for him distinctively a 
classics Hk/Taiwan music. Jacky Cheung (M13) (张学友M, 1961) is the most popular singer in this 
survey, appealing broadly across age groups and social groups. He is a Cantopop singer from Hong Kong, 
who also sings Mandarin song and is highly popular across Asia. Jonathan Lee (M7) (李宗盛 M, 1959), a 
Taiwanese singer who is also well known as a record producer and songwriter for other popular Taiwanese 
singers in the Mainland. Alan Tam (M11) (谭咏麟M, 1950), one of the icons and early pioneers of 
Cantopop who led it to its peak starting from the 1980s. 
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(4)  Trendy Chinese music 
This factor contains a mix of popular music from mostly Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also Mainland China. 
The artists are generally younger and favored by younger fans compared to the classics Hk/Taiwan pop, 
therefore this is labeled trendy Chinese. Trendy Chinese music is heavily loaded by categories such as 
Mainland pop music (M5), HK-Taiwan pop (M4), Jolin Tsai (Taiwan singer born 1980), May Day (Taiwan 
band, 1973 & 1977), Lu Han (pop idol born 1990), and GEM (Hong Kong singer born 1991)—who are 
noticeably younger than the artists in the classics Hk/Taiwan factor. This factor contrasts with Cui Jian 
(M18), the father of Mainland rock in the 1980s, as well as Adele (M31) a Western pop artist. Some music 
items overlap with Local music, such as Net Music (M41) and Li Yuchun (M24). 
Trendy Chinese music represents the most mainstream contemporary music in China. Classics Hk/Taiwan 
and trendy Chinese are related, as many of the musicians who load heavily in trendy Chinese are still from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, whereas classics Hk/Taiwan is more of a classics-pop.  “In the PRC there are other 
distinct musical genres—such as Beijing’s rock movement, xibeifeng, revolutionary songs, and PRC pop 
music—but these all play a minute role in comparison with Mandopop from Taiwan.” (Moskowitz, 2010a: 3). 
Social hierarchy is relatively unimportant for trendy Chinese music, which is preferred by the young, though 
there’s a slight distaste for trendy Chinese music by the highly educated. Females also have stronger tastes 
for this group. The category consists of a relatively neutral combination of contemporary mainstream artists 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also some Mainland artists. The music in this group is considered 
Mandopop—popular music sung in Mandarin, the lingua franca of Mainland China and Taiwan. As the 
Mainland market grew more important, singers from Hong Kong also release songs in Mandarin and blends 
into the Mandopop music category. 
The following items are in the trendy Chinese category, which consists of contemporary pop music. 
Mainland Mandarin Pop (M5)  is the item that specifically asks for pop music from Mainland China. 
People in Mainland China tend to think of this as just “Chinese pop” and would not use the term Mainland 
unless to distinguish from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Popular Hong Kong and Taiwan Mandarin Music 
(M4) refer to Mandarin popular music from Greater China regions, which is now the most popular and 
recognized form of popular music in Mainland China. Japanese and Korean pop (M02) which 
specifically identify music from those origins.  
Figure 3-8. Pictures of trendy Chinese music items 
Jolin Tsai (M10) May Day (M9) Lu Han (M17) G.E.M. (M15) 
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G.E.M. (M15) (邓紫棋 F, 1991), an acronym for “Get Everybody Moving,” is the English stage name for a 
young Hong Kong singer who started her career in Hong Kong but became famous in Mainland China after 
winning a Mainland singing/idol contest. She is known in Mainland China by her Chinese name Deng Ziqi. 
Lu Han (M17)  (鹿晗 M, 1990) is a young male pop idol who was once part of a Sino-Korean band, before 
pursuing an individual career in Mainland China. He has been studied for his massive idol engagement with 
the online community (Liang and Shen, 2016). Jolin Tsai (M10) (蔡依林 F, 1980) is a Taiwanese singer 
well known for her dance-pop/electronic dance music. May Day (M9) (五月天 5 males, born in 1973-77) is 
a Taiwanese band famous for its mainstream Mandopop. 
Local music 
Local pop music had always been present in China since Reform and Opening, typically associated with the 
voices of the grassroots, such as the Chinese rock movement (de Kloet, 2005b, 2010). But it never reached 
mainstream in popularity, a position long dominated by pop music from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Local pop 
also traditionally had lower status compared to Hong Kong and Taiwan pop, as music that comes from more 
developed regions are signs of cosmopolitan modernity and commercialism (Moskowitz, 2010a).  
Figure 3-9. Factor loadings on the local factor 
 
 
Local pop singers, Communist singers, as well as folk singers are all included in the local music category. 
This factor is labeled Local music because it consists of primarily contemporary artists from the mainland. 
Some of the artists here are also associated with modernized variants of Chinese folk. Loading most heavily 
on this factor is Phoenix Legend (M22). Red (M42) and Folk (M43) are 2 music items which load heaviest on 
traditional music, but also load moderately high in this factor. Preferences for local music is primarily 
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opposed by preferences for popular Western music (M1) and preferences for Eason Chan (M14), a 
contemporary Hong Kong Cantonese singer who also sings in Mandarin. 
Trendy Net Music (M41) represents the contemporary phenomenon where music from unknown artists 
or amateurs, typically of grassroots origin and at the fringe, who are not promoted by mainstream record 
labels but are accumulating fans through online platforms. Most recently, the rise of online streaming 
provides new platforms for grassroot artists to display their music to the public. The streaming platforms 
have become highly popular to the mass, allowing unknown artists to come to instant fame with viral songs, 
creating a category of “Internet hits.” However, those with high cultural capital looks down on those types of 
music. The names of artists in net music are quite diverse and niche. Practicalities of a survey random-
sampling large populations require well-recognized artists to be asked—which would no longer qualify as a 
net music artist anymore. Plaza dance music (M39) (广场舞) is the music associated with people who 
dance in public plazas, a popular pastime for mid-age housewives and retiring people.  
Figure 3-10. Pictures of local music items 
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The following are the names of specific artists or groups. Li Yuchun (M24) (李宇春 F, 1984) is a well-
known pop singer and an example of artists who launched a professional career through a talent show. A new 
wave of Mainland pop appeared after 2005 through popular singing/idol competition, where the winners are 
legitimated through popular vote by the national audience (Meng, 2009). Li Yuchun came to fame by 
winning as the “Supergirl.” The shows target the Chinese youth, and more than 3 million text message votes 
were cast in the 2005 season. The grassroots support for the Supergirl became a legitimizing mandate and 
empowered a new wave of Chinese pop music that reflects local taste (Fung, 2013). Wulantuya (M28) (乌
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兰图雅 F, 1983) is a Mongolian singer who sings folk songs that blend pop with Mongolian themes. Phoenix 
Legend (M22)  (凤凰传奇 1M and 1F, 1979 & 1980) is a male and female duo who sings Mandopop that 
blends hip-hop with folk elements and is seemingly popular among the grassroots. Chopstick Brothers 
(M21) (筷子兄弟,2 males, born 1969 & 1980) is an example of an Internet music group, who later rose to 
national fame with their performance in the 2015 CCTV New Year’s Gala. Han Hong (M26) (韩红 F, 1971) 
is a Tibetan singer more famous for her ethnic songs as well as Communist singing but is also active in the 
mainstream media. Contemporary folk music often associated with the Communist party. She is an example 
of a popular folk singer who attempts to capture the symbolic meanings of ethnic folk songs through 
popularized versions (Baranovitch, 2001). Liu Huan (M16) (刘欢M, 1963) is a songwriter and singer who 
is considered to be an important figure in pop music in mainland China. Dao Lang (M20) (刀郎 M, 1961) is 
a more grassroots pop-singer whose name and style associate with ethnic and folk music. Cui Jian (M18) 
(崔健 M, 1961) is known as the Father of Chinese Rock, an early pioneer and the figurehead of the Chinese 
rock movement. For a period, Chinese rock music and musicians were not allowed to appear in broadcasts or 
on television (Fung 2016). Compared to Hong Kong and Taiwan pop which is mainstream and from 
glamorous regions, the Chinese Rock music movement came from grassroots with a geographic reach 
centered around Beijing (de Kloet, 2010; Harris, 2010). Yet it received a disproportionate amount of Western 
scholarly interest for its rebelliousness under China’s political repressiveness, as well as its linkage to rock as 
a genre familiar in the West (Baranovitch, 2003; de Kloet, 2010). Yan Weiwen (M25) (阎维文M, 1957) 
has origins in the People’s Liberation Army and is well known as a singer of Red music. 
Teresa Teng (M6) (邓丽君 F, 1943-1995) is an unusual case as she was from Taiwan, and loads equally on 
local as well as classics Hk/Taiwan. Being most heavily loaded in the local music factor simply means that 
preferences for her are most similar to preferences for other musicians in the category. She was a Mandarin 
pop singer who was a superstar across East Asia but died in 1995 without ever traveling to Mainland China. 
She was born and raised in Taiwan and belonged to a generation who lived the years when Taiwan and 
mainland China were politically hostile with little civilian contact. She was one of the first Taiwanese singers 
to become wildly popular in Mainland China after Reform and Opening, when a generation was exposed to 
popular entertainment for the first time through cassette tapes sneaked onto the Mainland.  
 Discussion—The key divisions in Chinese music 
This section presented a categorization of music in China based on preferences of the population, using 
latent trait analysis, which presents an overview of the Chinese music scene by showing its main divisions. 
This answers the research question on the main divisions of music in contemporary China. In support of 
previous research, the genre-based division prevalent in the West is less dominant in China. All the genre 
questions (R&B, hip-hop, rock, techno, or even Western classical and opera) appear as a sub-division under 
foreign music. The divisions are best described as along 3 dimensions: 1) traditional versus pop, and for pop, 
2) the region of origin from local, to classics Hk/Taiwan and foreign, and 3) a further division into high-
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status and mass variants where selective foreign music has higher status than trendy foreign music, and 
classics Hk/Taiwan music has higher status than trendy Chinese music. 
The division between tradition and modern music can be seen in traditional music (F1), which contains all 
the traditional music of both Chinese and Western origins. Traditional music (F1) contains both Chinese 
operas, and Western classical and opera, which are stylistically different and similar only in that they are 
both traditional, heavily institutionalized, and “legitimate” art forms. There are some elements of folk in 
Local music (F6), but they are singers of modern music that blends elements of folk, such as Dao Lang 
(M20), Wulantuya (M29) and Han Hong (M26), rather than adherents of the traditional canon, which are all 
heavily loaded in factor 1. The traditional music factor accounts for the most variations in music taste, which 
is 12%. 
The second key finding is the importance of regional origin—the division of popular music into foreign (F2 
and F3), classics Hk/Taiwan (F4), trendy Chinese (F5), and local (F6) show that region of origin is an 
important division. Trendy Chinese music is the only factor which encompasses music from a diversity of 
regions—Mainland China, Hong Kong/Taiwan, and Korean/Japanese. Thus, after traditional music is 
considered, the region of origin is an important division in popular music. 
The third division in music represents a status-hierarchy. This is most evident in the separation of foreign 
music into 2 factors. Selective foreign contains popular artists like Adele (M31), the Chinese pianist Li Yundi 
(M27), and R&B (M46), while trendy foreign contains genres like hip-hop (M36) and techno (M63), Lady 
Gaga (M33) and the Korean artist Psy (M30). Analysis of those music items indicates a division between 
highbrow and lowbrow foreign music types, thus they are named selective foreign and trendy foreign 
respectively. Also, the division between classics Hk/Taiwan (F4) and trendy Chinese (F5) can also be seen as 
division into higher-status and popular forms of pop music. Further support comes in the next section where 
socioeconomic status will be analyzed. 
Remarkably, artists have been grouped into geographic groups surprisingly accurately, merely based on 
information on people’s music preferences. This shows a clear line of distinction in preferences along 
geographic lines. However, the division by the origin of the music is not rigid. For example, Chinese artists 
with a foreign background or whose music associates with foreign music also load heavily on foreign music. 
The 6 factors that are found indicate that music is patterned largely by music-types, yet it does not quite fit 
the individualization hypothesis that everyone is free to like as they choose. The next section, which 
investigates the stratification of music in China, will explain that this represents divisions in status rather 
than a rigid division based purely on the region of origin.  
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Part II. DISTINCTION UNDER POP CULTURE 
Chapter 4. Cultural omnivores or the persistence of distinction 
 Advancing the debate between Bourdieusian and cultural omnivore analysis 
Current theories on cultural stratification are divided into two main opposing camps: cultural capital theories 
that argue for the persistence of cultural hierarchy and cultural capital, and cultural omnivore theories that 
demonstrate the rise of cultural eclecticism under contemporary pop culture. This research explains how 
both theories are partial truths. The cultural omnivore argument that elites are accepting toward popular 
culture is valid but is limited to popular, trendy music, but it overlooks the stratification through niche items 
that fail to be picked up in surveys. While the Bourdieusian theories correctly point out the persistence of 
distinction, it overlooks that some forms of popular culture can be a taste shared neutrally by people in 
different strata. By looking across a broad spectrum of music in China, this research shows how different 
forms of music serve as repertoires for distinction and popular entertainment. 
Theoretical divisions 
The Bourdieusian account of cultural capital and the cultural omnivore thesis are two opposing accounts in 
cultural stratification, both in the theory and in the methodology. The theory of cultural capital contends that 
culture continues to be an asset that is being drawn for cultural distinction, while cultural omnivore accounts 
suggest the breakdown of barriers under popular culture. Bourdieu’s original account describes how elites 
leverage high art as a cultural capital for social distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). His theories have been 
increasingly criticized as popular culture becomes dominant in modern societies. An influential account is 
the cultural omnivore thesis, which suggests that elites are increasingly eclectic in their consumption due to 
increasing openness and tolerance (Peterson and Kern, 1996). This debate was introduced in chapter 1. 
Other scholars continue to believe in the relevance of the theory of cultural capital. Researchers have been 
attempting to update Bourdieu’s theory to explain how cultural distinction continues to be enacted through 
new forms of popular culture, but in ways that are consistent with the mechanism of habitus and 
intergenerational inequality described by Bourdieu. This research agenda can be referred to as “emerging 
forms of cultural capital,” which updates Bourdieu’s theory by explaining how new ways of cultural 
distinction do not rely on traditional highbrow cultures (Prieur and Savage, 2013). One variant is 
“cosmopolitan cultural capital,” which discusses the potential for a cosmopolitan outlook to be a recognizable 
cultural resource (Prieur and Savage, 2014). Researches are finding that cultural distinction, especially 
among the educated youths, has shifted from traditional culture to new forms of commercial cultures 
(Bennett et al., 2009; Savage, 2015). 
Proponents of cosmopolitan cultural capital claim that cosmopolitanism is a new form of cultural capital. 
Often cited cosmopolitans are professionals and business people with high mobility and involvement in 
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global networks (Bauman, 1998), flourishing “in the top management of multinational corporations and even 
more in the consulting firms that serve them” (Calhoun, 2002: 890). Cosmopolitanism describes of 
movements that allow elites to experience unfamiliar cultures, gaining cosmopolitan identities and mindsets 
which reach beyond local identities. In various countries in Europe, the young, mobile cosmopolitan class is 
increasingly picking up a cosmopolitan orientation to culture, where the ability to “stand outside one’s own 
national frame of reference may itself be an important cultural marker” (Prieur and Savage, 2014: 310). 
Cosmopolitanism is an internalized mindset, which excludes the superficial mobility of “tourists, exiles, 
expatriates, translational employees, migrant workers” (Rantanen, 2005: 121). In this interpretation, 
cosmopolitanism is itself a cultural inequality, “What seems like free individual choice is often made possible 
by capital – social and cultural as well as economic” (Calhoun, 2008: 433). Cosmopolitan cultural capital is 
typically referenced in studies to describe the increasingly international outlook of elites in different sectors 
such as in business or education (Bühlmann et al., 2013; Igarashi and Saito, 2014; Weenink, 2008), but the 
exact relationship between cosmopolitanism and cultural stratification remains elusive and under-theorized.  
Most ironically, proponents of cultural omnivores also invoke cosmopolitanism to explain the decline of 
cultural capital (Chan, 2019). For those scholars, cosmopolitanism promises a mindset of tolerance based on 
a mindful recognition of difference (Beck, 2006, 2018; Hannerz, 1990, 1996; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002; 
Vertovec, 2009). Cosmopolitanism is not just the ability to travel, but “a personal ability to make one’s way 
into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting” (Hannerz, 1990: 293). The 
cosmopolitans are expected to be more open-minded about the cultures of the underclasses. In this 
interpretation, cosmopolitanism explains the fall of distinction, as it encourages interest in cultures outside 
that of exclusionary elite circles. 
The methodological divide 
Methodologically, Bourdieusian scholars favor MCA and qualitative interviews, whereas advocates of cultural 
omnivores prefer surveys and rigorous quantitative methods from mainstream social sciences. Bourdieusian 
scholars have been advocating the use of qualitative research in cultural stratification, arguing that surveys 
are failing to pick up distinction beneath the appearance of cultural eclecticism (Friedman et al., 2015; Holt, 
1997; Jarness, 2015). This research presents my effort to examine cultural capital through more advanced 
quantitative methods. Through a customized survey and MIRT analysis, this research examines the music 
landscape holistically, revealing a more comprehensive landscape than previous studies.  
Current methods are guilty of highlighting data from a particular perspective. The MCA approach has long 
been favored by Bourdieusian scholars. Even if cultural omnivores were to be a dominant feature in the 
cultural scene, MCA methodologically will not present it as the first axis, instead it would continue to salvage 
any minor polarization to present as axes. The shortcoming of MCA is that design is too tailored to support 
the homology argument, and is a niche method outside of the Bourdieusian circle. MCA is designed to 
generate the axes that best magnify the polarity in preferences. Input any data to MCA, and it will try its best 
to demonstrate the existence of the hierarchy. The use of MCA has also traditionally avoided tests of 
statistical significance, which has become a standard in quantitative social sciences. At the very least, the 
penchant for MCA within the Bourdieusian circle has hindered dialogues with broader social scientists. 
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The methods used in cultural omnivore accounts are often based on large surveys with a limited number of 
items. They end up examining the most recognized forms of cultures and finds them to be widely consumed 
by the elites. The shortcoming with this approach is that it only quantifies the music landscape holistically, 
without considering differences within the music types. It merely shows that high-status individuals are 
liking more items in popular culture. As I will show, this approach is also flawed in being methodologically 
biased against the cultures of the underclasses. 
Key contributions 
This research advances cultural capital research and breaks the impasse through a new survey and 
quantitative methodology. This research neutrally categorizes music according to the similarity in 
preferences, avoiding the shortcoming of existing methods which highlighting data from a particular 
perspective. This allows the hypotheses on social distinction to be open for examination and comparison (see 
chapter 2 for the full methodological discussion). Firstly, this research finds compelling evidence for the 
existence of a cultural hierarchy with the strengths of quantitative research—based on a random sample, 
validated through tests of statistical significance. Secondly, this research also demonstrates how it coexists 
with cultural eclecticism under popular culture. The proliferation of mass culture does not imply the 
breakdown of barrier, but rather, enables social distinction to be executed with increased complexity. My 
research shows that different types of music allow for different types of distinction—traditional music as a 
Bourdieusian legitimate culture capital (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986), the rise of popular highbrow through 
emerging cultural capital (Prieur and Savage, 2013), and the symbolic exclusion music of underprivileged 
groups (Bryson, 1996). Compared to previous quantitative studies that primarily reveal one dimension of 
cultural stratification, this study comprehensively shows the interaction of various dimensions of cultural 
capital. 
The next section looks at the cultural omnivore argument by replicating Peterson’s methodology to show 
that, while cultural omnivore is observed, the apparent eclecticism of the HCCs is actually the exclusion of 
the LCCs from high-status popular music. Then, I will use MIRT and ANOVA to demonstrate the music 
hierarchy of different types of music.  
 Cultural eclecticism of the elites? 
This section tests if that empirical observation of cultural omnivores is observed. First I’ll follow Peterson’s 
method to examine if cultural omnivores exist in China as well. In this research, 52 items of music were 
asked, a much larger number of items of music compared to typical quantitative surveys, which aims to 
include a diversity of music items in the Chinese music scene. 
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Examining cultural omnivores 
(1)  Are lovers of “highbrow music” crossing cultural boundaries? 
Peterson hand-picked the music that constitutes highbrow and included only traditional highbrows in their 
definition, predefining highbrow as consumers of Western classical music and opera to examine whether 
they are crossing boundaries (Peterson and Kern, 1996). Following their approach, the cultural omnivore 
hypothesis is examined using two criteria—whether lovers of highbrow music are “crossing boundaries,” and 
how “boundary-crossing” relate to socioeconomic variables. Highbrow persons are defined as those who 
highly-like both Western classical and Western opera. Highbrow (Western-only) contains 1.5% of the sample. 
I also add a second definition which includes the traditional highbrow music in China—Chinese Peking opera 
and guqin instrumentals. Although Kunqu opera is also highbrow in the eyes of the literati, it is niche in the 
sampled population, highly liked by only 14 respondents, so it is not included to not overcomplicate the 
definition. Highbrow (Chinese & Western) is operationalized as knowing and highly liking at least 2 of the 4 
music above. This definition allows for multiple dimensions of flexibility in the preferred forms of high art—
those who only like highbrow forms of opera, those who only like highbrow forms of instrumental music, and 
those who only like Western or Chinese highbrow forms. The criterion is not overly lenient as it only 
categorizes 4.5% of the sample as highbrow persons. 
Table 4-1. Descriptive statistics for cultural omnivores 





Highbrow People 31.3 9.63 19 1.8% 
Non-Highbrow People 29.0 3.62 1029 98.2% 
Highbrow 
definition 2 
Highbrow People 29.6 9.45 47 4.5% 
Non-Highbrow People 28.2 3.33 1001 95.5% 
Highbrow definition 1 defines highbrow people those who like Western classical and Western opera. 
Highbrow definition 2 defines highbrow people as those who like all the above, plus Peking opera and 
guqin instrumental music. 
Do people who like traditionally highbrow art forms also like pop music? The table above provides the 
descriptive statistics. In the first definition of highbrow which includes only Western highbrow, highbrow 
people have heard of a greater number of music items (31.3 versus 29.0) and also have more strong likes 
(9.36 versus 3.62) than non-highbrow people. In the second definition of highbrow which includes both 
Chinese and Western highbrow music, highbrow people also have heard of more music (29.6 versus 28.2) 
and have more strong likes (9.45 versus 3.33) than non-highbrow people. 
Next, regressions are run to examine whether lovers of highbrow music significantly differ in their 1) 
preferences and 2) awareness toward non-highbrow music, and 3) attendance of live music. Highbrow 
(Chinese & Western) and Highbrow (Western-only) are dummy variables where 1 indicates belonging to the 
group and 0 otherwise. The regressions are identical to running a t-test in several models, but this is to keep 
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a consistent method as the analysis in the next section. Models 1-3 analyzes based on the definition of 
highbrow used in the West, while models 4-6 uses a definition that includes both Chinese & Western music. 
Table 4-2. Regression of awareness, preference, and participation on whether the person highly-likes 
traditional highbrow music 
 Highbrow definition 1  
those who like Western-only 
Highbrow definition 2 
those who like Chinese & Western 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Items Highly 









6.016*** 2.248 1.097*** 6.12*** 1.441 0.833*** 
(Intercept) 3.615*** 29.016*** 0.117* 3.327*** 28.197*** 0.096* 
r2 0.028 0.002  0.076 0.002  
adj.r2 0.027 0.001  0.075 0.001  
AIC   3110   3106 
loglikelihood   -3104   -3100 
cases 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 
Preference, awareness, and participation are the number of non-highbrow items highly liked (max 45 for 
model 1-2), the number of non-highbrow items aware (max 47 for model 4-5), and the number of live 
events attended last year (model 3 and 5).  
Highbrow (Western-only) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates highly liking both Western classical and 
Western opera. Highbrow (Chinese & Western) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates highly liking at 
least 2 of Western classical, Western opera, Peking opera, and guqin instrumental.  
Model 1-2, 4-5 apply the linear model, while model 3 and 6 apply the negative binomial model. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
Preference is measured by the number of non-highbrow items highly-liked. Out of a total of 49 music items, 
removing the 4 highbrow items leaves 45 as the maximum number of non-highbrow items in the dependent 
variable, of which a linear model is applied. Model 1 shows that lovers of highbrow music indeed like more 
items of non-highbrow music, more so than everyone else. This supports the omnivore thesis as they do 
enjoy non-highbrow music as well. 
Model 2 analyzes in terms of awareness. In the questionnaire, each respondent indicated whether he or she is 
aware of the music item, and if so, how much it is liked or disliked. In this case, lovers of highbrow are aware 
of more items, but not significantly more so. Model 3 examines participation in live music events, which 
includes classical performances as well as pop concerts. Since this number range from 0 to 5, with 0 being 
the most popular, a negative binomial model is applied. The results indicate that lovers of highbrow music 
are indeed more active participants of music. 
Model 4-6 repeat the same analysis for the broader definition of highbrow that includes Chinese and Western 
variants. In models 4 and 5, the 2 highbrow items are removed, leaving 47 as the maximum number of non-
highbrow items in the dependent variable. The results are highly similar. Lovers of traditional highbrow 
music are clearly “crossing boundaries” to enjoy non-highbrow items, in fact, liking more items than 
everyone else. They also participate in significantly more music events in a year. 
While this test supports the observation of cultural omnivorism, this test based on “highbrow people” is 
problematic in several ways. It requires an assumption of the meaning of highbrow, which may not apply to 
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the Chinese context. Although this research attempts two different definitions of “highbrow” art, it ignores 
that popular music can also constitute highbrow, which is a core finding of this research. This definition of 
eclecticism is also limited by the small number of “highbrow people,” which are 19 (1.8%) or 47 (4.5%) out a 
whole sample of 1048. Furthermore, it is possible that the “highbrow people” identified include people who 
are more generous in selecting “highly-likes.” The next part tests an alternative test of cultural eclectism. 
(2)  Are people with higher levels of cultural capital crossing cultural boundaries? 
Peterson’s original approach is problematic in that by assuming Western classical and opera to be highbrow, 
a predefined cultural hierarchy is inherent within the definition of cultural omnivores, a rather Bourdieusian 
highbrow hierarchy. It only examines whether those who already like highbrow are crossing into the 
middlebrow and lowbrow category. However, to have elites crossing boundaries requires the existence of 
boundaries in the first place. The omnivore account as originally defined is merely highlighting the 
unsurprising result that elites who consume highbrow are also consuming popular culture—it is hardly 
surprising that the elites in contemporary society also like pop music to some extent. This prevents the 
conclusion that cultural omnivores are signs of falling boundaries and increased openness and tolerance. 
Table 4-3. Descriptive statistics: the number of items heard and highly-liked by different education 
groups 





Middle School or Below 27.6 21.4 2.6 46.4 74 
Middle Technical 27.8 21.2 2.2 46.8 62 
High School 29.7 19.3 3.6 45.4 118 
College 31.0 18.0 3.5 45.5 288 
Bachelor 31.4 17.6 4.3 44.7 396 
Above Bachelor 31.1 17.9 4.9 44.1 110 
Therefore, this second part examines cultural omnivorism from the perspective of socio-economic 
background, rather than predefining a “highbrow” and testing for cross-covers. Here I examine how the 
number of items that have been heard and the number of items that are highly-liked differs between 
educational groups. The table above provides the descriptive statistics of the mean number of items heard or 
high-liked by different educational groups. The mean number of items that are highly-liked always increases 
as the level of education increases, from 2.63 for those middle school or below, to 4.94 for those with degrees 
above bachelor. Similarly, the mean number of items heard increases for each educational group, from 27.6 
items for middle school or below, to 31.4 items for bachelor’s degree. The number of items heard decreases 
slightly for the above bachelor (which may be due to the increase of “snobs” who abstain from popular 
culture in the HCCs, as discussed toward the end of this chapter). This suggests that cultural eclecticism of 
those with high culture is observed. The next part will apply regression. 
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Table 4-4. Regression of awareness, preference, and participation on education and other 
socioeconomic variables 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Items Liked Items Aware 
Live Music  
Participated 
Edu 0.235*** 0.314*** 0.12*** 
Party 0.517 0.391 0.255* 
Income-Log 0.123 0.507* 0.219*** 
Age 0.033 -0.099*** -0.005 
GenderF -0.765** 1.453*** -0.006 
(Intercept) -1.727 21.161*** -3.654*** 
r2 0.029 0.058  
adj.r2 0.024 0.053  
AIC   3051 
loglikelihood   -3037 
cases 1048 1048 1048 
Preference, awareness, and participation are the number of non-highbrow Items highly liked (max 45), 
known (max 45), and the number of live events attended last year. 
Model 1-2 applies a linear model, while model 3 applies a negative binomial model. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
Education, party, and income represents cultural, political, and economic capital respectively, to see if they 
influence music awareness, preference, and participation. Age and gender are the controls. The logarithm of 
income is used in the regression model, as income is skewed toward large values. Models 7-9 uses the 
Chinese & Western definition of highbrow. 
Model 7 and 8 shows that cultural capital is the most significant influencers of preference and awareness. 
Those with high cultural capital are “crossing boundaries” in support of the omnivore thesis. Every additional 
year of education associates with a 0.235 increase in the number of items of highly-likes and 0.314 increase 
in the number of items aware, as well as 0.12 events a year. Participation in live music relates most 
significantly to not only cultural capital but also economic capital, bringing income as an influencer of 
cultural engagement. 
The cultural omnivores argument depends on item selection 
On the surface, the results confirm Peterson’s omnivore account. In the first test, those who like “highbrow” 
music are indeed eclectic consumers of music. This is true in the number of items liked and in the number of 
live music events participated by those who like “highbrow,” but not significantly so in their number of items 
aware. The result is consistent whether “highbrow” is defined as Western classical and opera, or the broader 
definition of those music types plus Peking opera and guqin. Lovers of highbrow music do not favor it 
exclusively. In the second test, those with higher levels of cultural capital as defined by years of education are 
higher in the number of items liked, aware, and events participated. This also responds to the engagement 
versus disengagement division by showing that lovers of highbrow music and those with high cultural capital 
are also more engaged in live music. Thus, lovers of highbrow music and those with high cultural capital do 
not favor it exclusively, as their music preferences are not confined to legitimate items.  
The results appear to confirm that “cultural omnivores”—the increased eclecticism of the elites—are observed 
in China as well. However, Peterson’s original method is problematic in requiring an a priori definition of 
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highbrow art. Using the updated test of cultural eclecticism, people with more education are more eclectic, 
but there is not a straightforward number on the size of this group. Unlike latent class analysis, Peterson’s 
method does not segment the population into groups of omnivores, univores, etc. that have a measurable size 
(Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b). The omnivore thesis is often interpreted to imply the breakdown of social 
boundaries, with the disappearance of “snobs.” However, I disagree with that interpretation and will 
demonstrate this in the subsequent sections. In contrary, I argue that social distinction continues under the 
cloak of cultural eclecticism, turning subtle and executed with increased complexity. 
I argue that the cultural omnivore argument depends on the type of items asked. Therefore, cultural 
omnivore is an artifact of a survey that asks more items that are favored by the elites, therefore giving the 
impression that elites like more items. Cultural omnivorism has been measured through more items that the 
elites like, aware, or the count of live music events that were attended in the past year. In real life, distinction 
is drawn by specific items rather than under broad categories. In the following section, I examine the 
meaning of “likes” and “awareness” of more items by looking at how each of the 53 music items is stratified. 
The results reveal that the stratification of music is clear at the item level, therefore omnivorism is dependent 
on the particular selection of music items. 
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(1)  HCCs have higher awareness, particularly for selective foreign items 
Figure 4-1. Music awareness by years of education 
 
Details of the means and the t-test are in the appendix. 
Under the proliferation of pop music items, the first distinction that can be drawn is music awareness, which 
draws boundaries even before preferences are discussed. Recall that respondents choose from highly-like, 
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those who indicated a preference (aware) and those who were unaware of the music item. T-test examines 
whether the mean years of education are significantly different, and indicated by faded colors on the figure 
when it is not.  
A pattern persists across most music items—education level is consistently lower for those who indicated a 
lack of awareness on mainstream pop music items, lower than the mean years of education. Awareness does 
not identify the HCCs, but unawareness is shared by the LCCs. The music items asked in this survey are not 
“difficult,” as the average years of education of those who are aware are close to the average years of 
education of the whole sample. To have aware of those music items are not too surprising, whereas being 
unaware is rarer and serves as a more important distinction—only those with lower levels of education have 
higher unaware-responses. Most of those items have higher awareness as education increases. Being aware 
of foreign music items is linked with higher years of education, with M32 Justin Bieber being the most 
stratified. There are only two exceptions—the local operas (M48), and Wulantuya (M28), which are slightly 
better known by people with lower levels of education. It is also notable that this aware-unaware distinction 
is more observable for specific music items, but is obscured for broad music categories—rock, Mainland pop, 
Cantopop, HK & TW pop, folk, Internet music, and classical West do not show a significant difference in 
awareness. 
This result confirms the cultural omnivore account that those who are highly educated are aware of music 
items, particularly selective foreign music. This presents two dilemmas for the cultural omnivore account. 
Firstly, the “omnivore test” is highly dependent on the music items that are asked. Asking more foreign items 
increases the degree of “cultural eclecticism,” whereas asking more items like local opera and Wulantuya 
drives the opposite result. Currently there is not an exhaustive list of cultural items out there, nor a proper 
way to neutrally sample cultural items that represent the interests of the advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups, therefore the “omnivore test” is always subject to researcher bias.  
Secondly, the claim of the cultural omnivore account that elites are more tolerant of low culture appears 
absurd since it is selective foreign music that they are more aware of, hardly a low culture. Therefore, I offer 
an alternative interpretation of cultural omnivores—both HCCs and LCCs are equally aware of mainstream 
music, but HCCs are also aware of a long list of selective foreign music. Rather than an indication of elite 
tolerance, the appearance of eclecticism points to 1) the bias in the inclusion of music items consumed by the 
elites, and 2) the very evidence for the exclusion of LCCs from cultural consumption. 
(2)  Likes and dislikes by item 
The figure below uses a similar methodology as that in the previous figure, but shows the mean years of 
education of those who selected highly like or like the item in a green triangle that points upwards, and a 
downward red triangle for those who selected highly like or dislike. The years of education has been centered 
at the average years of education of the sample. Those who selected neutral or unaware are not included in 
the calculations for the specific music item. This clearly separates the high-status music items from the low-
status ones, as the mean years of education flips from being higher for those who like, to being higher for 
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those who dislike. The differences between the years of education of likes and dislikes are t-tested, and 
indicated with a bar if the differences are significant. 
This figure shows the similarity between the status as defined by likes and status as defined by dislikes. 
Music items that are liked by the highly educated are also generally polarized in being disliked by those with 
low levels of education—this would not be the case had more respondents selected unaware or neutral 
instead of selecting polarized results. There are also a number of local items which are more liked by LCCs 
than HCCs, an indication of symbolic exclusion (Bryson, 1996). 
Examining the cultural omnivore claim that those with higher education like more items, the conclusion is 
similar to that for awareness—it depends on the music items that are asked. While slightly more items see an 
increase in likes as education increases, there are also many items that are less liked—primarily local music 
items. Asking more local items will indicate lower cultural omnivorism or even the cultural eclecticism of the 
non-elites. Furthermore, this again demonstrates the superficiality of the cultural omnivore argument. While 
both HCCs and LCCs like mainstream music items, HCCs also like a long list of foreign and traditional 
highbrow items. Rather than demonstrating the cultural tolerance of elites, cultural omnivore is an 
indication of cultural exclusion. 
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Figure 4-2. Music preference by years of education 
 
The line between the triangles indicates a statistically significant (<5%) difference between the years 
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Divisions within popular music 
Under pop culture, the most popular items of music are consumed across social strata, by its own definition. 
This gives the impression that popular culture is indeed widely consumed and free of symbolic violence, 
giving the benign appearance of freedom of consumption. However, under mass culture, music distinction is 
drawn not through mainstream items, but through less popular items which are distinctive. The following 
figure explains how less popular items are the ones that are stratified in society. 
Figure 4-3. The most stratified music items are less popular, while the most popular items are less 
stratified 
 
Plotting the popularity (percent of people like or highly like the music) and the difference in the mean 
of education for each music item. The size of the dot represents the degree of stratification. 
The difference between the average years of education of those who like and dislike the items is plotted 
against popularity. The differences between the years of education of those who like and dislike the music, 
i.e. the length of the horizontal distance between the triangles in the earlier figure, are shown the horizontal 
axis. The vertical axis shows the popularity of the music item—the percentage of the sample who reported 
highly-like or like on the music. To emphasize music items that are stratifying, the size of the bubbles is in 
relation to the degree of stratification, the absolute value of the difference between the years of education of 
those who like and dislike the music.  
Having popularity on the vertical axis reveals the relationship between hierarchy and popularity under 
popular culture. The most popular items tend to be not stratified. After all, being popular implies being 
widely liked across the population, providing the appearance of free-for-all choices in the consumption of 
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groups. These are the items that HCCs also embrace to lubricate their social relations. The stratifying music 
items are the ones that are less popular and more obscure in popularity. They include selective music such as 
R&B (M38), traditional highbrow music such as Western opera (M35). Stratifying music also includes items 
that are markers of low cultural capital, such as Plaza Dance (M39) used for symbolic exclusion. “Popular 
music” leaves a general impression of neutrality, but the hierarchy continues to persist at the fringes of 
popularity. 
(1)  Popular and trendy items are least stratified 
The trendy items are the music items that tend to be more popular and are less stratified. They are used by 
the HCCs, particularly those with high cultural capital, to reach down to lubricate social relations. These are 
the music items in the middle, which are neutral and not stratified by cultural capital. Latent trait analysis 
demonstrated this by separating foreign music into two different factors, with selective foreign being the 
stratifying and trendy foreign being the unstratified form. Similarly, Chinese music is separated into trendy 
Chinese and classics Hk/Taiwan. Items in the trendy Chinese and trendy foreign categories are not stratified 
by education, which can also be witnessed by their position in the middle vertical section on this chart. The 
analysis in the next section will also show that trendy music is the music for the cosmopolitans, as it is the 
music that bridges privileged and under-privileged people. 
(2)  Stratified music items are niche items that are less popular 
While most HCCs also consume popular music alongside the high-status ones, they particularly pursue 
selective, selective music items, which are the items that draw the highest distinctions. At times HCCs 
consume music as popular entertainment, such as to turn the brain off when jogging, or when there is a need 
to bridge across social divides, yet other times, they consume selective music items for enjoyment and 
appreciation.  
The high-status stratifying music items include traditional highbrow and selective popular items, both of 
which are consumed by the HCCs and distinguish their tastes from others. The selective music items include 
Western pop (M1), R&B (M38), Adele (M31), and traditional highbrow items included Western opera (M35) 
and Western classical (M34). Some stratifying music items are low status, which are used for symbolic 
exclusion. They include Phoenix Legend (M22), Dao Lang (M20), Net Music (M41), and Plaza Dance music 
(M39). Being unpopular by itself does not necessarily imply stratification, as niche items can be high-status, 
neutral, or low-status, as seen in the figure. 
The role of age has been found to be an important division in the shift from traditional highbrow culture 
toward “emerging” forms of cultural capital (Prieur and Savage, 2013). Researchers have found that while 
older elites are more attracted to traditional highbrow culture, younger elites are attracted toward newer 
commercial forms of culture (Bennett et al., 2009; Reeves, 2014). However, popular music items with high 
status are always changing, as each generation pursue the music that is niche and selective of its time. This 
section shows how HCCs upgrade through the changing current, and plateau in their favorites as they reach a 
certain age. 
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Differences in high-status music for different age groups 
Figure 4-4. Different high and low-status music of each age group 
 
Comparing differences in age (y) with educational stratification (x) 
The figure above compares the educational stratification of the music items by age. The horizontal axis shows 
the differences between the years of education of those who like and dislike the music. The vertical axis is the 
mean age of the people who like those music items. Recall that the age of the respondents ranges from 18-44 
and the mean age of the sample is 29.9 years. This figure shows that every age group has its own favored 
music. More favored by the young are items such as hip-hop, Justin Bieber, May Day, and Qu Wanting. More 
favored by the old tends to be local and traditional music, such as Yan Weiwen, Suzhou Pingtan, Wulantuya, 
and the Chinese operas. The music items that appear in the middle horizontally include items that are 
favored by those near 30 and those items that are favored across a diverse age range (which is not 
differentiated in the figure).  
Each age group has its own high-status and low-status music. The older respondents contrast between 
Wulantuya as low-status and Pingtan and Peking opera as high status. The younger respondents contrast 
between techno as lower status and May Day as higher status. Recognized across age groups are the most 
powerful music for distinction across the population, which are Western pop, R&B, Adele, Western opera, 
against Net Music, Daolang, and Phoenix Legend. It also shows that the music items liked by the older 
respondents are more likely to be low-status compared to the music items liked by younger respondents—
this is likely to be due to the rapid increase in the level of education of the younger respondents in the 
developing country, which leads the music associated with the less educated old to be weighted down as low-
status. It could also be partially due to research design which did not include specific low-status items that 
Older 
Younger 
Mid-age, or wide appeal 
Newer music items 
Older music items 
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are recognized by the youngest Chinese (which could be names of specific stars of Net Music, who would be 
less recognized by the older respondents thus lowering the mean age). Also notable is the increase in cultural 
stratification for the younger respondents compared to the older ones—the “highbrow” music for the oldest 
age group is far less stratified compared to the Western pop music of the younger age groups. 
Therefore, the competition for high music status is always changing. The high-status of Pingtan and Kunqu, 
for example, is concentrated in the older group, while Western opera has high-status among the middle age 
group in this study. For the younger respondents, high status means R&B and Adele. New items of music will 
continue to appear, and some will climb toward high status for the next generation of Chinese. The process 
on how respondents pursue selective music, “upgrading” their initial mainstream tastes toward high-status 
tastes, will be discussed in the next section. 
Distinction in popular music occurs in niche, selective items 
The last chapter showed how the music landscape is a field of competition between status and popularity. 
The most popular items are unstratified, and it is the less popular items that mark distinction, which the 
LCCs are less able to differentiate. The earlier section also showed that LCCs tend to judge music through 
popularity, following the mainstream, whereas in their search for quality, HCCs pursue the niche and 
selective. 
Researches that look at large categories of music only observe “boundary crossing” at the category level, 
where elites appear to also like popular genres, but they miss the nuanced distinction which cannot be 
captured through genre-based preferences common in national surveys. The large number of music items 
asked in my survey enables the illustration of the relationship between popularity and status at the item 
level. Hence, surveys that ask only about the most popular and widely known items are only scraping the 
surface (the upper part of the chart) and fails to find the stratification by less popular items (situated toward 
the bottom of the part). For example, traditional music shows a heavy degree of internal stratification. 
Nowadays, the location of performance (rural stage or urban theatres) and the location of the audience 
(developing regions or cosmopolitan cities) allow varieties of traditional art to occupy across different status 
positions (see Xiao, 2015 for Henan Opera; Yin, 2003 for Huangmei Opera; Zhang, 2014 for Shanxi Opera). 
The local operas are more confined in influence and seen as less prestigious. Local operas and folk music 
were once entertainment of the mass, as part of rural entertainment, or local festivals (Johnson, 1985), but 
now frequently associated with an aging audience and poorer social standings. Nowadays, the location of 
performance (rural stage or urban theatres) and the location of the audience (developing regions or 
cosmopolitan cities) allow varieties of traditional art to occupy across different status positions (see Xiao, 
2015 for Henan Opera; Yin, 2003 for Huangmei Opera; Zhang, 2014 for Shanxi Opera).  
The findings in this study confirm the above. Western highbrow music occupies the most dominant position 
in the traditional music hierarchy, followed by the Chinese music types which were traditionally legitimized 
at the national level, however, there is also a variety of traditional music that does not have a highbrow 
status. While countless traditional art forms of the mass are becoming endangered or extinct, selected 
traditional highbrow variants are receiving state support and public interest from those with high cultural 
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capital. Finally, red songs are lowbrow in the category, showing that the most educated ones have distanced 
from that category of music. 
Slippery omnivores 
The decrease in awareness to a certain extent, but particularly the decrease in preference of the elites are too 
numerous to unequivocally support that elites “like more of everything.” As described earlier, elites favor 
items rather selectively. A sizable number of music items decreases in awareness or preference as education 
increases. In fact, there are music items with increased awareness but decreased preference, and vice versa—
showing that while educated elites exhibit cultural eclecticism, they are also less aware of local music items. 
Elites do tend to be aware of more mainstream and foreign items in general, but if more local items are asked 
it would show a different side. Their dislikes are also more complicated than simply disliking what the lower-
strata likes (Bryson, 1996), as they also dislike what those in the local strata-dislike, but to dislike it more (for 
example, Plaza Dance M39). The optimistic proposition that tolerant elites are open to liking everything is 
not well-grounded, and is due to not asking enough specific, local items. In contrary, “cultural omnivores” 
points to the cultural exclusion of LCCs from high-status selective foreign music and traditional music 
consumed by the HCCs. 
Empirical evidence for cultural eclecticism is partly magnified by having surveys that ask apparently 
“mainstream” items that favor the relatively well off, overlooking the more diversified, grassroot cultures of 
the local. Eclecticism would be a prevailing finding had this research only focused on the “most popular” 
music items. If only the most popular artists are selected (M13 Jacky Cheung, M6 Teresa Teng, etc), plus the 
most favorable and highly aware genres (M40 Rock, M43 Folk, M36 Hip Hop, M34 Western classical), plus 
some generic categories (M1 Western pop, M3 Cantopop, M2 J-pop/K-pop)—which seems quite reasonable 
of a research design and highly reminiscent of the items researched in the West—the evidence would point to 
cultural omnivores. Popular items and generic categories lead to the discovery of cultural omnivores. 
Whereas research that asks about local and less mainstream items (M48 local operas M48, M20 Dao Lang, 
M22 Phoenix Legend, M39 Plaza Dance, M25 Yan Weiwen, and M41 Net Music) would paint a remarkably 
different picture. Elites are more aware of commoditized mainstream items, but less aware of local items. 
Quantitative research that focuses on the mainstream picks up the eclecticism but not the stratification. 
Although Peterson and Kern never intended to refute Bourdieu with the omnivore account, saying 
“omnivorous taste…does not signify that the omnivore likes everything indiscriminantly” and that 
“omnivorousness does not imply an indifference to distinctions” (1996: 904), some critics use the largely 
empirical finding to refute Bourdieu’s theory. Those attempts are usually based on a grossly oversimplified 
understanding of Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s concepts are difficult and oversimplified by his critics, which is not 
helped by the need for translation from French, or his often criticized cryptic writing style (DiMaggio et al., 
1979: 1466; Goldthorpe, 2007: 2). Critics frequently reduce Bourdieu’s theory to a grossly simplified form—
turning his elaborate arguments on taste to a simple argument that elites exclusively consume highbrow art. 
With the rise of quantitative survey results suggesting the rise of omnivores, critics are quick to debunk 
Bourdieu’s theory based on that evidence. His theories became somehow contingent on elites who exclusivity 
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consume highbrow art. To those scholars, the discovery that elites also consume other art forms is taken to 
be a refutation of Bourdieu’s theory (e.g. Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b). 
In many ways, Bourdieu’s theory of taste and the omnivore account are on separate levels of analysis that do 
not directly speak to each other. Bourdieu’s theory of taste is a complex set of theories encompassing 
concepts like cultural capital, habitus, and field, while the omnivore account is closer to an empirical finding 
still in search of explanations. The omnivore account presents an empirical challenge for Bourdieu, but 
without adequately explaining why and how there are status differences between art forms. Cultural 
eclecticism is explained rather simplistically as increasing respect, tolerance, and openness to cultures of 
others (Peterson and Kern, 1996). Characteristics of being open to other cultures are also inherent to many 
theories in cosmopolitanism (Hannerz, 1990; Roudometof, 2005; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002; Tomlinson, 
1999), “a willingness to engage with the other” (Hannerz, 1990: 239). Yet scholars have continued to argue 
that the number of omnivores as described is limited in numbers (Warde and Bennett, 2008), the persistence 
of exclusion (Bryson, 1996, 1997; Warde et al., 1999), and the issue of cultural disengagement (Bennett et al., 
2009; Le Roux et al., 2008). The omnivore account is primarily an empirical observation, based on eclectic 
methods and definitions—from counting the number of likes between social groups, to seeing whether those 
who like highbrow music also like middlebrow and lowbrow art, without consistent theorization on what 
omnivorism actually entails (Robette and Roueff, 2014).  
This section examined whether the phenomenon of cultural omnivores is also witnessed in China. On the 
surface, the evidence for cultural omnivorism appears compelling. However, a closer inspection into the 
meaning of cultural omnivorism reveals that the concept is problematic and does not imply the decrease of 
cultural barriers. Firstly, the cultural omnivore thesis has a conceptual shortcoming that overstates its 
meaningfulness—eclecticism of the elites and disengagement of the lower strata can easily be the result of the 
choice of music items. This research asks a larger number of items as well as more specific artists compared 
to typical research on music, and discovers that the items that the privileged like more tend to be imported 
and globalized music items, while the underprivileged typically like more of local music items. Testing more 
items preferred by the lower strata can easily flip the result to find eclecticism of the underprivileged (e.g. in 
my case by asking more of Phoenix Legend, Wulantuya, and other local artists, while asking fewer items of 
foreign music). Cultural eclecticism is simply a reflection of the balance on items asked. Claims that elites 
consume more “types of music” or more “types of cultural activities” is slippery as they are largely dependent 
on how the “types” are operationalized. Cultural omnivorism is a tautology because, rather than ‘elites like 
more of everything,’ it merely shows ‘the questionnaire asked more items that elites like.’ 
Secondly, the cultural omnivores thesis portrays highbrow consumers crossing boundaries into middle and 
lowbrow music as a sign of increasing equality. This account overlooks the hierarchy that has developed 
within popular music, as elites are selective and exclusionary in their consumption of pop culture. Cultural 
omnivorism should be more narrowly seen as—people who enjoy highbrow music now also likes pop. 
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 Multivariate analysis using MIRT 
Using ANOVA to compare taste between socioeconomic subgroups 
To further examine whether a cultural hierarchy exists, this research uses MIRT (a latent trait analysis) and 
ANOVA, which examines different subtypes of music to examine their stratification. MIRT first distills the 
different types of tastes that give rise to differences in music preferences, to discover that different music 
serves different roles in social distinction (see chapter 2 for the full discussion on MIRT).  
After deriving the six music factors, they are analyzed by analysis of variance (ANOVA), a method common in 
behavioral sciences and is methodologically related to regression (Cronbach, 1957). ANOVA is regarded to be 
a robust test, with a high tolerance for violations to its normality assumptions such as under conditions of 
skew and kurtosis (Field et al., 2012: 412–414). Given the potential that the survey oversampled privileged 
individuals due to their higher interest in music and thus their participation rate, the use of ANOVA to 
compares tastes between groups is an appropriate test to use. ANOVA is used as a between-group design 
which tests whether different subgroups differ in their tastes, which eliminates most issues caused by over-
sampling privileged subgroups. ANOVA is also robust to unequal sample sizes to a substantial extent, with 
the homogeneity of variance has been tested and that assumption has not been violated. This provides proof 
whether socioeconomic factors stratify the different taste factors in society at large, while the mechanisms of 
taste division will be further analyzed through smaller sample interviews in later chapters. 
Different forms of social advantages, such as urban hukou, political advantages of the parents, parental 
education and parental wealth, reinforce each other in China. Of particular importance is education 
attainment, which all the privileged leverage their positions to advantage their child (Chiang, 2018; Deng and 
Treiman, 1997; Wu, 2010, 2011). The variables are added one by one into a model instead of adding all 
variables to the same model because the goal is to examine, for example, whether different income groups 
differ in their tastes once cultural capital and individual differences of age, sex and city are considered, rather 
than to examine whether income is influential on taste on top of occupational class. In other words, they are 
examined as a separate treatment effect, rather than for their marginal effects on top of all the other 
variables. Also, the goal of this research is not to predict the taste of hypothetical respondents, e.g. the taste 
of non-party parents who work in the government, which requires controlling for every factor to determine 
which of these causes highbrow taste in isolation. ANOVA is used to see whether differences in mean are 
statistically significant between population subgroups. The goal of this is to examine whether the factors that 
tell about the past influences taste, and whether the influence of the past is direct, or indirect through the 
higher chances of educational attainment.  
Dependent variables: music tastes and participation 
The concept of “legitimate” art used by Bourdieu poses a methodological challenge in China. Whereas 
research in the West sometimes use classical music and opera as variables for legitimate culture to measure 
the effect of enjoying highbrow art on various aspects of social attainment or position (DiMaggio, 1982a; 
DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985; Kraaykamp and Van Eijck, 2010; Rössel and Schroedter, 2015; Van Eijck, 1999), 
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this approach that relies on a priori assumption on what is highbrow is untenable in China because it is 
unclear which music is highbrow in contemporary China. In this research, “legitimate” culture is part of the 
open inquiry rather than assumed in advance. Items are not presumed to have a relationship with 
socioeconomic variables in the derivation of the taste factors; the relationship of socioeconomic variables and 
tastes are analyzed using regression afterward.  
Research that assumes certain music to be highbrow has only 1 independent variable to analyze—the number 
of highbrow or lowbrow music liked or disliked (Bryson, 1996; e.g. Peterson and Kern, 1996). By not taking 
the assumption in China, multiple music variables need to be analyzed. For each of the 49 music questions 
(53 music items in total), respondents were asked to rate on a Likert scale from highly-like, like, neutral, 
dislike, highly-dislike, or the option to select unaware if they cannot sufficiently recall what the music sounds 
like to give a preference. MIRT (Multidimensional Item Response Theory) reveal the 6 underlying 
dimensions of taste that lead to the differences in expressed music preferences. Individuals’ taste profiles are 
then compared to see the differences in means between population subgroups.  
Figure 4-5. The density function of the six factor-scores 
 
A fitted normal distribution is over-plotted in black dash 
In addition to the 6 taste factors above, this research also ask for the number of live music events 
attended in the past year. The variable has been converted to a continuous variable. The graph above shows 
that a negative binomial distribution (size = 0.7119, mu = 1.1651) best approximates the data, whereas a 
normal distribution does not. 
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Figure 4-6. Density function of live music attended 
 
A fitted negative binomial distribution (size = 0.7119, mu = 1.1651) is over-plotted in black dash, and a 
fitted normal distribution (mean = 1.1651, sd = 1.5673) in red dots. 
Independent variables 
The music taste and participations will be compared between different socioeconomic subgroups, which are 
education, occupational class, income, as well as the controlling variables of age, gender, and city. Each of 
those variables will be described below. 
(1)  Education 
The first socioeconomic variable to examine is years of education. It plays a key role in social stratification in 
modern societies, with a strong linkage between social origin and education attainment, as seen in multiple 
comparative studies (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Treiman and Yip, 1989). Education reflects the primary 
accumulation of cultural capital from parental cultural background, as well as their own secondary 
achievement, so it is commonly used to operationalize cultural capital. In empirical studies, education has a 
strong linkage with cultural taste and practices (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b; Kraaykamp and Van Eijck, 
2010; Reeves, 2015). While education is influential in countries in the West, to the extent of being frequently 
used as a proxy for cultural capital, whether education influences taste in China may not be as obvious as it 
seems for two main reasons. Firstly, Bourdieu believes cultural capital primarily comes from being raised in a 
family with high cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986), but it’s questionable whether this exists in 
contemporary China. Inequality developed in China only within the most recent generation, different from 
most Western societies which never experienced a period of socialism. Secondly, education opportunities 
increased massively in China in recent decades. This increased social mobility and challenges the 
intergenerational social reproduction process described by Bourdieu.  
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Table 4-5. Subgroups by education 
 cases pct 
Middle School or Below 74 7% 
High School 177 17% 
College 286 27% 
Bachelor 396 38% 
Above Bachelor 110 11% 
Total 1043 100% 
Excludes 5 young students whose eventual education attainment is uncertain 
Those with middle school or below, high school, college, bachelor, or above bachelor’s degree consist of 7%, 
17%, 27%, 38%, and 11% of the sample, respectively. Those who are currently pursuing a degree are 
presumed to be able to complete their degree. For increased precision, this analysis also excluded young 
students whose eventual highest education attainment is uncertain. 88 respondents are currently students, 
implying their eventual higher education attained might be higher than currently reported, which may 
distort the relationship between education and taste. 64 students already pursuing bachelor's degree or 
above already have a high level of education so they are kept in the sample. For the students pursuing middle 
school or below, high school, or college, those who are adult students behind the typical educational 
trajectory are kept in the sample, as they are presumed unlikely to complete a degree beyond the current one. 
There are 3 high school students age 18, and 2 college students age 19 whose eventual educational attainment 
is uncertain. Although the impact of this is determined to be almost negligible, these cases have been 
dropped from the analysis. The continuous variable for education is used for ANOVA. 
(2)  Occupational class 
The definition of class is a sensitive topic in China. Because Marxism-Leninism continues to be the national 
ideology, government’s official position on class is still a Marxist conception with the exploiting classes 
eliminated, allowing for 2 classes in China—proletariats and peasants, as the Communist party prides itself 
in abolishing all other exploitive classes after the Communist revolution (Li, 2016). Goodman argues that 
today’s Chinese society is stratified into a dominant class—consisting of political elites and economic elites, 
the middle classes—consisting of educated white collars in large cities, and a sizable subordinate classes who 
exchange physical labor for income (Goodman, 2014). According to Goodman, the state discourse on “middle 
class” includes what normally would be recognized as the upper class in other societies, downplaying the 
existence of an upper class in the supposedly socialist society (2014: 93). In recognition of the changes since 
market development, the government now allows the discussion of (mainly occupational-based) social strata 
(Anagnost, 2008; Lu, 2002; Tomba, 2016). 
Chinese scholars have been pushing for the recognition of increasing inequality through an occupational 
hierarchy modeled after Goldthorpe, adeptly called strata instead of class (Guo, 2016; Lu, 2012). The 
occupational class model of Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero (EGP) is a definition of social class common in 
Europe and the US, and is modeled after the distinction between employers, employees, and employment on 
labor and service contracts. This data is not used to discuss the construction of class, but examine whether 
the EGP occupational definition of class show differences in taste. 
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Occupational information has been collected from the respondents through an open response on their 
occupation, as well as a clarifying question on whether they are the employee, manager, or owner of the 
organization. These are used to determine the EGP strata. The official EGP classification consists of 7 classes, 
which are 1) higher and 2) lower managerial and professional occupations, 3) intermediate occupations, 4) 
small proprietors, 5) lower supervisory and technical occupations, 6) semi-routine and 7) routine 
occupations. To reduce the false sense of precision, this analysis groups them under three wider groups of the 
service occupations (EGP 1 & 2), mixed occupations (EGP 3 & 4), and manual occupations (EGP 5, 6, 7). 
Naturally, this analysis excludes all students from the sample. 
Table 4-6. Subgroups by EGP class 
EGP HH Income Years of 
Education 
cases pct 
Manual (EGP 567) 13,492 12.7 181 21.1% 
Mixed (EGP 34) 22,530 14.4 456 53.1% 
Service (EGP12) 25,638 15.5 221 25.8% 
Total - - 858 100% 
Excludes non-working respondents (students, home-makers, unemployed, etc) 
Those with manual, mixed, and service occupations consist of 21.1%, 53.1%, and 25.8% of the sample 
respectively. Because occupational class is linked with educational and economic positions, descriptive 
statistics on education and income grouped by occupational class are provided above. The mean household 
incomes per month for the three occupations are 13492, 22530, and 25638 from low to high occupation. The 
years of education are 12.7, 14.4, and 15.5 respectively.  
(3)  Income 
Income is measured as the average household monthly pre-tax earnings. Household rather than personal 
income is used because it accounts for those who choose not to work for income and rely on the income of the 
household. This is intended to be a rough measure of the amount available for spending, recognizing that 
individuals in a wealthy family might take on otherwise lower-income jobs for passion or to abstain from 
work. The log of income is used in the model to represent a normal distribution more closely. Some of the 
respondents are students, which recorded household income of the parental household. Although there is no 
conclusive difference in the results whether students are kept or removed, to eliminate any uncertainty, the 
student cases (8.4% of the sample) have been dropped, leaving us with 960 cases.  




Below 4k 104 11% 
4 to10k 328 34% 
10 to 20k 266 28% 
Above 20k 262 27% 
Total 960 100% 
Excludes 88 students 
Those with monthly household income below ¥4,000, ¥4,000-¥10,000, ¥10,000-¥12,000, and above 
¥20,000 consists of 11%, 34%, 28%, and 27% of the sample respectively. The clearest difference in taste 
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between income groups is in local music and live music. Selective foreign, trendy foreign, and classics 
Hk/Taiwan also shows a less decisive trend of increasing taste as income increases. 
(4)  Cosmopolitan experience 
Cosmopolitan experience is the experience of being well-traveled and rising beyond local perspectives (Beck, 
2006; Calhoun, 2002; Hannerz, 1990). This is operationalized through three variables: experience living 
abroad, employment by a foreign company, and experience living in multiple cities.  
Table 4-8. Crosstabulation of the subgroups for lived abroad, working for a foreign company, and the 
number of cities lived  
 Foreign Employment 
No Yes Row Total 
Lived 
abroad 
No 909 68 977 (93.2%) 
Yes 55 16 71 (6.8%) 
Column total 964 (92.0%) 84 (8.0%)  
 
 Number of cities lived 





Yes 37 34 71 (6.8%) 
No 590 387 977 (93.2%) 




Experience living abroad is based on the survey question that asks whether the respondent has lived outside 
of Mainland China for over 6 months, which can be for work or study. Foreign experience is rather rare in the 
sampled respondents. Seven percent of the respondents have lived abroad for at least 6 months, while the 
majority have not. 
Foreign employment is a binary variable from a question on the type of company that the respondent works 
(or last worked) for, which could be a foreign company or joint venture, as opposed to working for the 
government, state-owned enterprises, local company, or self-employed. Those who are students are 
considered to be not working for a foreign company. The percentage of respondents who currently works for 
a foreign company is 8%.  
The number of cities lived measures the number of cities that the respondent has lived for over 6 months. 
According to the cosmopolitanism hypothesis, those who have lived in more places have a broader exposure 
to a diversity of cultures and have a vision beyond the local, with the potential for higher openness and 
tolerance. The number who have lived in one, two, and more than two cities represent 28%, 32%, and 40% of 
the sample, respectively.  
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Control variables 
ANOVA is run to both test for significance in the differences, as well as to control for other factors. For 
example, due to the expansion of educational opportunities, younger respondents are likely to have higher 
levels of educational attainment, so differences in taste between educational subgroups could be truly due to 
education, or could be due to being enjoyed by the young who tends to be better educated. Age, sex, and city 
are the three variables which are controlled. A multilevel model which models city as a random effect has 
been tested, but the results show a negligible difference, therefore the simpler model is presented in this 
research. 
(1)  Age 
Respondents between the age of 18 and 45 (non-inclusive) were included in this study. They are further 
grouped into a young, middle, and older subgroup as age 18-24, 25-34, and 35-44 (all inclusive). The 
continuous variable for age been used as a control, but the subgroups are presented below. 
Table 4-9. Subgroups by age  
 cases pct 
Age 18 to 24 293 28% 
Age 25 to 34 406 39% 
Age 35 to 44 349 33% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
(2)  Gender 
Gender is a dummy variable with males as the reference. Gender is controlled in ANOVA models because it 
has been found to be linked with music preferences.  
Table 4-10. Subgroups by gender  
 cases pct 
Male 583 0.56 
Female 465 0.44 
Total 1048 100% 
 
(3)  City 
Four megacities in China are included in this study, stratified according to their urban population. City is a 
categorical variable, converted into dummy variables with those in Beijing, the capital city, coded as the 
reference category. A study in overall media consumption has found significant differences in media 
consumption by city. Shanghai has a strong region-centrism in showing much more interested in local media 
and local issues, supported by a strong local media industry under the leading Shanghai Media Group whose 
TV channels achieved 76% during prime time in 2003 (Lee et al., 2013: 50–53). Consumption between 
coastal and inland regions have also been found to be different (Zhou et al., 2010). Regional differences in 
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China complicated by various factors such as regional cultural differences, internal migration, socioeconomic 
factors, local regulation and industry composition which has eluded encompassing explanations. 
Table 4-11. Subgroups by city 
 cases pct 
Beijing 346 33% 
Shanghai 352 34% 
Guangzhou 140 13% 
Chengdu 210 20% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
 Divisions in music taste 
Applying ANOVA to factor scores 
The following section substantiates my claims by applying ANOVA to the six music factors from MIRT. The 
result shows that educational attainment is the most influential on taste, supporting the role of cultural 
capital. Selective foreign music and traditional music have the highest status, along with participation in live 
music. Local music has the lowest status. These results confirm that selective music types are the most 
stratifying. Trendy Foreign and trendy Chinese music are not stratified by education—they are neutral and 
used by the HCCs for social lubrication. Finally, classics Hk/Taiwan has an intermediate status of being 
popular but also weakly stratifying. 
The most high-status music types 
(1)  Highbrow traditional music constitutes a traditional form of cultural capital 
This analysis examines the music variables between different social-economic subgroups to see how the 
music taste differs. We start with traditional music. The first model considers whether taste for traditional 
music differs by years of education, controlled by age, sex, and city. This indicates that education stratifies 
the taste for traditional music, and is significant at 0.1%. Age also significantly influences the taste for 
traditional music on top of education. 
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Table 4-12. ANOVA results for traditional music 






Edu 27.94 *** 23.88 *** 24.53 *** 















  Age 27.5 *** 21.41 *** 21.59 *** 
(28.94) (22.07) (22.69) 






(1.27) (0.75) (0.69) 













cases 1043  858  960  
The cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
Model 2 adds EGP occupational class to the previous model. In models without education (a result which is 
not presented here), EGP is significant but becomes insignificant after controlling for education. Education is 
kept in model 2 to examine whether EGP stratifies taste after controlling for cultural capital. The result 
indicates that EGP class does not stratify taste once education is controlled. 
Similarly, income is added to model 3. The sample size used in the model is different because they exclude 
different respondents in each model: students, non-working people, people without income, as explained 
earlier in the variables.  
For brevity, none of those terms are significant, which leaves education and age as the only significant terms 
in the influence on traditional music. The factor scores for traditional music are plotted below, by the 
subgroups which are significant—in this case education and age. Traditional music is stratified by education, 
where those with higher levels of education show higher appreciations for traditional music. It is also more 
appreciated by those who are older. Therefore, despite the social upheavals that saw the changing legitimacy 
in music as well as the ban of elite cultures during the Cultural Revolution, traditional music continues to be 
a cultural capital today. This result parallels Bourdieusian descriptions of classical music as highbrow music 
Western societies. 
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Figure 4-7. Significant subgroup differences in the factor scores for traditional music 
 
(2)  Selective foreign music is an emerging cultural capital 
The same ANOVA models are also applied to selective foreign music. Differences in the taste for selective 
foreign music continue to be associated with different years of education, significant at 0.01%. Gender is also 
significant at 0.01%. Other variables tested from model 2 to 3 are not significant. 
Table 4-13. ANOVA results for selective foreign music 






Edu 57.37 *** 36.59 *** 47.48 *** 




















(0.16) (0.03) (0.24) 
  Gender 29.06 *** 17.95 *** 25.3 *** 
(31.77) (19.40) (27.16) 













cases 1043  858  960  
The cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The figure below shows the differences in factor scores between subgroups which were significantly different 
based on ANOVA F-test, which are education and gender. The extent of stratification by education shows 
that selective foreign is high status music, with a contrast between educational groups that is greater than 
traditional music—the differences in taste between college and middle school and below is much greater for 
selective foreign than for traditional music. Furthermore, preferences for selective foreign are not 
significantly different for different age and income groups, showing that they are not merely limited to the 
youth or the rich, but valued by society overall as a cultural capital. 
Chapter 4. Cultural omnivores or the persistence of distinction  
 108 
Figure 4-8. Significant subgroup differences in the factor scores for selective foreign 
 
(3)  Participating in live music 
Finally, the questionnaire also asks for the number of live music events participated in the last year, which is 
also analyzed here by using ANOVA with a negative binomial model. Live music is significantly stratified by 
education (model 1) at 0.01% significance. Yet this is also stratified by income (model 3). Age, gender, and 
city have no significant influence. 
Table 4-14. ANOVA results for participation in live music 










   
Income (Log) 
    
24.09 *** 


















cases 1043  858  960  
The cells indicate Chi-squared values, and the level of significance 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The figure below shows the actual number of live events participated by subgroups. Participating in live 
events is a high-status behavior, as it is higher for privileged social groups. The high participation rates by 
those with high levels of cultural capital indicate that attending live music is a high-status taste.  
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Figure 4-9. Significant subgroup differences in the participation of live music 
 
The music for symbolic exclusion 
(4)  Local music is distinctive as the music for LCCs 
Local music is the music that is recognized to be low status across the most subgroups. Tastes for local music 
is significantly different between education and EGP class subgroups, both at 0.01%. By income, it is 
significantly different at 5%. It is also different by age, gender, and city, significant at 0.01%, 5%, and 0.01%, 
respectively. 
Table 4-15. ANOVA results for local music 






Edu 38.99 *** 26.4 *** 22.61 *** 










    
6.92 *   
(7.68) 
  Age 26.21 *** 12.68 *** 19.38 *** 
(29.28) (13.97) (21.51) 
  Gender 3.95 * 2.68 . 3.24 . 
(4.41) (2.95) (3.6) 
  City 30.41 *** 18.95 *** 24.94 *** 
(11.33) (6.96) (9.23) 






  cases 1043  858  960  
The cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The values of the tastes for local music by subgroups are presented in the figure below. Local music is low-
status because it is disliked by those with high levels of education and income, and liked by those who work 
in manual jobs. It is also liked by those who are older. Differences between cities are also visible, as it is most 
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liked by those in Beijing and least by those in Guangzhou—which is much more influenced by music from 
Hong Kong. 
Local music is the only item that is stratified by both education, EGP class, and income, which shows that its 
dislike is recognized across many forms of privileges. Local music is widely recognized to be low-status, 
denigrated by both HCCs and MCCs in the interviews as well. 
Figure 4-10. Significant subgroup differences in the factor scores for local music 
 
Popular and weakly stratifying music types 
(5)  Classics Hk/Taiwan music 
Classics Hk/Taiwan music exhibits characteristics of a weakly distinguishing music. It is stratified by 
education (model 1), which is significant at 0.01% but less so than traditional, selective foreign, or live music. 
Neither EGP nor income stratifies it (models 2,3), but gender and city do (at 0.01% and 5%, respectively). 
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Table 4-16. ANOVA results for classics Hk/Taiwan music 






Edu 24.81 *** 16.14 *** 19.83 *** 


























(2.37) (0.00) (0.63) 
  Gender 80.38 *** 70.08 *** 63.42 *** 
(89.75) (78.92) (69.66) 
  City 9.22 * 8.41 * 9.36 * 







cases 1043  858  960  
The cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
Classics Hk/Taiwan music has the sign of a distinguishing type of music because it is more preferred by those 
with higher levels of education, but only slightly, and much weaker than the stratification of traditional, 
selective foreign, and local music—a result which can be seen in the figure below, as well as the relatively low 
F-value in education (24.81). It is more preferred by people in Guangzhou, which is a city close to Hong Kong 
and more influenced by Hong Kong music. 
Figure 4-11. Significant subgroup differences in the factor scores for classics Hk/Taiwan 
 
Trendy music is popular and the least stratified 
(6)  Trendy foreign music 
Model 1 shows that the taste for trendy foreign music is not stratified by education, in contrast to selective 
foreign. Trendy Foreign is stratified by age and gender, both at 0.01%. Yet tastes for trendy foreign are 
significantly different between income (5%) subgroups. 
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Table 4-17. ANOVA results for trendy foreign music 






















    
5.98 *   
(6.23) 
  Age 36.84 *** 38.99 *** 37.5 *** 
(38.85) (40.48) (39.13) 
  Gender 14.25 *** 13.65 *** 11.7 *** 
(15.02) (14.17) (12.20) 
  City 7.16 . 7.8 * 7.44 . 
(2.52) (2.70) (2.59) 






  cases 1043  858  960  
The cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The figure below shows the factor scores for trendy foreign by the significant subgroups. Firstly, the 
preferences for trendy foreign does not significantly differ between levels of education or differences in 
occupational class. But unlike selective foreign, trendy foreign is more liked by the younger. It is also slightly 
better liked by those with higher income (significance at 5%). Trendy foreign can thus be considered a music 
type that serves for social lubrication, particularly for those with various associated with the foreign, and 
music that is more liked by the youth.  
Figure 4-12. Significant subgroup differences in the factor scores for trendy foreign 
 
(7)  Trendy Chinese music 
Likewise, model 1 shows that education does not stratify trendy Chinese music, whereas age, gender, and city 
all play a part. The other models show that different levels of EGP class differ in their taste for trendy Chinese 
music, a result which is significant at 5%. 
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Table 4-18. ANOVA results for trendy Chinese music 






Edu 3.28 . 4.29 * 2.64 . 


























  Residuals 960.09 
 
772.61  861.9 
 
  cases 1043  858  960  
The cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The figure below shows how the factor scores for trendy Chinese music differ by subgroups. The important 
result is that cultural capital again does not stratify trendy Chinese music. Income does not stratify, and EGP 
is only slightly significant at 5%. Primarily the differences arise from factors that are not directly linked to 
social inequality, such as age, gender, and city. Trendy Chinese music is a popular type of music more 
favored by the young. 
Figure 4-13. Significant subgroup differences in the factor scores for trendy Chinese 
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Cosmopolitan cultural capital and taste eclecticism 



















Lived Abroad 0.03  0.05  10.88 *** 0.03  0.11  0.19  8.45 *** 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (11.69)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.21)    
Foreign Firm 1.49  2.40  4.30 * 0.66  3.71 . 2.87 . 0.14  
(1.57)  (2.63)  (4.62)  (0.74)  (4.02)  (3.23)    
Cities Lived 
(Sqrt) 
1.67  0.35  0.59  6.00 * 5.34 * 5.69 * 6.50 * 
(1.76)  (0.39)  (0.63)  (6.72)  (5.79)  (6.42)    
Education 23.28 *** 50.95 *** 0.18  20.83 *** 4.87 * 40.29 *** 42.83 *** 
 (24.55)  (55.80)  (0.19)  (23.35)  (5.28)  (45.43)    
Age 26.73 *** 0.32  42.88 *** 2.43  27.20 *** 26.44 *** 0.17  
 (28.20)  (0.35)  (46.06)  (2.72)  (29.50)  (29.81)    
Sex 1.33  27.84 *** 12.90 *** 75.87 *** 38.02 *** 3.19 . 0.03  
 (1.41)  (30.49)  (13.86)  (85.02)  (41.24)  (3.60)    
City 4.20  4.71  5.07  8.63 * 20.16 *** 31.82 *** 3.16  
 (1.48)  (1.72)  (1.81)  (3.22)  (7.29)  (11.96)    
Residuals 984.04  947.70  966.22  926.32  956.94  920.50  3.00  
cases 1048  1048  1048  1048  1048  1048  1048  
F1-F6: The cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
Live music: the cells indicate Chi-squared values, and the level of significance 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
Instead of contributing to social distinction as a “cosmopolitan cultural capital” (Bühlmann et al., 2013; 
Igarashi and Saito, 2014; Prieur and Savage, 2014), cosmopolitanism is contributing to openness and 
tolerance (Beck, 2006, 2018; Chan, 2019; Hannerz, 1990, 1996; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002; Vertovec, 
2009). This can be seen through all three indicators of cosmopolitanism. 
Experience living abroad and working for a foreign company are indicators of “foreign cosmopolitanism”—
which leads to higher interest in trendy foreign music. Whereas traditional and selective foreign are most 
favored by those with higher levels of education, foreign cosmopolitanism has no influence on those music 
types. The sum of squares for the living abroad term is 0.003 for traditional music and 0.05 for selective 
foreign, and the coefficients of foreign firm are 1.49 and 2.40 respectively, none of which are significant. 
Experience abroad only contributes to favoring trendy foreign music (Sum of squared 10.88, 0.1% 
significance)—a relatively popular, social lubricating music not stratified by education. It also contributes to 
higher participation in live music (Chi-squared 8.45, 0.1% significance), an activity also associated with 
income and education. The influence of working for a foreign firm is similar to living abroad but much 
weaker, with significant influence only on trendy foreign music (sum of squared 10.88, 0.1% significance). 
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Figure 4-14. Music categories significantly stratified by experience abroad 
 
Figure 4-15. Music categories significantly stratified by working for a foreign company 
 
In this study, the number of cities lived is primarily local cities, so this is a variable for “local 
cosmopolitanism.” Those who have lived in more cities are also more likely to prefer the Chinese music 
categories that are lubricating—classics Hk/Taiwan and trendy music (Sum of squared 6.00 and 5.34, both 
significant at 5%), both of which are music types for social lubrication. Surprisingly, local cosmopolitanism 
also increases the taste for local music (Sum of squared 5.69, 5% significance)—the only factor that decreases 
symbolic exclusion. Likewise, local cosmopolitanism does not increase preference for traditional highbrow or 
selective foreign music, both of which are highly favored by the educated.  
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This research finds that Bourdieu’s description of the music hierarchy is observed through stratifying music, 
but in support of the cultural omnivores account, there also exists a category of music which is generally 
unstratified and consumed across social positions. Furthermore, music is taste is also influenced by many 
other factors such as age, gender, and geographical divides. 
(1)  The existence of music hierarchy, drawing distinction based on stratifying music  
Education is the socioeconomic variable that has the highest influence on taste—significant for traditional, 
selective foreign, local, classics Hk/Taiwan, and live music. Occupational class by itself does influence taste 
(a result not presented) but its overall effect became insignificant after education is controlled (aside from 
the symbolic exclusion of local music). Thus, while music taste differs between occupational classes, it is 
much more strongly influenced by the higher levels of education of those in higher classes. Furthermore, age, 
gender, and city all leave their influences, contributing to the complexity of the formation of music taste, and 
obscuring the power of music to draw distinctions. However, it is still cultural capital that has the highest 
influence on taste, and is the variable that most strongly influences taste. 
This analysis demonstrates the existence of a music hierarchy. Traditional music is more preferred by those 
with high cultural capital, fitting Bourdieu’s classical description of legitimate culture. Furthermore, cultural 
capital is not limited to traditional highbrow music, but is also seen for selective foreign—a popular form of 
music. The stratification of selective foreign music by education is an important result because this extends 
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Bourdieu’s theory by showing that popular music, or at least certain forms of it, can also be stratifying. The 
stratification of popular music demonstrates an “emerging form of cultural capital” which is new ways of 
distinction after the decline of the once dominating classical music in the West (Prieur and Savage, 2013, 
2014). In China, the emerging form of cultural capital is in the form of Western popular music, which has 
centered China as the cultures of the dominant West, even though the music is not necessarily highbrow in 
their Western origins. 
(2)  Trendy music is largely unstratified 
The ANOVA analysis in this chapter verifies that selective foreign and classics Hk/Taiwan are the higher 
status types, whereas trendy foreign and trendy Chinese are the mainstream types. This demonstrates that 
although cultural capital is stratifying on music, there are also some contemporary music types liked by 
younger respondents which are not stratifying. The influence of economic capital and EGP class on these 
music types is either non-existent or weak. Therefore, interest in trendy music is shared across educational, 
income, and class divisions, making this a music that lubricates social relationships across divides. Trendy 
music is the best example of music that fits the cultural omnivore argument of elites cutting crossing 
boundaries. Given that elites also consume selective and highbrow art in exclusion, cultural omnivore 
analysis thus shows that elites are more eclectic in their tastes—because they consume both trendy music and 
high-status music, whereas others consume trendy music but not high-status music. 
A curious result from MIRT in the last chapter is the division of foreign music into selective foreign and 
trendy foreign, and the separation of classics Hk/Taiwan and trendy Chinese music. We now know the 
reason for their separation. Recall that MIRT derived underlying taste factors based on how they best explain 
the differences in preferences, based on only individual preferences without information on socioeconomic 
divisions. The ANOVA analysis in this chapter verifies that selective foreign and classics Hk/Taiwan are the 
higher status types, whereas trendy foreign and trendy Chinese are the mainstream types. 
Instead of cultural capital, those popular music forms are influenced by cosmopolitanism experiences. Local 
cosmopolitanism is linked with higher preferences for trendy Chinese music, whereas foreign cosmopolitism 
and working for foreign company associates with higher preferences for trendy foreign. Therefore, foreign 
and local cosmopolitanism influences taste through the increased breadth of music preferences and openness 
to these popular forms of music, which marks them as lubricating music types that help bridges people from 
different parts of society. However, the increased eclecticism of taste of the cosmopolitans does not extend to 
highbrow music such as traditional and selective foreign, which remains limited to those with high levels of 
cultural capital. 
Classics Hk/Taiwan music and participation in live music include characteristics of both social lubrication 
and social distinction. Notably, higher income does not relate to higher interest in the distinguishing music 
types, as it is associated with lubricating music types as well as participation in live events. This reaffirms 
Bourdieu’s distinction between the tastes of those with cultural capital and those with economic capital, as 
they are not interchangeable for one another (except very weakly so for classics Hk/Taiwan music). 
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(3)  Other factors that influence music taste 
Cultural preferences under mass culture are influenced by many factors, such as changing popularity, life-
stage, age and cohort, gender, geographic region, personality, and mood (Gibson et al., 2000; Greenberg et 
al., 2016; Knobloch and Zillmann, 2002; Miranda and Claes, 2008; Nave et al., 2018; Reeves, 2014; 
Rentfrow et al., 2011; Rentfrow and Gosling, 2003, 2007; Schwartz and Fouts, 2003)—portraying the 
impression of individualism and making the stratification by cultural capital less visible, unlike the highbrow 
culture of the past. In China, different music is popular for different cohorts, from the earlier Hong Kong and 
Taiwan superstars, to the more recent Western mainstream (where mainstream as perceived by local 
reception rather than popularity in Western societies). The influence of life-stage can also be seen, as fervor 
for popular music subsides after a certain age. Regional influences are also visible as people from coastal 
regions tend to be more Westernized in their preferences for pop and traditional music. All of these obscures 
from the underlying hierarchy of culture and gives the impression of diversity and neutrality of mass culture. 
This research shows that age, gender, and city all exert their influences on taste. The younger respondents 
prefer trendy foreign and trendy Chinese, whereas older respondents prefer traditional and local music. 
Those in the middle age group (age 25-35 in this study) shows the highest taste for selective foreign, classics 
Hk/Taiwan, and live music. In China, the role of age is complicated by its high correlation with 
socioeconomic status. The youths in China more likely to be highly educated, urban, working in the service 
industry, etc., simply due to the rapid development of privileges in China. Age has been added as a control 
variable in all the relevant quantitative analysis, to allow the partial effects of age on the independent 
variables to be separated. Age will be more fully discussed as part of cohort influences and “upgrading” 
through the changing popularity of mass culture in the next chapter. 
This study finds that females have higher tastes for selective foreign and trendy Chinese, but lower interest in 
trendy foreign and classics Hk/Taiwan. Females are also slightly more interested in traditional and live 
music, and lower interest in local music, but these differences are insignificant. While gender inequality is 
linked with cultural capital, through access to education and other resources which lead to the formation of 
cultural capital (Bauer et al., 1992), studies on cultural capital have not particularly focused on the linkage of 
taste and gender inequality. Witnessing the marks of inequalities such as wealth and privileged education 
through taste are regarded to be inequalities being ingrained into the cultural fabric, but the identification of 
feminine taste has been the ones that are associated with higher taste and higher cultural capital. 
Researchers have found that females have tended to be more interested in classical music and high arts—
signs of cultural capital—than males. Psychologists have found, for example, that in the UK males like 
heavier music such as rock, heavy metal, and reggae, whereas females and femininity are associated with 
preferences for lighter pop, country and classical (Colley, 2008). The gender differences in music preferences 
have been linked with gender roles and developmental psychology (Schwartz and Fouts, 2003), which is 
beyond the scope of this research. For the purpose of this research, gender is controlled as a variable in the 
examination of cultural taste. 
City also contributes to regional differences in taste. A study in overall media consumption has found 
significant differences in media consumption by city. Shanghai has a strong region-centrism in showing 
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much more interested in local media and local issues, supported by a strong local media industry under the 
leading Shanghai Media Group whose TV channels achieved 76% during prime time in 2003 (Lee et al., 
2013: 50–53). Regional differences in China complicated by various factors such as regional cultural 
differences, internal migration, socioeconomic factors, local regulation, and industry composition which has 
eluded encompassing explanations. 
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Chapter 5. Social distinction in practice 
 Navigating social relations with embodied cultural capitals 
The last chapter offered a quantitative analysis of how those with high cultural capital (HCCs) are using 
stratified music for social distinction, which includes preferences for high-traditional music and high-status 
selective popular music, and the distaste for low-status local music. This chapter supports the quantitative 
findings with qualitative interviews to see how they are applied in practice, to better understand the 
mechanisms of distinction through popular culture. 
Social distinction under popular culture is a topic of much contention. Bourdieu’s claim of cultural capital, 
based on the French society of the 1960-70s, was based on the high cultures of its time. Since then, exclusive 
high culture has been in decline. Not all privileged are found to consume traditional high culture, and most 
privileged have crossed boundaries to consume mass culture (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and 
Simkus, 1992). Some scholars take strong positions that the evidence for cultural omnivores implies that 
cultural tolerance has penetrated the consumption of popular culture, showing little evidence of a class 
divide in consumption (Chan, 2019; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007a). Other scholars argue for adapting 
Bourdieu’s theory to contemporary times through new forms of cultural capital—such as one based on 
increasing global vs local divide (Prieur and Savage, 2013).  
A response to the cultural omnivore challenge is the attempt to revive the concept of “embodied cultural 
capital” which came from Bourdieu but overlooked by some scholars (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu believed 
that cultural capital takes multiple forms, including objectified and embodied forms. Scholars have 
attempted to rescue Bourdieu from the cultural omnivore challenge by arguing that distinction is not only 
about what types of art are consumed, but how they are appreciated (Coulangeon and Lemel, 2007; Holt, 
1997). Holt in his article titled “Recovering Bourdieu’s theory of tastes from its critics” argues to further 
examine distinction in embodied forms of taste (1997). Cultural capital in the objectified form relates to the 
possession of objects or participation in certain cultural activities, whereas embodied cultural capital 
differentiates in the attitude of consumption. Embodied cultural capital is distinguished by the mode of 
disinterested appreciation—the Kantian aesthetics of appreciation of art marked by distance and withdrawal 
from everyday necessities (Bourdieu, 1986).  
The argument based on “embodied cultural capital” has turned out to be a worthy challenge to cultural 
omnivore account, as Peterson acknowledged the possibility of “discriminating omnivores” who, even when 
consuming the same items, “appreciate and critique it in the light of some knowledge of the genre, its great 
performers, and links to other cultural forms” (Peterson and Kern, 1996: 904). This argument is also 
supported by increasing and primarily qualitative accounts that examines the application of aesthetic 
disposition toward cultural consumption in modern forms of culture such as fashion, comedy, gourmet food, 
and reality TV (Entwistle and Rocamora, 2006; Friedman and Kuipers, 2013; Johnston and Baumann, 2014; 
Kuipers, 2006; McCoy and Scarborough, 2014; Skeggs et al., 2008). Aesthetic disposition in contemporary 
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society has been argued to have moved from traditional high culture toward a postmodernist appreciation 
that emphasizes conceptual and abstract aesthetic visions (Hanquinet et al., 2014). 
However, cultural taste is not only a social capital that lubricates relations among people in similar social 
positions as posited by Bourdieu. In modern society, there are also benefits to lubricating relations across 
social divides. Research has found that highbrow culture increases strong-ties, popular culture increases 
weak-ties (Lizardo, 2006). Taste in modern societies is a resource not only in terms of identifying and 
excluding others, but also in its use in bridging connections across divides. This view is supported by 
Friedman’s research, in which he finds that omnivorousness exists only within the upwardly mobile who 
shares the taste to connect with people from lowbrow origins and also the higher tastes of networks later in 
life, albeit highbrow tastes are displayed clumsily due to lack of natural confidence (2012) 
I offer my argument that taste has the power to be used for both social distinction—in-group solidarity of the 
privileged, as well as social lubrication—to lubricate relationship with outgroups when necessary. I further 
argue that it is the privileged who have both resources at their disposal, allowing them to draw upon pop 
culture as a repertoire to enable them to navigate social relations. I demonstrate this through three aspects. 
First, HCCs and LCCs differ in their mode of appreciation of pop culture. Second, the hierarchy within 
popular music is more recognized by the HCCs. Thirdly, HCCs are able to leverage this advantage in having 
repertoires of music to cross boundaries with those with lower levels of cultural capital at times but also 
practice social distinction at times. Research has shown that omnivores are more likely to learn higher wages 
and move up the social ladder (Reeves and de Vries, 2019). 
 Modes of appreciation—the discerning appreciation of the HCCs vs the taste 
followers 
This section draws from the interviews to illustrate how HCCs, MCCs, and LCCs describe the music they like 
and dislike. In the interviews, HCCs and LCCs reveal fundamental differences in the way they view music. In 
particular, HCCs show discerning appreciation in their approach to music in which they are attracted by 
“quality” music, whereas LCCs are taste-followers driven by a pursue of popularity. These differences have 
been theorized as embodied cultural capital, which moves distinction beyond what is consumed to include 
how it is consumed (Friedman, 2011; Holt, 1997; Prieur and Savage, 2014).  
HCCs are confident critics of music, relying on their own judgment instead of popularity, offering critical 
explanations of what is laudable about each piece of music or a particular rendition of a piece of art. During 
the interviews, the most discerning HCCs offer an informative lecture on the context, history, and details of 
the art form. In contrast, MCCs and LCCs tend to vaguely describe what sounds “good” and what is 
“popular.” They tend to follow the list of popular hits, but generally have difficulty articulating why they like 
those hits. They are primarily opinion-followers who are driven by popularity, regarding high popularity to 
be hip and desirable, a testimony of quality, and are generally less interested in the meaning of the lyrics or 
the background of the artist or genre. Some LCCs are also generally uninterested in music. 
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Instead of taste-followers, HCCs confidently believe that they are the ultimate judge of musical quality, 
sometimes against popular opinion. They show a discerning appreciation driven by “quality” (of their 
own judgment)—putting research effort to gain knowledge, critical engagement with music. They offer a rich 
description of their favorite music, depicting details such as the context, the song/lyric history, the meaning 
in the lyric, and the personal meaning of the music. HCCs believe that enjoying music requires putting effort 
into researching and understanding the context and meaning behind the work. They share a similarity of 
having a deep knowledge of their favorite music, as well as a strong discernment as to what constitutes 
quality in their music type. Many share a habit of listening to their favorite song repeatedly such that they 
understand it by heart, to recognize subtle details in the song, to be able to engage the songs critically. A 
disinterested disposition is often engaged in HCC’s description of their favorite music. This discerning 
appreciation requires extensive cultivation to develop. They claim that the response from music should not 
be spontaneous ephemeral emotions, but with emotional distance, which creates deeper meanings that 
persist. HCCs look down upon music that provides instant gratification but lacking in meaning or depth. 
Because of their discerning attitude toward music, HCCs sees the music landscape in a hierarchy.  
The LCCs tend to be less involved in music, treating it passively as popular entertainment. The higher 
LCCs/mid-low MCCs listen to music through apps and video apps. To the unaware, their music preferences 
appear to be quite inclusive, unmarked by boundaries. They listen to the most popular artists as everyone 
else, encompassing a diversity of music types including local, classics Hk/Taiwan, and foreign (but usually 
not traditional music). However, their interest in music is limited to the mainstream items, and their 
discussion of music never showed the elaborate critical appreciation of the HCCs. They are primarily 
opinion followers driven by popularity—they follow the list of popular hits, but have difficulty 
articulating why they like those hits (especially so when compared to the endless explanations that HCCs give 
for highbrow music). Descriptions tend to me ephemeral such as liking the rhythm, “it sounds good.” They 
regard high popularity to be fashionable and desirable, and are less interested in the meaning of the lyrics or 
the context of the artist or genre. LCCs evaluate music in neutral terms of popularity without awareness of its 
loaded nature, even as their tastes are regarded to be “low quality” by the HCCs. The sections below draw 
from interviews to illustrate the contrast between the discerning versus popular approach. 
Discerning appreciation – HCCs and upper MCCs 
(1)  HCCs 
The HCCs like selective foreign because it allows them to engage in their knowledge and critical appreciation 
of music. HCCs distances away from “popular” music to pursue non-mainstream pop. Selective, rarefied 
music is a key distinction in HCC’s pop music. For them, vaguely liking Western pop is not enough—liking 
the hottest “Billboard” Western pop indiscriminately is definitely not a sign of good taste.  
When HCCs discuss music, they are accompanied by backgrounds, context, and aesthetic descriptions that 
draw on the cultural capital of HCCs. Wenju (CC6) likes Western pop songs such as “Say You Love Me” by 
Patti Austin (American singer born in 1950), but is also heavily devoted to musicals, which was introduced to 
her during her English class at her private high school. She mentions favorites such as Chicago, Le Petit 
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Prince, Matilda, “Le temps des cathedrals” from Notre-Dame de Paris. She likes them because they convey 
emotions with deeper meanings in the songs. In understanding a song, Wenju (CC6) does her own research 
on the context and background of the work. She often reads related works such as original novels. She likes 
“The Fighter,” a song by Keith Urban (Australian country singer) and Carrie Underwood (American singer), 
because she is drawn by the deeper meaning in the work, which is the theme of defending and supporting a 
woman. She is touched by the lyrics of “Me and the Sky,” a song from the musical “Come from Away,” which 
tells the heroic story of Beverley Bass, the first female captain of an American Airlines aircraft. She 
appreciates music that conveys emotion with deeper meanings. She contrasts those against the Chinese 
musical “Murder on the Hanging Garden” (空中花园谋杀案) by Meng Jinghui (孟京辉), which she says was 
shallow and provokes temporary but superficial emotions without leaving meaningful substance. Another 
way that popular music can be appreciated is through the lyrics. Lyrics with poetic qualities are important to 
Dongkun (CC5). He current favorite song is the pop song “A whale incarnating as a lonely island” (化身孤岛
的鲸) by Zhou Shen (周深), which to him “reflects the change in feeling when one falls in love—from freedom, 
to being humbled as infinitesimal.” For the HCCs, the discerning appreciation is often also applied to 
traditional highbrow music, but they have been equally applied to selective music as well.  
(2)  Upper MCCs 
MCCs lack clear defining characteristics, sharing some aspects of HCCs and LCCs. In these affluent 
megacities, the MCCs are still privileged but less so than the HCCs. Upper MCCs show discerning 
appreciation toward culture, even though the art form may not be traditional high arts.  
An example of the higher-end of middlebrow is Muyao (CC4), a fan of Western rock music. He was born and 
raised in the privileged city of Beijing and learned how to play music instruments. He demonstrates a high 
level of critical judgment, albeit toward rock music, which he admits is not high-status. Now, with a family, 
he encourages his children to play learn the piano. His example demonstrates a discerning consumption of 
pop music, and an example of a music type generally favored by males. Muyao (CC4) followed Western pop 
at an early age, but rock is not recognized to be the highest status in society. He recalls following the 
“American top 20” on China Radio International’s (CRI) “Hit FM” radio broadcast. His parents gave him 
money for music which he used to buy rock, metal and punk dakou CDs (bootleg CDs from abroad) and to 
subscribe to Tongsugequ (a magazine on rock music). He admits to being rebellious when young, and 
followed rock and metal because “the mainstream pop music that everyone followed were for vulgar people.” 
He likes music by Bruno Mars (American singer), The Eagles (American rock band), Scorpions (German rock 
band), Oasis (British rock band), Coldplay (British rock band). He also learned drums and electric guitar, 
allowing him to form a band with friends when he attended university. He used to read and post critiques on 
music forums and feels quite confident of his discerning ability in rock music, as he has “heard a lot of songs, 
more than many people.”  
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Figure 5-1. A respondent’s exposures to rock music 
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Taste followers—the MCCs and LCCs 
(3)  Shallow eclecticism of MCCs 
In contrast to HCCs, lower MCCs may also like Western pop or traditional music, but their tastes are more 
mainstream or do not show the same level of critical appreciation. MCCs also claim to like “Western pop.” 
They follow the most popular Western songs on popularity rankings that are increasingly accessible in China. 
MCC respondents show me how they access those Western pop songs which are available on every app. 
When HCCs pursue Western pop earlier (before they devoted to traditional music), the process was much 
more research-intensive. They subscribed to magazines, discussed in forums, and read musical critiques. The 
music liked by MCCs is better considered to be trendy foreign. 
An example is Donglu (CC4), who lived in and attended university in Shandong province before moving to 
Beijing to work. She likes 80s and 90s Hong Kong and Taiwan pop singers such as Priscilla Chan, Leslie 
Cheung, Terry Lin, and Eason Chan. She likes jazz and rock in general, but she is unable to name any specific 
music or artist, unlike the way she effortlessly names Chinese pop singers. She also says she has, in her own 
words, “heard of opera by Sara Brightman,” which opera lovers would disagree as she is a crossover singer. 
Sara Brightman is relatively well known in China, exemplified by her duet with Chinese singer Liu Huan in 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Donglu also listens to a variety of opera such as Huangmei opera (M47) and Yu 
opera from Henan province, but she says she is unable to distinguish between them. She also says she listens 
to classical, though her favorite is Joe Hisaishi (久石让), the Japanese composer of film scores for popular 
animation films of Hayao Miyazaki. She dislikes “saliva songs,” distinguishing herself from LCC tastes. She 
also dislikes hip-hop (M36) and R&B (M38). Quantitative findings indicate that hip-hop is indeed lowbrow, 
but R&B is well regarded among the HCC circles. She exemplifies an MCC who is quite eclectic in her tastes, 
but does not demonstrate the same level of interest in selective items, the depth of knowledge and the critical 
appreciation expressed by the HCCs. 
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(4)  LCCs as popularity followers 
From the representative survey, the LCCs in megacities are characterized by a lower level of awareness of 
music, particularly highbrow music, and a higher likelihood of liking local music. LCCs’ attitude toward 
music is much more passive, hearing them through broadcasts, without a critical opinion nor interest in 
critiquing music. They rely on popularity as a way of learning about new songs and music evaluation, which 
persists into adult life. 
Puchao (CC1), who defied his disadvantaged background to end up residing in the capital, is an example of an 
LCC who is interested in music but is driven by popularity. He grew up on a rural farm and his father is an 
apple farmer. He never had the chance to learn any musical instrument. He attended elementary school in a 
village which was poorly resourced. He remembers that the school had trouble recruiting students, and about 
3 years later the school was closed and consolidated into one in the closest town. His family did not afford 
him any music lessons or any cultural activities. He followed mainstream media and never had any 
engagement with foreign culture except those through Chinese media. 
Compared to others with a similar background, he was one of the few luckier ones who climbed the trajectory 
to end up working in the capital, though in a satellite district of Beijing. His father has a high-school degree, 
relatively well educated for a farmer, and placed emphasis on his education. He attended elementary school 
in his village, and with his good grades, studied high school in the city that administered his village, 
eventually completing a technical degree (college) in computers in the outskirts of Beijing, where he stayed to 
work. Although Puchao is moderately educated, he came from an underprivileged background and he 
otherwise would have been like all his friends back home who did not beat the odds to make it to Beijing. 
Unfortunately, other lower educated persons contacted and other contacts suggested by him declined to be 
interviewed about music—all explaining that they do not have much to say on it. 
His music repertoire appears surprisingly wide on the surface, as it includes Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korean, 
and Western pop songs. He showed me the songs in his playlist, which includes foreign songs such as 
“Despacito Remix” featuring Justin Bieber (M32) (2017), “Ddu-du Ddu-du” a song by Korean female group 
Blackpink (2018), and the Chinese version of “Levitate” (back-translated as “Beyond Lightyears” (光年之外)), 
the theme song of the Hollywood movie “Passengers” (2016). His playlist also includes many local songs such 
as “Desert Camel” (沙漠骆驼) by “Rabbit Bros” (展展 and 罗罗) (2017), the theme song of “Running Man” (奔
跑吧兄弟)—an outdoor reality show adapted from Korea (2014), “Chengdu” (成都) by Zhao Lei (赵雷) a local 
Chinese singer (2016), and “Next door Tai Mountain” (隔壁泰山) by the local group “Arirang Family” (阿里郎
组合) (2018). 
Despite the appearance of “omnivorous” taste crossing national boundaries, his choice of songs is quite 
different from the HCCs. When exact titles are discussed, he listens to much more local music compared to 
HCCs and MCCs who rarely mention them except as derogatory examples. He is mostly interested in the 
hottest songs recommended by music apps. He learn about those songs from app suggestions on the hottest 
and most viral songs. He also has little loyalty toward his favorite songs, saying that he enjoys change—“when 
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the hot songs lose popularity, I don’t listen to them anymore.” Lyrics are not important for him, which is how 
he consumes English and Korean songs, saying that “I listen for the rhythm and the beat. I like the fast 
tempo.” 
Thus, if the criterion is whether foreign songs are listened, then Puchao’s songs do include Western, but it is 
clear that his tastes are quite different as he is only interested in the most popular items which lead to the 
inclusions of Western music, but he does not pursue Western music in particular. This is akin to the 
difference between liking specific pieces of popular classical music like Blue Danube, and the lovers of 
classical music who display much deeper knowledge of the category (Bourdieu, 1984). The HCCs research 
deeply into the specific music types or artists to gain an appreciation of their favorites, and are able to talk 
and justify their favorites through critical lens. HCCs are always keen to point out that despite their interest 
in critics’ reviews, they interpret and appreciate music based on their own judgment. On the other hand, 
Puchao lacks words to describe what he admires, only describing his interest in “huode” (火的)—the “hottest” 
and “the most hip” music determined based on music rankings. He also uses the app “Ticktok” (which HCC 
sees as the app for lowbrow people), and says “I know a song is hot at the moment when it is frequently used 
in clips.” Furthermore, he does not follow musicians or music bloggers, opposite of the critically engaged 
music followers of the HCC. 
Sensing the difference between HCC and Puchao’s enjoyment of music beneath the surface, I probed Puchao 
on the notion of the quality of the music or singers. Is that something he considers when he listens? Which 
artists does he think produce quality music? He explains “I’m aware that other singers sing better than these 
Internet hot songs, such as Eason Chan (M14) and those classic pop music (经典歌曲), but I still prefer the 
hottest songs. I don’t like songs that are old, or ones about love and emotions. The songs very hot in the short 
term are very relaxing and easy to listen.” His love for recent hot songs is evident as the songs he mentioned 
are generally from the past 1-2 years, compared to HCCs whose pop music playlist contains primarily of older 
songs. Perhaps the most evident difference in Puchao’s music is the lack of any traditional music in his 
playlist—no Western symphony, folk, Chinese traditional, or any instrumental music, which are all 
fundamental to HCCs. He explains that he has not heard of them and has little interest in them. 
 Awareness of the hierarchy 
(1)  HCCs are more aware of what is highbrow 
The status of certain traditional music as highbrow, particularly Western classical, is recognized by all the 
HCCs and MCCs, but the impression becomes vaguer and less confident as the level of cultural capital 
decreases. On the other hand, Chinese traditional music tends to be associated with respondents’ 
grandparent's generation, and is recognized to be highbrow but to a slightly smaller extent compared to 
Western classical canon. Respondents describe of “highbrow” in Chinese as gaoya (高雅), defined in the 
Oxford Chinese-English dictionary as “elegant: have an elegant style, be gracious in manner, high art” 
(Oxford, 2017).  
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All the HCCs already enjoy some form of highbrow traditional music and easily recognize their high status. 
HCCs’ views of their favorite music will be further discussed in the section on their mode of appreciation. 
MCCs also generally recognize the status of certain traditional music as highbrow. The LCCs generally have a 
vague impression that Western classical and traditional music are highbrow, but are unable to elaborate on 
it. They do not think it is something relevant to their lives, compared to HCCs who confidently and 
effortlessly explain the quality they see inherent in highbrow music. LCCs say they have little interest to learn 
about Western classical, which they say they do not listen and do not like. Mining (CC1), for example, flatly 
says she does not listen to pure instrumentals. 
(2)  HCCs denigrate local music 
Although HCCs initially claim to like all kinds of music, their attitudes demonstrate a deeper resistance 
toward lowbrow music (Bryson, 1996). HCCs and even MCCs look down on local music and trendy Chinese 
music. HCCs often criticize the quality of local music. Their criticisms of local music follow Adorno’s 
arguments—as mass-produced tunes without substance (Adorno and Simpson, 1941). Muyao (CC4) says 
“there are very few local musical talents. The popular singers are mostly just packaging, like Jolin Tsai (M10). 
Local music is usually produced simplistically, with little use of chord. Listening to it doesn’t improve taste 
(听了没有提升). I don’t like local music in general. Some singers with lesser fame are actually better”—again 
preferring selective musicians over the mainstream. 
However, HCCs usually avoid a blanket denigration of music from Mainland China, well-aware that these are 
mainstream and liked by many people. HCCs often direct their attacks at specific bad examples of local 
music, avoiding openly “disliking” of a whole category of music as described by Bryson (1996), which would 
be less socially acceptable. The HCCs have various negative labels for these local songs—saliva songs (口水
歌), divine songs (神曲). LCCs, however, describe them positively as songs that are explosive—i.e. hot and 
popular (火爆). The term I used in the survey was the more neutral “popular Internet songs” (网络热曲)—a 
term also used in music apps. They are typically songs by unknown grassroot musicians, some of which 
infamously catapulted to national fame through Internet channels such as Ticktok, via clips that HCCs find 
distasteful. They are popular particularly among teenagers generally with lower socioeconomic status.  
Dingjiao (CC6) says she does not like the divine songs either. She targeted her criticism on “Learn to meow 
(like a cat)” (学猫叫)—a song that went viral in 2018. “It was played on alleys and streets, but it has no 
content and no quality. It is dumb, and the lyric has no meaning. You can memorize the song after hearing it 
twice. Those viral songs are like fast food. It fills your hunger, but you cannot eat it all the time.” She also 
does not like the Chinoiserie-style of many viral songs which combines Chinese cultural elements into viral 
songs, describing them as a catchy way to package low-quality music. Muyao (CC4) is similarly critical of 
saliva songs. “Those are for the mass. The chords are repetitive. For example, the song ‘Small apple’ (小苹果) 
has beguiling (讨巧) lyrics and simple dancing which draws conversations (有话题感), but they are not 
innovative, just repetitive. It represents a decline in taste. The listeners are definitely not highbrow people, 
more likely naïve teenagers or middle-aged aunties (大妈).” Yiyin (CC6) says “I cannot feel the beauty in 
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saliva songs, even though they are down to earth (接地气), they associate with ‘the 3 vulgars’ (三俗8). The 
lyrics of saliva songs has no beauty, but I cannot avoid hearing them as they are everywhere.” 
Local music is besieged by HCC and MCCs in both the interviews as well as quantitative data. In the 
quantitative survey, items that load heavily on the local music factor include Phoenix Legend, Dao Lang, and 
Wulantuya. Local music is disliked by all categories of socioeconomic status—significantly disliked by those 
with higher levels of education, those from urban backgrounds, those with higher levels of income. It is also 
disliked by those who are older. Since this factor consists of mainly local music, it shows that popular music 
is stratified by region, and local is relegated to a relatively lower status. 
(3)  LCCs’ low awareness of the music hierarchy 
The previous sections have shown that HCCs recognize the overarching hierarchy in popular music, ranging 
from foreign, to classics Hk/Taiwan, to local music. But if the music hierarchy is so evident, what prevents 
everyone from liking or claiming to like high-status music, shattering the symbolic boundary? Turns out, 
MCCs only have an incomplete understanding of the hierarchy, while LCCs are generally unaware of the 
difference between the selective and mainstream pops. 
MCCs, like the HCCs, are clear about what is bad taste. They widely dislike the lowbrow tastes of local music, 
particularly the viral Internet hot songs, differentiating themselves from the tastes of the LCCs. They too, 
tend to be aware of the highbrow status of Western classical, but lack the knowledge and discerning 
appreciation that distinguishes the HCCs from the MCCs. MCCs also compete amongst themselves to appear 
to be HCC in tastes, which irritate other MCCs. Shiping (CC3) respects the status Western classical and 
admits to not understanding it, but complains that too many people around him “flaunt their love for 
Western classical yet only have a superficial understanding of it. They are merely fuyongfengya”—a Chinese 
idiom which means to pose as a lover of culture (附庸风雅). He is a proud fan of traditional opera who is 
frustrated by his inability to refute the flaunting parvenus. The knowledge and ability to discuss high-status 
music at ease will be further discussed in a later section. 
The LCCs are less interested in music in general, and not as aware of the loaded implications of music taste. 
To them, music is popular entertainment, and everyone is free to choose what styles they like, as if following 
the arguments of the “individualization” argument as described by Chan & Goldthorpe (Chan and 
Goldthorpe, 2007b). The LCCs are either aware of the most popular music items passively through social life, 
or are actively seeking the most popular music items through playlists. After all, they think that one cannot 
be criticized by following what everyone else is listening, which is a dilemma found by my research—the taste 
of the mass implies high popularity, a positive for the LCC, but indiscriminately following popular songs is a 
 
8 The 3 vulgars is a Chinese phrase to refer to philistine, uncultured, and purposely appeal with low tastes (庸
俗、低俗、媚俗) 
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huge sign that yells bad taste to the HCCs. The HCCs generally believe there are intrinsic qualities in music,  
which only those with better taste can differentiate (Adorno and Simpson, 1941), though admits that some 
popular music can be good. 
The LCCs are typically not aware that foreign music is of a higher status than local music, partly because they 
also consume foreign music as they follow the most popular music, though not in the selective and critical 
manner of the HCCs. They have a vague but unsure impression that Western classical as highbrow, compared 
to HCCs who confidently and effortlessly explain the quality they see inherent in highbrow music. Mining 
(CC1) says she has only heard a small number of Western songs, which are the most famous ones like “You 
raise me up” (the song looked down by Changti earlier). Though she is aware of a hierarchy between classical 
music, mainstream popular music, and lowbrow music like Phoenix Legend, she does not think her music 
tastes makes a big difference in her daily life. 
The power of the hierarchy of music taste is that only the HCCs has a good grasp of it to be able to “measure” 
others, whereas the LCCs are being measured without their awareness. The MCCs are caught in-between, 
frustrated by being compared, yet also utilizing it against the LCCs. The post-modernists’ belief that people 
are free to choose what they like is only partially true. Individuals do have the freedom to consume and form 
lifestyles of their choosing without being bound by class rigidity (see Baudrillard, 2016; Bauman, 1988; 
Featherstone, 1990; Giddens, 1991), yet LCCs, unaware of the “rules of the game,” are in informational 
asymmetry despite the free choice. 
 How HCCs navigate social distinction and lubrication through music 
Preferences for selective music depends on the amount of cultural capital of the individual. However, there is 
also another group of music called trendy music, which is not structured by cultural capital. Thus, I have 
quantitatively shown how Bourdieu’s argument for the stratification of culture and the cultural omnivore 
contention for the fall of boundaries are both practiced in real life—through differences between niche and 
trendy music types. This section further builds on the argument to show that HCCs are more aware of the 
music hierarchy—leveraging the information asymmetry to use music for both social distinction and 
lubrication, disadvantaging the LCCs. 
The interviews show how those with high cultural capital (the HCCs) are aware of the hierarchy and belittle 
the music liked by those with low cultural capital (the LCCs), whereas the LCCs are generally not aware of the 
stigma of music taste. Furthermore, the HCCs are able to navigate social life—at times connecting with the 
LCCs through their cultural eclecticism, while identifying and distancing from LCCs in other times. The 
HCCs explain how they use popular music both to connect across social strata, but also to recognize and draw 
of distinction. HCCs consume music in dual modes. At times HCCs consume music as popular entertainment 
to bridge across social divides, yet at other times, they pursue music for discerning appreciation. Some HCCs 
continue to be “snobs” who abstain from pop-culture—Peterson’s description of elites who solely consume 
high culture but not popular ones (Peterson and Kern, 1996). Meanwhile, the LCCs are oblivious to the 
hierarchy. While they believe they are enjoying music without barrier, their tastes are being observed and 
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marked by the HCCs. Thus, despite the appearance of cultural eclecticism, mass culture continues to allow 
for social distinction and lubrication of the elites. 
Using trendy music as social lubricants 
On the surface, the musical preferences of many HCCs are eclectic. But to describe the taste of HCCs as 
“omnivorous” would be a gross simplification of their listening habits, as their intensity sharply differs 
among music types. There is a clear difference between the general “likes” toward the popular music 
frequently but passively encountered in everyday life, and the favorites which HCCs actively learned about 
and sought after. Some HCCs are favorable about specific popular contemporary artists (Eason Chan and Jay 
Chou are perhaps the best examples), while others HCCs do not listen to these popular singers. However, it is 
clear that none of the HCCs are particularly passionate about following pop culture—their music passion is 
reserved for more selective pop-culture or traditional highbrow music, where they put a disproportionate 
amount of energy, research, and passion. These are the music types which they research the artist and 
background, read music critiques, and take the effort to find and download—which is marked by selectivity. 
While their playlist may include Chinese artists, the regional origin of their music interest is primarily 
foreign. 
Many HCCs consume highbrow music along with pop music without conflict. Pop music tends to be more 
general leisure, whereas highbrow music tends to be enjoyed by engaging with discernment and 
disinterestedness. Pop for Chenyue (CC7) is the music to be played in the background that “doesn’t consume 
the brain,” such as when driving or running; classical is for “listening with the heart.” Ziguo (CC5) thinks that 
pop music is for general leisure, centering around everyday themes such as “romances and breakups,” but 
traditional opera is valued for its formality and grandeur (正式、隆重). 
Their acceptance of mainstream popular culture is used to help them navigate social relations. Wenju (CC6) 
provides an example of an experience when she jokingly said her friend lack taste for liking “diva songs”—
songs that went viral on the Internet often regarded to be lowbrow for HCCs (神曲), which angered her 
friends. She now realizes that people from certain backgrounds genuinely enjoy those songs, so she will not 
make such comments anymore to keep the cordial friendship. She comments that “there’s no need to use 
nurture to overcome nature” (不要用教化去排斥天性)—an acknowledgment that natural dispositions are 
hard to change and it’s preferable to recognize and accept it. Therefore, she now consciously plays different 
songs depending on which friend is in her car, because she wants to play music that everyone can enjoy to 
avoid conflict. She also plays funny Internet songs or videos to have a laugh with friends (such as “Learn to 
Meow” (学猫叫), which many HCCs regard to be lowbrow.) She says she hopes to find similarities between 
people, and keeping the differences to themselves.  
Indeed, cultural omnivorism functions as a social lubricant to connect across classes, yet the very expression 
of tolerance reveals an underlying acknowledgment of inferiority. The laughter from amusement is different 
from the pleasure from the wholehearted enjoyment given to her highbrow favorites. Wenju (CC6)’s personal 
favorites are Western musicals and classical. She attends those performances whenever she has a chance. 
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This attitude does not apply to pop concerts, which she never goes because pop concerts are “too noisy.” A 
deeper connection is established with others who share her tastes, while “Learn to Meow” is used to bridge.  
Using selective music to draw social distinction 
In the interviews, people never admitted to have openly discriminated against others based on taste. 
Nonetheless, HCCs show pride and superiority in their high regard for their favorite music, while showing 
distaste for low-status music. The stigmatization against underprivileged groups, though, has been observed 
to be a problem wider in society—such as the difficulty for migrants to connect with native urbanites, and the 
prevalence of the suzhi discourse (inner quality) as a denigratory term indicates that social distinction is 
happening in wider society (such as Anagnost, 2004; Chen, 2013, 2013; Gan, 2014; Guan, 2011; Jacka, 
2009). Studies have also found that the blind pursuit of popular culture has been criticized as “without 
discrimination” (EJ Croll, 2006: 29). 
Yiyin (CC6) explains, “some local artists may have good music, but they are liked by those with low levels of 
education, so I don’t enjoy being associated with them. For example, some songs of Phoenix Legend (M22) 
are otherwise fine, but they are always played in [lowbrow] plaza dances (M39).” Since popular talent shows 
had been a breakout point for stars in China (Meng, 2009), Yiyin sympathizes with talented singers who sing 
lowbrow music, as “those otherwise talented singers need to appeal to grassroots in order to rise from 
popular contests, so they have to cater to populist tastes.” Although she appreciates some local pop songs, 
she distances away from them because of the association with lowbrow. She describes the songs she likes as 
“those created by artists with musical education, such as those who create musicals, operas, or movie 
soundtracks. I also like music from different cultures, which are fresh to my ears. Perhaps I was rebellious 
when young. I felt that music liked by fewer people are higher class (高级).” This demonstrates that social 
distancing is also an important factor, as people who low-status music is recognized for their lower social 
background. 
In contrast, HCC interviewees display a sense of pride in the discussion of their favorite music. There are also 
a small number of HCCs who abstain from pop music. “Ticktok,” “saliva songs,” and “divine songs” trigger 
deprecating attitude from most HCCs and MCCs (those with high levels and medium levels of cultural 
capital), but a few HCCs are so disengaged from popular music that they are not aware of those specific 
terms. Instead of symbolic exclusion of specific subtypes as described by Bryson (Bryson, 1996), they look 
down upon popular music more broadly as snobs who exclusively consume high culture (Peterson and Kern, 
1996). They direct criticisms not to local music or Internet songs, but to the mindlessness and commerciality 
of popular culture as a whole along the lines of Adorno (Adorno and Simpson, 1941).  
The existence of “snobs” who only consume highbrow music 
For Chenyue (CC7), “popular music is very superficial. The singing is poor, and the songs are unpleasant. I 
never follow the music stars. Nowadays anyone good looking can be a singer without any skill or training.” 
When pressed about Internet celebrities, she says, “I don’t understand, and I do not care. They change very 
quickly and disappear very quickly. They rapidly become obsolete and displaced. The songs are very low and 
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uncultured. Internet celebrities are very ignorant. They digitally alter their appearance to look pretty. That’s 
all.” Changti (CC5)’s music interest has primarily been Western classical music, explaining that she was 
never a group person so never really followed pop culture with her classmates. Dongkun (CC5) is the 
respondent most distanced from popular culture. He watches many opera performances online and in 
theaters, but he doesn’t watch movies, saying “I don’t really like popular culture.” He gave me long histories 
of Kunqu opera, but could not talk about popular music. When asked about “Ticktok,” he’s part of the few 
HCCs who has no denigrating attitude because he is not aware of what it is. “I don’t have anything to say 
about it. I totally do not know what it is.” Dongkun (CC5) appreciates Kunqu opera because it is a “heritage 
that has passed the test of time.” He believes that “to understand Kunqu, one needs to be sufficiently 
cultured.” He draws from the ancient Confucian belief that elite music has intrinsic qualities that can 
cultivate people, “music education has the power to cultivate society to establish harmony and social order ” 
(e.g. see Thrasher, 1981). While he does not directly say that people who like pop music are uncultured, he 
clearly believes that the music he likes is high culture. 
For some HCCs, their distastes go beyond local music and extends to mainstream music more generally. 
HCCs complain of mass Western pop frequently played in stores and widely recognized in China. One 
example is “You raise me up” a song by Irish-Norwegian duo “Secret Garden” in 2002, which happened to be 
played during the interview with Changti. She interjected “I don’t like this. It gives me headaches. The song is 
too flat, just a plain direct expression of emotions (直抒胸臆) that leaves no room for “chewing” (没有咀嚼余
地—no room for further interpretation or appreciation.)” Heidi Rupke, while teaching English in China, 
describes the Western songs popular in China as “easy listening music, with its themes of home and love…are 
played in restaurants, department stores, and on public transportation vehicles. American music has 
penetrated even the most rural areas, where taxi drivers switched the Chinese music tape in their cassette 
player to Richard Marx when Rupke hailed the cab” (Rupke and Blank, 2009: 130, 137). Due to the vast 
popularity of Western-mass music, it is looked down by HCCs. Similarly, a distaste toward “noisy” songs like 
rap, hip-hop, and techno is shared by almost all the HCCs interviewed. Ziguo (CC5) says “I’m not sure 
whether they can be considered music, or just a behavioral art.”  
 Discussion—cultural hierarchy under pop culture 
Cultural hierarchy persists under pop culture because the HCCs are advantaged in 1) their discerning 
appreciation and 2) better awareness of the hierarchy, which allows them to 3) navigate social relations suing 
both social distinction and social lubrication. Firstly, the cultural elites differ in the way they approach music, 
demonstrating the importance of embodied cultural capital. Due to differences in the level of embodied 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986), the HCCs are pursing niche and selective music for “quality,” whereas LCCs 
are taste followers who pursue popularity. HCCs reveal a discerning approach to music, relying on research, 
learning, and critical appreciation, whereas LCCs show either musical apathy, or are taste-followers driven by 
popularity. HCCs describe the research they conducted to find those non-mainstream items, and to 
understand the backgrounds and meaning of the music which is crucial to their appreciation. They say they 
are not blindly pursuing rarity for the sake of rarity. They pursue “quality” which is their own judgment, and 
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its pursuit often leads them away from popular music toward alternative and non-mainstream music, 
distancing away from the most popular Western pop widely recognized in China. HCCs are much more 
confident critics of music, relying on their own judgment instead of popularity, which leads them toward 
engagement with selective and non-mainstream artists and songs. When HCCs discuss music, they are 
accompanied by backgrounds, context, and aesthetic descriptions which draw on the cultural capital of 
HCCs. HCC’s discerning appreciation and the music they like exist in a symbiotic relationship. They prefer 
music that can be appreciated critically, and the music they are the ones that allow them to deploy their 
embodied cultural capital. The differences in the way music is approached and discussed is quite evident in 
the interviews. HCCs also eagerly volunteer themselves to be interviewed, whereas recruiting LCCs to discuss 
‘their favorite music’ has been challenging. This concurs with Bourdieu’s finding where the mass may like 
items within highbrow genres, such as the Blue Danube, but HCCs distinguish themselves with more 
comprehensive knowledge of selective and specific items, which they can critique, discuss, and demonstrate 
appreciation (Bourdieu, 1984).   
While the most popular music items appeal across social divisions, the less popular but selective items 
continue to draw social boundaries. Cultural distinction is not contingent on high culture as it persists in a 
world filled with pop culture. Bourdieu did not see highbrow culture as the only legitimate culture, but 
viewed legitimate culture as the ones that are recognized as valuable in the struggle in symbolic violence 
where the tastes and preferences of the dominating groups are valued and those of the dominated being 
devalued (Prieur and Savage, 2011). What is legitimate is embedded in local contexts and subject to change. 
In China, the influx of global music culture becomes a differentiator that allows the privileged to identify 
those with and without proper tastes, supported by the discerning tastes of the elites which are hard to 
imitate. Instead of enabling everyone to select their own lifestyles, distinction persists in subtle ways, from a 
simple highbrow-lowbrow distinction, to a complex but subtle denigration. Bourdieu’s concept of cultural 
capital is still relevant in society today. 
Secondly, LCCs are disadvantaged in this hierarchy because the music hierarchy is obscured to those with 
low cultural capital (LCC). Social distinction is becoming hidden by the mainstream mass culture, which is 
widely popular across the population. Tastes in popular music are obscured by many factors such as 
changing popularity, personal preferences, mood, and age that makes the landscape appear benign to the 
LCCs. Popular music, constantly under the flux of different ages and styles, gives the impression of freedom 
of expression which obscures the continual persistence of stratification that continues to be recognized by the 
HCCs. The inequality in information allows HCCs to recognize and navigate through mass culture to 
lubricate social relationships yet also discriminate against the tastes of the LCCs. 
Thirdly, while cultural capital theory continues to be accurate in identifying the persistence of distinction, it 
understated the power of popular music to lubricate social relations. This research shows the coexistence of 
cultural distinction and lubrication. Since only the HCCs are able to recognize the hierarchy, they are 
lubricating social relations through trendy music to give the false impression of open tolerance, while 
identifying ingroups through stratifying music—leveraging the information asymmetry through the opaque 
hierarchy to disadvantage those with low cultural capital (LCCs). The two forces coexist in the music scene, 
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allowing the HCCs to both distinguish as well as lubricate relationships. This is another example how 
highbrow culture increases strong-tie connection which fosters ingroup cohesion, while popular music helps 
establish weak ties (Lizardo, 2006). HCCs are empowered through music to navigate social relations, 
distinguishing others from their ingroups, while lubricating relation with outgroups when needed. The music 
hierarchy is known by the HCCs but unbeknownst to the LCCs, marking an informational asymmetry which 
is utilized to the disadvantage of the LCCs. The LCCs, passively enjoying what they like, are being evaluated 
for social exclusion or inclusion at the mercy of the HCCs. 
In practice, it is not so easy for the LCC to distinguish which music is high-status, yet HCCs are often able to 
navigate this complex hierarchy to send and receive signals of distinction. This reveals a complex sub-group 
hierarchy which is difficult for the LCCs to differentiate, and often missed in surveys that focus on broad 
genres. Vaguely “liking” foreign music is not enough to pass as an elite, and liking foreign-mass music turns 
into a sign of bad taste. HCCs navigate this complexity to deploy their cultural capital for distinction, whereas 
LCCs do not. As music change in popularity and become mainstream, HCCs have a history of progressing 
away from mainstream items toward selective artists and music. Despite the changing popularity of cultural 
items, HCCs navigate through the changes by “upgrading their tastes” (see chapter 5). Thus, they can utilize 
popular music for both social lubrication and social distinction, whereas the LCCs are either not interested in 
music, or unaware of the differentiation that is being drawn. Those with high cultural capital (the HCCs) 
have the freedom to use those types of music to both distinguish others, and at the same time bridge social 
divides as they choose. The LCCs, on the other hand, are oblivious to the power of music to draw distinctions. 
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Part III. CULTURAL CAPITAL IN CHINA 
Chapter 6. The sources of taste in China—intergenerational endowment or 
individual attainment? 
 The context of inequality in China 
The previous chapters have shown the stratification of musical taste in a manner which would be consistent 
with the existence of cultural capital in China—the shared tastes and the distastes by those in privileged 
social positions. This and the next chapter look more fundamentally at the sources of tastes. Using 
quantitative analysis, this chapter seeks to answer two main questions. Firstly, what are the socioeconomic 
factors that influence taste in China, and what is the extent that cultural capital is rooted in intergenerational 
inequalities? The finding shows that differences in taste in China can be traced all the way back to parental 
and childhood privileges. This provides convincing evidence that the formation of taste is rooted in 
intergenerational inequality, a testimony of the power of the cultural capital. Although the marketization that 
led to the rise of economic inequality occurred only a generation ago, differences in parental privileges have 
already led to the formation of cultural capital that is visible in China today. Furthermore, the linkage 
between forms of inequality and the various aspects of cultural capital will be established—which are 
traditional highbrow cultural capital, symbolic exclusion, cultural engagement/disengagement, and emerging 
forms of capital. 
Understanding cultural capital in China 
It is important to understanding distinction today by tracing back to the development of social inequalities in 
China, including inequality in education and hukou. The study of cultural capital is important in China 
because it helps explains the deeper causes of inequality and stigmatization that is prevalent in China today. 
Bourdieu believes that symbolic violence between social groups can be explained by deeper inequality in the 
endowments of cultural capital. According to Bourdieu, cultural capital—distinctive cultural tastes which 
signify and advantages a person’s status in society—is developed into the habitus from childhood upbringing, 
fostering a certain taste for those in privileged social groups, which is then drawn for social exclusion. 
Bourdieu’s theory on symbolic violence is also supported by researches that point to discrimination and 
stigma toward those with lower social status in China, which questions whether the sources of those 
inequalities are based on personal achievement, or rooted more deeply into parental or childhood 
endowments. Bourdieu is doubtful on the potential for secondary socialization to overcome deficits in 
primary socialization (1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133). Under the Western context, cultural capital 
is accumulated primarily through childhood upbringing through privileged parents. Through childhood 
upbringing and secondary socialization, taste for legitimate culture is developed as a resource.  
However, this narrative does not readily apply to China, as there have been no sustained intergenerational 
privileges in China to the extent of countries in the West that did not experience Communism. China was 
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highly egalitarian until reform and opening in 1978. Before Reform and Opening, China was under a socialist 
economy with few inequalities. Furthermore, whereas modernization happened over generations in 
developed countries in the West, the development of economic and cultural capital was compressed 
essentially within one generation in China. This diverges from Bourdieu’s conception that cultural capital is 
sourced in inequalities in elite families. An effect of this compressed development is that the gaps between 
social strata co-existing in the same space and time are much wider, not only economically but also in 
lifestyles and mentality. Even today, a considerable proportion of the population is still agricultural, while 
those in the most developed cities are living lifestyles comparable to most developed regions in the West. 
Thus, the debate needs to be contextualized in a specific regional setting. Bourdieu’s theory was formulated 
in a historic French society, and critics say it might have lost relevance in contemporary societies under the 
profusion of popular culture. Western accounts may not be directly applicable in China, due to both 
differences between European, American culture and Chinese culture, their different historical trajectory, as 
well as current differences in the level of development. This provides an exceptional case to understand how 
cultural capital has been formed from an egalitarian society.  
Prevalence of social boundaries 
Amidst increasing levels of economic inequality in China (Chen and Ravallion, 2009; Sicular et al., 2007; Xie 
and Zhou, 2014; Yang, 1999), we are seeing increasingly visible boundaries being drawn between social 
groups. This can be seen through increasing boundaries erected by the new rich, the middle class, and the 
stigmatization experienced by the underclasses. The rise of “symbolic boundaries” is the perception of social 
boundaries between people which produces social closure and exclusion (Lamont and Molnár, 2002). Due to 
the economic-centrism of existing studies, accounts of the social hierarchy in China is dominated by 
economic, material, and urban-rural based stratification (Goodman, 2014; Lu, 2012), which has overlooked 
cultural aspects of inequality. I summarize their findings to demonstrate the prevalence of social boundaries 
in China, but will argue afterward why a cultural perspective allows a clearer understanding of distinction. 
Market reforms since 1978 have created a generation of new riches, but also a huge disparity in society 
(Osburg, 2013). The “new rich” are showing off their affluence and taste through luxury goods (Goodman, 
2008a; Osburg, 2013). The rise of economic disparity has led to various terms to describe the affluent class: 
xingui (the new rich), xinfu (new wealth), dakuan (big spender), baofahu (parvenu: the nouveau riche, for 
the unrefined rich people), furen jieceng (the rich stratum), and shangliu shehui (“high society”), with 
various extents of delegitimizing connotations (Goodman, 2008b; Lei, 2003; Miao, 2016: 24; Osburg, 2013: 
11). Unconscious sensibilities make the privileged feel entitled to more respect and social recognition, which 
the privileged deloy in social expressions to legitimize “the construction and communication of symbolic 
boundaries, in particular those demarcating class differences” (Hanser, 2008: 186). The lower classes also 
distinguish people by status. The retail clerks sub-segment and discriminate the less wealthy from the more 
wealthy in their services. In response, the rich use tactics to convey their status and wealth, to show why they 
deserve deferential treatment in the “theater for counter performances of distinction” (Hanser, 2008: 137).  
Similarly, economic development has led to the rise of the “middle class” in Chinese urban cities. There are 
ample studies on the lives of the “middle class” in China (such as Chen and Goodman, 2013; E Croll, 2006; 
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Miao, 2016; Tsang, 2014; Zhu, 2016). The “middle class” is not used here to refer to a specific definition of 
social class, as Chinese social hierarchy “is distinguished more by sociocultural than by economic factors” 
(Tsang, 2014: 13). Definitions of social class remain subtly problematic in China. Officially, the Communist 
party has already eliminated exploiting classes after the revolution so only two classes remain—proletariats 
and peasants (Li, 2016). “Middle-class” here refers to the rise of consumerist society and distinction based on 
ownership of material goods, fashion, and lifestyles of leisure (Cartier, 2013; Davis, 2000b; Latham et al., 
2006; Tsang, 2014). In practice, the “middle class” is not a coherent group with a clear ingroup self-identity, 
but rather an identity based on outgroup exclusion—defining themselves against those from poorer 
backgrounds. Class perception in China is based on subjective prejudice—“often determined through means 
of exclusion rather than inclusion – what they believed they are not rather than what they believed they are” 
(Miao, 2016: 29). I now turn to the boundaries they erected—the social discrimination against the 
underclasses. 
Researches in China have described the stigma between the rich and poor (Osburg, 2013), between migrants 
and locals (Honig, 1989, 1990, 1992; Zhang et al., 2009: 20019), and between rural and urban (Gan, 2014; 
Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004; Zhang and Treiman, 2013). Social discrimination against lower social groups 
has been increasingly evident, targeting rural migrants, the urban poor, dagongmei (female workers) (Pun, 
1999, 2005), baomu (domestic workers) (Sun, 2009a), and even retail clerks (Hanser, 2008). Stigma against 
rural workers has been found across much of the developing world (Erman, 2001; Mosse et al., 2002), and 
discrimination against migrants also has a long history in China. One of the first waves of migrants in 
Chinese urbanization was the rural migrants to Shanghai since the 1850s, who were discriminated for being 
“poor, ignorant, dirty, and unsophisticated” (Honig, 1989, 1992). Internal migration was restricted under 
Mao’s period, but the influx of rural workers into the cities after Reform and Opening created another wave 
of discrimination against the migrants. After Reform and Opening, many people from the countryside 
migrated to cities to provide manual labor. The total number of rural-to-urban migrants in China was over 
260 million in 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). The urban population in China more than 
doubled from 26% in 1990 to 56% in 2015, but a substantial portion of the population is still rural (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2015). The migrant workers provided cheap labor force that contributed greatly to 
industrialization, modernization, and the economic miracle in China, yet they are deprived of rights such as 
social security provision and educational opportunity in the cities (Kuang and Liu, 2012; Wu and Treiman, 
2004, 2007; Zhang et al., 2014; Zhang and Treiman, 2013). The migrant workers often take on dangerous, 
dirty, and demeaning “3D-jobs” (Roberts, 2001). 
The experiences of stigmatism and targets of prejudice have been documented in many pieces of research 
(such as Chen, 2013; Chen et al., 2011; Gan, 2014; Guan, 2011; Kuang and Liu, 2012; Li et al., 2007; Solinger, 
1999; Zhang, 2001; Zhang et al., 2009; Zhang and Wu, 2017). Cultural distinction between people from 
urban and rural areas was described as a cultural politics, part of a coproduction between urban elites and 
the state (Lei, 2003). Marginalized social groups, particularly the migrant workers, have frequently been 
ridiculed in taste and behavior, for their “unattractive physical appearance, as potential perils of disease or 
crime, and discredited places of origin” (Guan and Liu, 2014: 75). Labeling and stereotyping based on tastes 
and appearance are common, such as smell, behavior, and uncivilized language which are signs of underlying 
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“dirtiness” and the lack of class (cengci) (Hanser, 2008: 108, 134; Li et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2009). These 
can also be expressed subtly as symbolic violence—“the modern form [of prejudice] which is expressed 
implicitly and indirectly” (Yang et al., 2010: 204). The underclasses are not only deprived of material 
resources but also in cultural and symbolic resources (Sun, 2013). The stigmatization of rural workers is 
often justified by the suzhi discourse—that they are indeed inferior in lacking “innate” dispositions inside.  
Furthermore, social exclusion results in the difficulty for rural migrants to integrate into urban life. The first 
generation of migrant workers never managed to integrate into urban life, as they tended to return to the 
countryside after temporarily working in the cities during their youth. The youngest cohort of rural migrants 
has spent most or all their lives in cities, engaging with consumerism and leisure much like other urban 
youths (Pun, 2003), yet they still live a segregated life with no urban friends (Cheng, 2014). Despite being 
relatively better educated and improved materially, they faced deeper social exclusion than the earlier 
generation, with deeper frustration as there is no returning to the rural (Pun and Huilin, 2010). Guanxi is an 
important component of social relations in China (Yang, 1994), which is heavily restrained by “having the 
same forms of lifestyle practices, which in this context mean having matching accents, matching dialects, 
similar kinship, or blood relationships or even the same surname” (Tsang, 2014: 123; Wank, 1999: 164). 
Despite their attempts to “shed the signs of their rural origins” (Cheng, 2014: 141), rural origins still prevent 
them from integrating into the guanxi networks of the urbanites, indicating continued boundaries between 
the social groups. 
Development of Inequality in China 
To understand the development of cultural capital in China, I will first describe the recent history of social 
inequality in China which includes the perspectives of economic inequality, inequality in political capital, 
hukou (rural versus urban household registration), and the inequality in education. These provide the 
context to situate the sources of cultural capital in China and the relationship between cultural capital and 
existing conceptions of social inequality. 
(1)  Inequality prior to China’s Reform and Opening 
During the Communist period under Mao, political capital was the most relevant form of capital in China. 
After the Communists took power in 1949, the party abolished the private economy and flattened the former 
social ladder. Economic capital ceased to confer power, replaced by benefits from association with the party-
state apparatus, giving tremendous power to political capital. The old elites were suppressed, with their 
wealth confiscated into state ownership. Despite the rise of egalitarian society for most people, political 
status conferred significant power for a small number of cadres. This is common across countries that have 
experienced Communism, where a class of bureaucrats used their political power to obtain privileges, akin to 
the ruling classes in a capitalist system (Djilas, 1959). Party members privileged themselves and their family 
members in access to resources. The government was ruled by the party, where policies were commanded by 
authoritarian planning guidelines. Political status became a new form of social hierarchy. Political capital 
rests in party membership—which is also associated with one’s class origin as well as political background 
(Andreas, 2016). In work units, members are classified as workers or cadres, of which cadres are usually 
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party members and given leadership roles. The concentration of resources in the centralized state results in 
privileges through affiliation with the state.  
Political capital was not just a status symbol but could also be converted into cultural capital. Compared to 
the Communist cadres who usually came from low social origins, the educated ones had cultural capital in 
specialized knowledge or management skills. Under state socialism, they were supervised by the red cadres, 
as cultural capital became secondary to political capital. (Andreas, 2016). As party members were able to 
privilege themselves and their family members in access to resources, they were also better able to access 
cultural capital for their family members, leveraging their resources to put their children through education 
and better job opportunities (Andreas, 2016). Secondary education expanded for everyone, but university 
education was still limited favored bureaucrat families, a phenomenon common in many Communist 
countries, such as Soviet Russia (Gerber and Hout, 1995), Czechoslovakia (Mateju, 1993), Hungary (Hanley 
and McKeever, 1997; Simkus and Andorka, 1982) and Poland (Heyns and Bialecki, 1993). During Mao’s 
period and early periods in the reform, children of cadre or military families had better chances of 
enrollment in senior high school and above (Zhou et al., 1998), even during the cultural revolution (Deng and 
Treiman, 1997). 
(2)  The rapid rise in economic inequality in China 
Economic capital regained power after Reform and Opening. Reform and Opening since 1978 led Communist 
China to a new period of state capitalism, a unique path of development with its successes and challenges. 
The post-Mao period is a period of Reform and Opening under state capitalism, which launched 4 decades of 
rapid economic development to this day. Deng Xiaoping’s plan for economic reform starting in 1979 aimed to 
achieve a “xiaokang” (relatively comfortable) life (Lu, 2000: 124). A key economic reform in China which 
differentiated from the Soviet reforms was the creation of a dual-price structure, which priced production 
differently between the co-existing planned and market economy. The initial period of Reform and Opening 
was regarded to be a period of “wealth creation” that benefitted the majority. While ex-bureaucrats xiahai 
(entered the private sector, literally “jumped into the sea”) to leverage their relationship with bureaucrats for 
great wealth, a greater number of entrepreneurs coming from low social status saw rapid increases in 
income. The massive transformation in the last decades turned the poor but egalitarian country into a state-
capitalist economic power. State capitalism achieved remarkable economic growth and lifted many people 
out of poverty. In fact, overall income inequality declined in the 1980s, as the gap between rural and urban 
narrowed, because those who were the poorest saw their income rise the fastest (Nee, 1991). 
The gaps in economic wealth began to widen in the 1990s, as income differences grew increasingly wide 
between different groups of the population. By the late 1990s, China is regarded to have shifted to “wealth 
concentration” where wealth mostly consolidates amongst the elites (see Xiang and Shen, 2009). Individual 
business owners grew into privately owned corporations, and the management in corporations earned far 
more than the average workers. Those in state-owned enterprises who previously enjoyed lifetime 
employment and social benefits saw their “iron rice bowl” shattered starting in the 1990s (Davis, 2000a: 17). 
Income inequality became increasingly worsened in the 21st century, as the privileged ones in society have 
the most resource to grow their wealth. As disposable income increased, the proportion spent on food 
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decreased from 57.5% in 1978 to 35.8% in 2006, in line with Engel’s Law. However, the bottom 5% of city 
households still spent 47% of income on food in 2006, compared to 27% for the top income decile (Solinger, 
2013: 62). Although the wealth of Chinese improved as a whole, much of the improvement concentrated on 
the top and widened the disparity between social groups. Differences between social groups have widened 
considerably since Reform and Opening. The distribution of wealth has been increasingly unequal, 
concentrating wealth for into those who established a privileged position in society early in the economic 
liberalization (Davis and Wang, 2009; Sun and Guo, 2013; Whyte, 2010). Despite nominally being a 
“socialist” country, China has higher levels of inequality than developed “capitalist” societies such as the US 
and UK based on the GINI index (Goodman, 2014; World Bank, 2010). Coastal regions, urban cities, and 
certain social groups gained wealth more quickly than others. Spatial and regional inequality also enlarged, 
with wealth concentrating in the special economic zones and coastal cities, and the rural areas falling farther 
and farther behind. 
(3)  Persistence of political capital after Reform and Opening 
The supremacy of political capital declined after Reform and Opening, as market forces confer power to 
economic capital again. Marketization led to the rise of private business in the early 1980s. Political capital, 
which previously conferred power in the production and allocation of resources under socialism, ceded to 
markets driven by ownership, property, and economic resources. Victor Nee proposed the power transfer 
thesis that political capital, almighty prior to 1978, has ceded to economic capital since Reform and Opening 
(Nee, 1989, 1996). However, other researches find the persistence of political capital and its conversion into 
economic, social, and cultural capital. 
Scholars have argued that economic capital is only valuable “under state protection or freedom from state 
interference,” without which is always under the risk of political persecution (Guo, 2013: 20). Despite the 
increased visibility of economic capital, many scholars see a close collaboration between officials and 
entrepreneurs, and thus the continued power of political capital at the elite level (Goodman, 2014; Guo, 
2013; Liu, 2009). Many scholars have found the salient convertibility of political capital and economic capital 
under the mutual collaboration between state and market (Bian and Logan, 1996; Davis and Wang, 2009; 
Goodman, 2008a; Wang, 2008). Although the party-state tried to prevent the misuse of power by party 
officials, in practice the party’s power has not been constrainable by the constitution, the rule of law, or the 
judiciary, which enabled the conversion of political power into economic capital. The initial rich were the 
cadres, who purchased commodities at the lower state-controlled prices to sell at the higher market price, 
and selling land-use rights to commercial companies for tremendous profits (Tsang, 2014: 6). Collective 
goods were privatized for great profits for the well-connected. A large number of cadres in state-owned 
enterprises switched into the private sector (xiahai), converting political capital into economic capital for 
profits. Nee describes this as a hybrid of “cadre-entrepreneurs” (Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996). Many of China’s new 
rich are children of high-ranking cadres that scholars describe the existence of a “red capitalists” class 
(Dickson, 2003) and a dominant class of political elites (Goodman, 2014). The convergence of the capitals is 
also argued by Goodman’s conception of China’s ruling elites. Economic and political elites are closely 
connected, and are often quite affluent themselves or from their close-ones (Goodman, 2016). Due to its 
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recognized importance, political status has also been incorporated in the standard model of social 
stratification in China (Lu, 2012). 
The conversion of political capital into economic capital is believed to be enabled through social capital, as 
having political connections through facilitates business after market-reforms. In a country where the 
boundary between state and market overlaps, having political capital—by either being in a position of power 
or having political connections to such—is a valuable resource. With ambiguity in law, regulation, and 
enforcement, entrepreneur and professionals cooperate with their political connections to facilitate 
exchanges. “Generally speaking, officials enjoy better access to state power even where they are not in charge 
than citizens who lack connections with officials. The latter can achieve inclusion through open official 
channels, guanxi (connection) networks or bribery… Differences in these powers constitute a principal form 
of power inequality and are major causes of class and status inequalities in post-socialist China.” (Guo, 2013: 
19). Social capital is connected with the concept of guanxi in China, which is seen as a culturally intricate 
development of friendship and loyalty (Yang, 1994). Unofficial political power can be accessed through 
economic capital in the form of bribery, or through the guanxi network—ties that facilitate exchanges of 
favors based on mutual benefits and indebtedness (Bian, 1994, 2002). Connections are important in a society 
whose state capitalism grants high authority to person and social bonding in charge over transparent 
institutional processes, such as in financing, taxation, investment, and real estate (Faure, 2008: 485; Tsang, 
2014: 123). The collaboration between officials and the rich enabled officials the access to resources and the 
new rich the access to political protection and influence. The political elites are comparable to businessmen 
due to the reform in China that put economic development central to governments. County governments are 
like local corporate headquarters (Oi, 1999), and “the business of government is business” (Goodman, 2016: 
252). Many of the most successful business owners are those well-connected with the party-state. Studies 
have found that party status continues to be important in the state-capitalist society (Li, 2016). Ex-cadres 
with strong ties with the party-state used their guanxi network to profit from their connection with the 
government which remains influential under state capitalism (Tsang, 2014: 9) 
Research has also found the conversion of political capital into cultural capital. The new generation of 
political elites, unlike earlier generation party members, are also extremely well educated. A party member 
with a college education is 26 times more likely to become a cadre (Li, 2012), and 74% of provincial standing 
committee members have master’s degree, and 23% even have doctorates (Walder, 2006). Studies show that 
even after marketization, the political status of parents is still more influential than economic resources in 
determining one’s educational attainment (Zhou et al., 1998), and multi-generational surveys show that the 
offspring of party elites (even if purged during radical Maoism) is favored to inherit elite status (Walder and 
Hu, 2009). A study on book reading habits has also found a clear cultural divide between elites and other 
social groups, with government and party officials with the highest amount of cultural capital (Wang et al., 
2006). Parents like to send children to public service jobs and jobs under state monopoly for their financial 
benefits, subsidies, and prestige (Guo, 2013). Thus, economic, cultural and political capital are ultimately 
intertwined. 
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(4)  Educational inequalities 
Education is fundamental in producing cultural practices and the differentiation in cultural patterns 
(Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). The level of education is itself a measurement of 
socioeconomic position and is crucial in the development of the habitus which further class differentiation 
through internalized aspects such as attitudes, instincts, and taste. The habitus reflects itself in lifestyles and 
consumption practices that are limited to certain social groups, which becomes an instrument for social 
distinction. Education is such a core of social reproduction that is often used as the single variable to 
represent cultural capital.  
Education in the first 10 years after the revolution (1949-1959) was a period of improved education across 
the population. Elementary education became universal, and higher education opportunity expanded 
drastically from 229 formal colleges in 1957 to 610 in 1962 (Zhou et al., 1998: 202). This period of rapid state 
development and educational expansion ended with the disastrous rushed development period of the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-1959). The new few years was a period of decline in economic development thus 
educational opportunities, which saw the increasing importance of parental political status in education 
attainment. During the cultural revolution (1966-1977), education was disrupted as education institutions 
shut down. Education opportunity became more equal in this period, surprisingly due to sharply decreased 
enrollment which reduced the opportunity for education for everyone. The effect of interventionist policy on 
education opportunity was significant in this period. Even though education opportunities expanded under 
Communism, parental origin becomes influential for advancing to higher levels of education. Despite the 
official determination to promote social equality, education inequality was still substantial in the Socialist 
period.  
After the end of the cultural revolution, education and college entrance examination (gaokao) were 
reinstituted, restoring education to, at least ideally, a meritocratic enrollment system. The period after 
Reform and Opening also saw an increase in educational opportunities, particularly the expansion of higher 
education since the 1990s. The school enrollment rate for those between 6 and 16 was already 95.5% in 1978 
and reached 98% by 1994. Nine-year compulsory education was implemented in the 1990s (Tsui, 1997). The 
transition from elementary school to junior high school reached 90% in 1995 (Wu and Zhang, 2010). Higher 
education enrollment rapidly expanded in the 1990s thanks to improved educational policy (Wan, 2006; 
Wang, 2014). The number of institutions expanded by 67% from 1990 to 2005, with the number of students 
increasing more than 7 times in the period (Wu and Zhang, 2010). In the 10 years from 1998 to 2008, the 
number of students more than doubled from 9.8 million to 23.3 million (Li et al., 2014). These served to 
reduce the gender and rural-urban gap in education opportunities. 
Educational institutions in China are stratified in not only educational attainment, but within the levels of 
primary, secondary to university, with the intention of selecting and producing talents more efficiently for 
the country. Enrolling in the better-resourced “key” (shifan / zhongdian) schools at each level is a “class 
sorter” that funnels toward better life chances and class positions (Li et al., 2014; Woronov, 2013). There’s 
also the stratification in academic majors, where students from rural areas are concentrated in fields 
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unpopular in the job market, but urban students tend to be in majors with better-paid career potentials such 
as English, economics, law, and management (Liu et al., 2009). 
Education achievement is also complicated by economic factors. Parents of the elites have the resources to 
spend a hefty amount for children’s education, from costly kindergarten, paid tutoring, enrolling in 
expensive elite schools, purchasing homes in neighborhoods with better schools (which is an extremely 
expensive endeavor in the megacities), using connections and donations to get into key schools, and for 
oversea education (E Croll, 2006; Solinger, 2013; Tang, 2013; Zhao, 2015). Furthermore, children of the 
privileged are receiving piano, martial arts, calligraphy, and swimming lessons, plus traveling on vacations to 
faraway places, even studying abroad, compared to the underclass who did not have opportunities for those 
opportunities (Davis and Sensenbrenner, 2000). Parents with higher levels of cultural capital tend to value 
artistic development in the children, and it is parents with sufficient economic capital who can afford such 
education. In particular, learning to play music instruments is a sign of high cultural and economic capital of 
the parents. Paying for lessons, especially buying expensive instruments like the piano for children, was a 
luxury during the early years of Reform and Opening, and a tremendous prestige. 
The respondents’ age ranges from 18 to 45, thus their parents are roughly born in the 1950s-70s, under Mao’s 
period prior to Reform and Opening. As discussed earlier, that generation primarily lived under egalitarian 
period in China. Education level in that period was generally low, thus being relatively highly educated is 
much less common and more prestigious than today. However, the Cultural Revolution disrupted the 
intergenerational advantages of cultural capital, as there were parents from otherwise privileged families 
who lost the opportunity for higher education during that period. Comparing the influence of parental 
education and education will reveal whether the sources of highbrow taste come from respondents’ own 
cultural attainment and the extent of parental influences. 
(5)  Hukou inequalities 
The hukou system is a household registration system modeled after the Soviet propiska. It was established in 
1958 to control internal migration, which was to assist agricultural collectivization and manage food shortage 
in cities (Lu and Perry, 1997; Wang, 2004). Every citizen is required to be registered in the place where they 
reside, with a dual classification of the residential area and the agricultural/non-agricultural status, which 
determined the eligibility for welfare provisions (Chan and Zhang, 1999; Kuang and Liu, 2012). Traveling 
and migration had to be approved, which prevented peasants from entering cities without prior permission. 
This reinforced the division between rural and urban, restricted urbanization, and created preferential 
treatment toward the urban which persisted to this day (Tsang, 2014: 37). 
After Reform and Opening, there is freedom of movement but the hukou status limits the social privileges 
that one can obtain—such as jobs, health care, education opportunities (Pun, 2005; Wang, 2004). The 
freedom of movement created the wave of migrant workers who moved to cities in search of work. This forms 
the basis for the enormous number of rural migrants who work in Chinese urban cities, but without access to 
social provisions from the cities. In 1982, 79% of the population in China lived in the rural, a number which 
decreased to 54% in 2005. However, in 2005 73.9% of the population still hold a rural hukou, demonstrating 
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the ease of migration but the difficulty in getting one’s hukou converted to urban status (Wu and Zhang, 
2010). Hukou status is assigned at birth based on parental registration status, unrelated to the actual locale 
of the individual (Chan and Zhang, 1999). Hukou conversion remains difficult, such as by a considerable 
amount of money, or by university admission and then job placement, which allows only the most selective 
from the rural to convert into urban hukou (Wang, 2004). Conversion from rural to urban hukou is quite 
selective, limited to those who have gone beyond odds in educational attainment or wealth (Wu, 2011). 
The hukou policy is well known for its effects in limiting social mobility and a source of social inequality. 
Having an urban hukou is a privilege, and hukou status is intricately linked with other forms of social 
hierarchy, such as the wealth of family origin, education attainment, party membership, and place of 
residence. Studies have shown the negative impact of rural hukou on income (Liu, 2005), education (Wu and 
Treiman, 2004), and occupational equality (Wu and Treiman, 2007). The inequality of hukou, education, 
and wealth are quite intertwined and difficult to isolate a clear cause and effect. For example, government 
policies often privilege higher-level cites over smaller cities, and urban over rural, in the provision of social 
benefits such as access to higher education. Those with lower education are also the ones who are less able to 
convert to urban hukou. 
Furthermore, in addition to being a source of disadvantage in society such as in occupation and income 
opportunities, rural hukou also leads to stigmatization. Research has shown that the hukou system is a form 
of segregation which forms different social identities between urban and the rural (Otis, 2003). “Hukou 
provides one of the most helpful means for sociologists to distinguish members of the Chinese new middle 
class from the rest of the population.” (Tsang, 2014: 37–38). 
 Research Approach 
This section outlines the research approach and the variables that are to be investigated. Given the extent of 
social discrimination and inequality in China, this chapter seeks to answer—how cultural capital relates to 
existing inequalities in China and the extent that cultural capital is rooted in intergenerational inequalities. 
What constitutes cultural capital in China?  The relationship to be investigated is represented in the figure 
below.  
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Figure 6-1. Diagram of the intergenerational sources of cultural capital 
 
 
The next part describes the various dimensions of cultural capital, which will be used as dependent variables 
to test for differences between subgroups. The part after that describes the variables that measure 
intergenerational inequality, which will be used to examine if the levels of cultural capital differ between 
popular subgroups who with different parental, childhood, or adulthood privileges. 
Dependent variables—various dimensions of cultural capital 
The concept of cultural capital is central to the discussion of cultural inequality in sociology. Cultural capital 
has been defined as “institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, 
formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion” (Lamont and 
Lareau, 1988: 156). While Bourdieu was the first to comprehensively theorize the concept, the form that it 
takes could differ in societies, and this research questions the meaning of “high status cultural signals” in 
contemporary China against four possibilities—classical highbrow arts, symbolic exclusion of the lowbrow, 
higher cultural engagement of the elites, or orientations toward new, including popular, forms of art. 
Cultural capital was first conceived by Bourdieu, which based on his study of French society in the 1960s and 
1970s, is represented by elites’ penchant for the traditional high culture of the time (Bourdieu, 1984). In this 
research, Bourdieu’s classical conception of cultural capital is called “classical highbrow,” represented by 
the traditional music factor from MIRT. To recap, that music factor is heavily loaded by various Chinese 
operas and traditional music, along with Western classical and Western opera, the preference for which 
suitably represents classical cultural capital. 
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However, with the decline of highbrow culture and rise of the challenge of the cultural omnivores, which 
suggests that elites are increasingly tolerant and inclusive in consumption (Peterson and Kern, 1996), 
Bourdieu’s original theory seems outdated in contemporary society under the proliferation of popular 
culture. There have been three alternative perspectives on the pattern of cultural distinction in contemporary 
society. Bryson argued that the elites, under the pretense of tolerance and openness, continue to practice the 
“symbolic exclusion” of cultural forms favored by the underclasses (Bryson, 1996). This is operationalized 
here research by the local music factor from MIRT (see Chapter 4), which consists of various local music 
items that are favored by the underprivileged but almost universally denigrated by the privileged. 
Alternatively, a study on cultural consumption in contemporary Britain applied MCA to find a new division 
between the cultural engagement of the elites versus the disengagement of the underprivileged (Bennett et 
al., 2009). Elites are found to be more active participants in cultural life. This argument preserves the 
Bourdieusian homology between culture and social position without being dependent on classical highbrow 
art. In my research, this is called “cultural engagement,” operationalized by the variable on the number of 
live music events participated in the past year. 
Lastly, Bourdieusian scholars have recently turned to the concept of emerging cultural capital, which 
suggests alternative forms of distinction by elites in the contemporary world based on “mode of 
consumption” (Prieur and Savage, 2013, 2014). This argues that cultural distinction can be drawn through 
contemporary popular culture through distinction in the attitude of consumption. This is best 
operationalized in my research as the taste for selective foreign music, which has the characteristics of being 
contemporary music forms that are marked by a discerning mode of appreciation, selected by elites due to 
their ability to distinguish “quality” (see Chapter 5). 
The analysis uses analysis of variance (ANOVA), the same as described in Chapter 4. This analyzes whether 
people’s level of cultural capital (represented using having high-status tastes) different between 
socioeconomic subgroups, controlling for differences in age, gender, and city. 
Parental privileges 
The influencers of cultural capital have been divided into the three stages of parental privileges, childhood 
privileges, and adulthood privileges. Parental privileges are the advantages of the respondents’ parents, of 
which the ones included in this study are parental occupational class, education, state affiliation, and party 
membership. Childhood privileges are the privileges experienced as a child, which include hukou and play 
whether the individual learned to play a musical instrument—which reflects both parental interest in culture 
as well as parental affluence to afford music lessons. Finally, adulthood privileges include the level of 
education, of which higher education obtained as adults is the most relevant, and foreign experience which is 
most likely to be accumulated through study abroad or work engagements later in life. It is also recognized 
that parental privileges may also influence childhood privileges and adulthood privileges, and childhood 
privileges may also influence adulthood privileges, so mediation effects will be considered in the models 
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(1)  Father’s occupational class 
This variable is similar to the EGP variable described in an earlier chapter, but asks for the fathers’ EGP class 
instead of the respondents’. This question is based on the current employment situation of the father, or the 
last employment situation for fathers who are unemployed/retired/diseased. Ideally, the research hopes to 
obtain an earlier EGP status of the father—such as when the respondent was born or at a certain age. 
However, it is deemed to be unnecessarily challenging and may induce higher non-response rates. Given the 
rapid development of China in the past 40 years, it is reasonable to believe that father’s EGP status during 
respondents’ childhood is the same or definitely no worse than the current one, thus this is taken as father’s 
occupational class in the past, while recognizing that this is not as ideal as a precise reflection of parental 
privilege during respondents’ upbringing. The EGP status is segmented 3 segments which represent a 
hierarchy of occupational class of the father9. 
Table 6-1. Subgroups by father’s EGP  
 cases pct 
Manual (EGP class 5,6,7) 514 49% 
Mixed (EGP class 3,4) 284 27% 
Service (EGP class 1,2) 250 24% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
Father’s occupation was divided into manual (EGP 5, 6, or 7), mixed (EGP 3 or 4), or service (EGP 1 or 2), 
with 49%, 27%, and 24% of the sample, respectively. 
(2)  Father’s education 
Education is the socioeconomic factor of focus in this chapter. Education is commonly used to operationalize 
cultural capital. Education reflects the combination of both the primary accumulation of cultural capital from 
their parental privileges, as well as their own secondary achievement later in life. In the West, education has 
a strong linkage with cultural taste and practices (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b; Kraaykamp and Van Eijck, 
2010; Reeves, 2015). Education in China underwent rapid expansion in recent decades. On the surface, this 
is a sign of expanding equality, but education opportunity has been unequal, and education attainment 
encompass other forms of inequality in China, such as parental socioeconomic status and the urban-rural 
divide (Wu, 2010; Wu and Zhang, 2010; Zhou et al., 1998).  
Parental education is measured through the father’s educational attainment. Asking only for father’s 
education is not uncommon in China, because paternal and maternal education are highly correlated, plus 
traditionally fathers are the better educated in the family as well as being the main wage earner, whereas 
 
9 The official EGP classification consists of 7 classes, which are 1) higher and 2) lower managerial and 
professional occupations, 3) intermediate occupations, 4) small employers and own account workers, 5) 
lower supervisory and technical occupations, 6) semi-routine and 7) routine occupations. 
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some mothers do not work outside of the home (Wu, 2011). This is intended to reflect the father’s level of 
cultural capital. 
Table 6-2. Subgroups by father’s education 
 cases pct 
MS or Below 416 40% 
HS 355 34% 
College or Above 277 26% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
In the sample, respondents whose father’s educational attainment is middle school or below, high school, 
and college or above consist of 40%, 34%, and 26% of the sample, respectively. The level of educational 
attainment is noticeably lower than that of the respondents. 
(3)  Father’s state affiliation, and parental party membership 
Aside from occupational class, some scholars have argued that association with the state apparatus is also a 
form of privilege in China. Goldthorpe’s class has been criticized to overlook non-market institutions, such as 
the importance of political-status of the institution in employment relations (Bian et al., 2005; Zou, 2015). 
The social structure under Mao was based on bureaucratic rank and state-mechanisms, which to some extent 
has continued to this day (Yan, 2010). The most influential adaptation of EGP’s model of occupational social 
strata in China comes from the CASS Institute of Sociology, which includes whether one is inside or outside 
the party-state system10 (Lu, 2002: 44). While this research does not intend to debate the merit of certain 
class definitions, two variables relating to political affiliation have been included. 
First, the father’s job affiliation is asked. This is intended to differentiate the father’s employment hierarchy, 
rather than the higher ideal of precisely measuring the father’s occupational status when the respondent was 
growing up. This is by asking whether the father’s current/last occupation was in the government, a state-
affiliated institution, or a state-owned enterprise (as opposed to working in the private economy: private 
firms, foreign firms, or joint-ventures, or self-employed).  
Secondly, the “party parents” variable ask about membership in the Communist Party of China. The question 
for parents was asked as “do you have any parent who is a member of the party?”—this is true if either or 
both parents are party members. Political resources are operationalized as party membership of the 
respondent and the parents. While recognizing that this does not differentiate between ordinary party 
 
10 The 9 social strata are 1) state and social administrators, 2) higher managerial, 3) private business owners, 
4) individual business owners (self-employed or employ manual workers), 5) professional and technical 
personnel, 6) office workers, 7) service workers, 8) industrial workers, 9) agricultural laborers. 
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members from those who with deep connections, in a mass survey these should give a rough indication of 
political resources and any taste distinction from affiliation with the group.  
Table 6-3. Subgroups by father’s job affiliation and parental party membership 
 Party Parent/s No Party Parent Total 
Dad works for the State 215 (20.5%) 223 (21.3%) 438 (42%) 
Dad does not  
work for the State 
101 (9.6%) 509 (48.6%) 610 (58%) 
Total 316 (30.0%) 732 (70.0%) 1048 
 
Party membership relates to whether the father works in a state-job, but both party members and non-
members have jobs affiliated with the state. In this sample, 42% of the respondents have a father who is 
employed by the state, while 58% are in the private economy. In this sample, 70% of the respondents do not 
have any parent who is a party member, whereas 30% have at least one parent who is a party member. There 
is a strong correlation between parental party membership and the father having a job affiliated with the 
state. 
Childhood privileges 
(1)  Childhood hukou 
Hukou is a dummy variable that reflects whether the respondent has an urban hukou (household 
registration) at age 18. Since the respondents by sample design are already residing in the cities, this variable 
captures the individual’s hukou background. 18 is used because those who convert a hukou based on their 
own merits, such as through education, occupation, or wealth, are likely to have converted after age 18. 
Although hukou conversion through parents is possible at an earlier age, age 18 was chosen because hukou 
status at a major turning point would be easier to recall. 
Hukou, the household registration which divides its population between urban and rural, is another 
important source of cultural capital in China. Hukou status marks arguably the largest binary division 
between being privileged or underprivileged in contemporary Chinese society. However, instead of 
investigating the more obvious question of whether rural and urban populations differ in taste, this examines 
whether the hukou that one had while growing up leaves any persistent effect on the accumulation of cultural 
capital. This helps to answer whether the stigma against migrant workers is primarily based on occupation 
and wealth, or can it be attributed to a cultural distinction that is deeper.  
One’s hukou at the age of 18 was asked as an indicator of one’s rural or urban upbringing. Instead of asking 
one’s current hukou status, this survey asked one’s hukou status at age 18—to see which hukou one held 
during their childhood development, as a status inherited from parents excluding the hukou status obtained 
by their own achievement as adults. The respondents currently living in megacities could have converted 
from rural to urban hukou as adults by their own educational, vocational, or economic achievement, so 
hukou at the age of 18 is a measurement of parental influence. This allows us to trace further back to see 
whether hukou during one’s upbringing influences cultural taste. This is quite important, as it allows us to 
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determine whether cultural capital is primarily linked to achievement as adults—attaining higher education, 
high income, joining the party (with the recognition that parental factors nonetheless have a heavy influence 
on adult achievements), or whether cultural capital is inculcated earlier in life, a position that Bourdieu takes 
with his concept of habitus. If hukou status as childhood is still discriminating in the music taste, it reinforces 
existing research that childhood hukou status is not only disadvantaging, but also leaves an imprint in ways 
that future income and education are unable to make-up. The difference between this measurement and 
hukou at birth is that those who converted to urban hukou before age 18 are considered as urban here, since 
this reflects a higher likelihood of growing up in the urban and reflects parental achievement. Childhood in 
the rural village parallels to Bourdieu’s observations of countryside upbringing in France, from which he 
conceptualized the perpetual influence of habitus on later life. 
Table 6-4. Subgroups by childhood hukou 
 cases pct 
RuralBg 484 46% 
UrbanBg 564 54% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
In this sample, 46% of the respondents have a rural background, while 54% have an urban background. 
(2)  Childhood musical instrument lessons 
This variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent received music instruction as a 
child—defined as having learned to play any musical instrument for over 1 year as a child (under age 18). 
Economic capital became increasingly important after Reform and Opening, but the economic wealth of the 
parents is difficult to measure in retrospect. It is also highly improbable for respondents to know about their 
parent’s historic income during their childhood. However, an alternative way to capture this is through 
whether the parents afforded their child a musical education. Learning to play an instrument in their 
childhood indicates parental interest in children’s cultural development (parental cultural capital) as well as 
having the disposable income to pay for instruments and lessons (economic capital). Music education is a 
sign of middle-class taste, particularly so for the generation who grew up during the beginning of Reform and 
Opening. 
Table 6-5. Subgroups by music lessons  
 cases pct 
No 758 72% 
Yes 290 28% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
Most respondents have not learned a musical instrument for over a year as a child, comprising 72% of the 
sample. Twenty-eight percent of the respondents did. 
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Adulthood privileges 
(1)  Education 
Education has been discussed in the section on parental education. The sample is believed to be skewed to 
those who are higher educated. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents have a bachelor's degree, and 10% 
have above a bachelor’s degree. The use of ANOVA, to analyze whether taste is affected by educational 
subgroups, is robust to different subgroup sizes. 
Table 6-6. Subgroups by education  
 cases pct 
Middle School or Below 74 7% 
High School 180 17% 
College 288 27% 
Bachelor 396 38% 
Above Bachelor 110 10% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
(2)  Foreign living experience 
The foreign experience variable shows whether the respondent has lived outside Mainland China for 6 
months or more, continuously or in total. Although this might be thought of as an experience that 
accumulates cultural capital, the results (discussed in an earlier chapter) indicate that foreign experience is 
primarily related to tastes of the high-income rather than those of high cultural capital. Foreign experience is 
thus an indicator of the affluence to travel and spend time abroad through short-term education or work, 
instead of the quality of upbringing that is more influential on cultural capital. Since foreign education can 
lead to higher income, and for those in higher-paying jobs to have the opportunity to work and live abroad, 
this is not meant to be an indication of causality. 
Table 6-7. Subgroups by foreign experience  
 cases pct 
No foreign exp 977 93% 
Foreign exp 71 07% 
Total 1048 100% 
 
Correlation between the variables 
The table of correlations below shows that parental inequalities and development inequalities are, 
unsurprisingly, highly related. The categorical variables have been converted to dummy variables for the 
correlation. All the correlations are significant at 0.1%. In particular, although education attainment most 
heavily influences highbrow taste, education is correlated with all the other variables.  
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Table 6-8. Pearson’s correlation between various privileges 














Hukou Edu Foreign 
Parental 
Privileges 
Service Dad - 0.395 0.087 0.301 0.174 0.222 0.232 0.143 
Edu Dad 0.395 - 0.100 0.316 0.246 0.330 0.355 0.204 
Gov Dad 0.087 0.100 - 0.128 0.072 0.173 0.094 0.066 





0.174 0.246 0.072 0.198 - 0.222 0.208 0.173 
Hukou 0.222 0.330 0.173 0.254 0.222 - 0.342 0.128 
Adulthood 
Privileges 
Edu 0.232 0.355 0.094 0.202 0.208 0.342 - 0.204 
Foreign 0.143 0.204 0.066 0.154 0.173 0.128 0.204 - 
All of the correlations are significant at 0.1%, therefore they are not individually marked with asterisks. 
The positive correlations between the variables indicates that parental, childhood, and adulthood privileges 
are closely related. This supports the numerous previous researches that point to the conversion of various 
forms of capital, and the sustaining of privileges between different generations (Bian and Logan, 1996; Davis 
and Wang, 2009; Goodman, 2008a, 2016; Guo, 2013; Li, 2012; Liu, 2005; Nee, 1989, 1991; Tsang, 2014; 
Walder, 2006; Walder and Hu, 2009; Wang, 2008; Wu, 2011; Wu and Treiman, 2004, 2007). In other 
words, it is not surprising that they all play a role in the development of high tastes. Therefore, these terms 
not all go into a single model, due to the high degree of collinearity. Furthermore, this research aims at 
dissecting the relationship between these inequalities and highbrow taste to understand which of these are 
more important—to better understand the meaning of cultural capital in China. In particular, the influence of 
parental, childhood, and adulthood privileges on taste will indicate whether cultural capital in China is recent 
in formation or represents a solidifying intergenerational inequality within the 40 years of Reform and 
Opening. 
 Tracing the sources of cultural capital to parental and childhood privileges 
Drawing from survey data, the cultural capital indicators will be compared between people whose father’s 
occupational class, education, party membership and employment relationship with the state are different. 
Then childhood privileges and adulthood privileges will be examined. Cultural capital is separately examined 
as classical highbrow cultural capital, emerging cultural capital, symbolic exclusion, and cultural 
engagement. The overarching finding is that the sources of cultural capital can be traced to parental and 
childhood privileges, even though widespread inequality in China only occurred one generation ago since 
Reform and Opening. 
The influence of parental privileges on cultural capital 
(1)  Father’s occupational class 
First, we look at the differences in classical highbrow, emerging cultural capital, and symbolic exclusion 
scores between the groups of people whose fathers’ occupational classes are different—the left three charts in 
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the figure below. The charts show that those whose fathers are in higher occupational classes have higher 
scores for classical highbrow and emerging cultural capital but demonstrate lower symbolic exclusion. Next, 
we examine the chart for cultural engagement, which shows the average number of cultural engagement 
events attended in the past year among the same subgroups. The chart shows that the higher the 
occupational class of the father, the higher the cultural engagement. Thus, father’s occupational class appears 
to influence all forms of cultural capital of the individual, which suggests that it is rooted in parental 
privileges. 
Figure 6-2. Differences in cultural capital by father’s EGP occupational class 
 
 
To examine the statistical significance of the finding, as well as to examine whether the influence is direct or 
indirect—i.e. the possibility that father’s class increases the chances for higher education and it is the higher 
education that leads to higher cultural capital—ANOVA models are run (see table below). 
The first set of ANOVA models, model A, test if the cultural capital scores are different between the groups of 
people whose father’s EGP are different, after controlling for age, gender, and city. For classical highbrow, 
emerging cultural capital, and symbolic exclusion, ordinary ANOVA is run, with the sum of squared and the 
F-value in parenthesis being reported. Cultural engagement is a variable of counts, so the negative binomial 
ANOVA model is run, with the Chi-squared likelihood is reported. The significance level of all the tests are 
reported using the asterisks. The father’s EGP is statistically significant in model 2A, 3A, and 4A, which 
indicates that emerging cultural capital, symbolic exclusion, and cultural engagement differ depending on 
the father’s occupational class. 
To examine whether the increased cultural capital scores are more strongly due to parental privileges of 
father’s EGP class, or is it more strongly due to the individual’s own achievement, the years of education is 
added to the ANOVA model to control for the influence of the individual’s own achievement. The additional 
models are added as model 2B, 3B, and 4B. (There is no need to test the model 1B because the taste for 
classical highbrow has already been shown to be not significantly different by father’s EGP class in model 
1A).  
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Table 6-9. ANOVA results for father’s EGP 
 (1A) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) (4A) (4B) 
  
Classical 
 highbrow Emerging cc  Symbolic exclusion Cultural engagement 
EGP Dad 5.02 . 11.18 *** 2.00  17.16 *** 7.54 * 30.52 *** 14.16 *** (2.58)  (5.83)  (1.09)  (9.38)  (4.25)      
Edu -  - 
 47.87 *** -  29.51 *** -  39.01 *** 
    (52.42)   (33.28)      
Age 22.89 *** 1.12 
 0.23  28.15 *** 23.39 *** 0.41  0.04  
(23.58)  (1.16)  (0.25)  (30.79)  (26.38)      
Gender 1.61  31.93 *** 28.08 *** 4.15 * 3.11 . 0.11 
 0.26  
(1.65)  (33.32)  (30.76)  (4.54)  (3.51)      
City 4.34  3.98 
 4.63  30.71 *** 30.66 *** 2.16  2.37  
(1.49)  (1.39)  (1.69)  (11.20)  (11.53)      
Residuals 1009.98  996.52   948.66   950.82   921.3   30.52   14.16   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
In model 4, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The result suggests that father’s occupational class continues to influence the degree of symbolic exclusion 
and cultural engagement even after controlling for the person's own educational attainment. In model 3B 
and 4B, the father’s EGP class continues to be significant, at 5% and 0.01% significance, respectively. 
Therefore, emerging cultural capital is influenced by education, whereas the father’s occupational class still 
influences symbolic exclusion and cultural engagement. Symbolic exclusion and cultural engagement are 
inculcated earlier in life, as it relates to parental occupational class. 
(2)  Father’s education 
The analysis for father’s education and subsequent variables is the same as that before, therefore I will not 
repeat the description of the shared aspects with previous models. The figure below compares the indicators 
of cultural capital by father’s education, divided into middle school or below, high school, and college or 
above. Parental privilege, this time examined through father’s education, again appears to influence the 
development of cultural capital. Classical highbrow, emerging cultural capital, and cultural engagement 
again increases, and symbolic exclusion decreases, as father’s education increases. 
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Figure 6-3. Differences in cultural capital by father’s education 
 
 
We again turn to the ANOVA models to examine statistical significance as well as to distinguish direct and 
indirect influences of parental privilege on cultural capital. Model 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A show father’s education 
to be significant, which means the cultural capital scores are significantly different according to father’s 
education, after controlling for age, gender, and city. Model 1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B show that the individual’s 
years of education mediates the effect of parental education for classical highbrow and emerging cultural 
capital, because father’s education is no longer significant in model 1B and 2B. However, father’s education 
continues to be significant for symbolic exclusion and cultural engagement after controlling for education, in 
model 3B and 4B. Thus, symbolic exclusion and cultural engagement are both influenced earlier in life 
through father’s privileges, whereas the influence for classical highbrow and emerging cultural capital is 
indirectly through educational attainment of the individual. 
Table 6-10. ANOVA results for father’s education 
 (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) 
  Classical highbrow Emerging cc 
Edu Dad 
4.08 * 0.03  9.78 *** 0.25  
(4.20)  (0.03)  (10.21)  (0.27)  
Edu 
-  23.73 *** -  47.51 *** 
   (24.99)     (51.99)  
Age 
23.51 *** 27.62 *** 1.1  0.2  
(24.21)  (29.10)  (1.15)  (0.21)  
Gender 
1.64  1.03  32.55 *** 28.39 *** 
(1.68)  (1.09)  (33.95)  (31.07)  
City 
4.5  4.82  4.3  4.93  
(1.55)  (1.69)  (1.49)  (1.80)  
Residuals 1010.92   987.2   997.92   950.4   
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 (3A) (3B) (4A) (4B) 
  Symbolic exclusion Cultural engagement 
Edu Dad 
27.44 *** 10.52 *** 33.3 *** 12.34 *** 
(30.37)  (11.91)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
Edu 
-  22.2 *** -  34.31 *** 
   (25.15)     (1.00)  
Age 
30.47 *** 25.88 *** 0.27  0.01  
(33.73)  (29.31)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
Gender 
4.63 * 3.6 * 0.15  0.28  
(5.12)  (4.07)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
City 
32.36 *** 31.81 *** 1.7  2.1  
(11.94)  (12.01)  (3.00)  (3.00)  
Residuals 940.53   918.33   33.3   12.34   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
In model 4, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The influence of parental education on cultural capital is partially indirect, accounted by higher education for 
the child after the child grows up. Although parental education strongly influences other privileges for the 
child, the privileges were not exclusionary. Continuous reforms such as the expansion of education and 
urbanization opened pathways for others to attain cultural capital. Yet parental education still has an 
influence on cultural engagement, which is potentially caused by children of well-educated parents being 
brought to cultural activities, which becomes a habit when the child grows up. Similarly, symbolic exclusion 
was influenced by parental education, potentially due to influencing the child away from the local toward the 
foreign. These will be further explained based on interview data in chapter 7. However, the influence on 
emerging cultural capital was explained by higher education of the child, potentially because the rise of 
selective music is a much more recent phenomenon. 
(3)  Fathers’ state affiliation 
The figure below compares the cultural capital by different fathers’ state affiliation. The graphs show that the 
father’s work affiliation with the state is linked with higher scores for classical highbrow, emerging cultural 
capital, and cultural engagement, but the relationship is not clear for symbolic exclusion. 
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Figure 6-4. Differences in cultural capital by father’s job affiliation 
 
ANOVA shows that, after controlling for age, gender and city, the term for father’s state job is significant for 
all four cultural capital indicators (model 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A). This means cultural capital scores are different 
depending on whether people’s fathers worked in state-affiliated jobs or not. Adding the individual’s own 
education to the model makes the father’s state job term insignificant for all models (1B, 2B, 3B) except for 
cultural engagement (4B), which means that the influence of father’s state job is primarily through the higher 
educational attainment of the child except for cultural engagement, where a father’s privileges in association 
with state continue to be influential even after controlling for education. 
Table 6-11. ANOVA results for father’s state affiliation 
 (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) 
  Classical highbrow Emerging cc 
Father State Job 
5.75 * 2.65 . 6.22 * 1.91  
(5.93)   (2.80)  (6.46)   (2.09)  
Edu 
-   24.68 *** -   52.74 *** 
    (26.07)      (57.81)  
Age 
17.52 *** 22.85 *** 2.78 . 0.54  
(18.07)   (24.14)  (2.89)   (0.59)  
Gender 
1.81   1.01  34.09 *** 28.43 *** 
(1.86)   (1.06)  (35.44)   (31.16)  
City 
4.22   4.45  4.38   4.86  
(1.45)   (1.57)  (1.52)   (1.78)  
Residuals 1009.25   984.58   1001.48   948.75   
 (3A) (3B) (4A) (4B) 
  Symbolic exclusion Cultural engagement 
Father State Job 
4.86 * 1.65  16.17 *** 8.62 *** 
(5.25)   (1.85)  (1.00)   (1.00)   
Edu 
-   35.92 *** -   47.94 *** 
    (40.28)      (1.00)   
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Age 
37.08 *** 27.9 *** 1.96   0.49   
(40.08)   (31.30)  (1.00)   (1.00)   
Gender 
5.81 * 3.99 * 0.05   0.22   
(6.29)   (4.48)  (1.00)   (1.00)   
City 
32.65 *** 31.84 *** 1.31   1.71   
(11.76)   (11.90)  (3.00)   (3.00)   
Residuals 963.12   927.2   16.17   8.62   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
For cultural engagement, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
(4)  Parental party membership 
The charts below compare cultural capital scores depending on whether the respondent has at least a parent 
who is a party member. The results show that parental party membership is associated with higher classical 
highbrow cultural capital and higher cultural engagement, but the results for emerging cultural capital and 
symbolic exclusion are less clear. 
Figure 6-5. Differences in cultural capital by parents’ party affiliation 
 
 
Testing the result with ANOVA shows the score for classical highbrow and cultural engagement are 
significantly different for those who have parental party membership, because the party parent term is 
significant in model 1A and 4A. There is no influence from parental party membership on the score of 
emerging cultural capital or symbolic exclusion. Adding the respondents’ own party membership to the 
model, in model 1B and 4B, tests if the respondents’ own party membership mediates the effect of parental 
party membership, i.e. is the influence of parental party membership on cultural capital direct, or is it 
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indirect through the higher chances of party member parents to have children who also become a party 
member.  
Both party parents and the party terms are significant in both models 1B and 4B, therefore growing up in a 
family with party members does increase classical highbrow cultural capital and cultural engagement, even 
after controlling for the person’s own party membership. The increased classical highbrow cultural capital is 
a sign of the better social positions of party members as a political capital, as well as a sign of patriotism 
toward national culture. As political capital, party membership is a resource that relates to high social 
positions since Mao’s China. Studies have found its convertibility to economic and cultural capital. The 
possession of political capital increases the frequency of book reading, and sophistication of the books that 
are read (Wang et al., 2006). The well-educated and people successful in their fields are granted the 
opportunity to become party members, therefore they are in a stronger social position in society to develop 
classical highbrow cultural capital. 
Table 6-12. ANOVA results for parental party membership 
 (1A) (1B) (2A) (3A) (4A) (4B) 
  Classical highbrow Emerging cc 
Symbolic 
exclusion Cultural engagement 
Party 
Parents 
15.58 *** 9.34 
**
* 0.69   0.34   27.98 
**
* 19.89 *** 
(16.23)   (9.84)  (0.71)   (0.37)   (1.00)   (1.00)   
Party 
-   12.45 *** -   -   -   8.43 *** 
    (13.12)              (1.00)   
Age 
21.92 *** 22.98 
**
* 1.46   33.36 
**
* 0.73   0.78   
(22.83)   (24.22)  (1.51)   (35.88)   (1.00)   (1.00)   
Gender 
2.06   1.87  34.88 *** 6.10 * 0.00   0.03   
(2.15)   (1.97)  (36.06)   (6.56)   (1.00)   (1.00)   
City 
4.11   4.09  4.49   31.31 *** 1.77   1.96   
(1.43)   (1.44)  (1.55)   (11.23)   (3.00)   (3.00)   
Residuals 999.42   986.97   1007.01   967.63   27.98   19.89   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
In model 4, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The ideological influence of party membership (and state affiliation) on classical highbrow (i.e. traditional 
music), and the lack of influence on emerging cultural capital (i.e. selective foreign music) deserves 
additional mention, as they both relate to current Communist ideologies of patriotism and fear of Western 
cultural values. Worries about the negative influence of foreign culture have long been a concern of the 
Communist party. Communist China traditionally had strong state control of media and foreign influences, 
but loosened control after Reform and Opening led to the emergence of transnational media. After Reform 
and Opening, the government has been more relaxed about apolitical music as entertainment, yet 
maintained censorship to control what can be consumed. A sign of the state’s acceptance toward popular 
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culture was the establishment of CCTV’s music television station in 1993, which in its early years served a 
range of both politicized songs promoting patriotism and nationalism, along with popular songs 
(Baranovitch, 2003: 194). Baranovitch shows that the state recognizes that people no longer accept 
undisguised propaganda messages, and adapted to the changing sentiments by “Chinese MTV programs 
featured different songs that alternated with one another, some very politicized, some with subtle 
propaganda, others with no political message at all. The result, taken as a whole, was a hybrid of popularized, 
sugarcoated political propaganda.” (Baranovitch, 2003: 169). The media policy changed from absolute 
control to actively guiding and influencing popular music to be aligned with national ideologies. 
However, the Party continued to maintain control in filtering, limiting, and censoring the amount and the 
content of cultural consumption that entered China for fear of ideological erosion. There have been 
successive movements such as “CCP’s campaigns against “spiritual pollution” in 1983, against “bourgeois 
liberalization” in 1987, and against “peaceful evolution” in 1989 (JM Chan, 1994: 81). Even after joining WTO 
in 2011, China blocked media groups from open access to the local market, maintaining control and 
ownership of cultural producers, limiting Western influence to investments, joint ventures, partnerships, and 
special licensing (Lee et al., 2013: 44). Western media delivery companies such as YouTube and Google Play 
App store are completely blocked, allowing full party control over media censorship. (Yang, 1997). The state 
company China Film Group (CFG) oversee the import of foreign movies by controlling the proportion of 
revenue of US distributors, imposing quotas on the number of imports per year, censorship of content, and 
imposing blackout periods which forced Hollywood blockbusters to compete with each other on release dates 
(Boyd-Barrett, 2014: 171–173). Legally imported Western media are limited by import quotas, screened for 
content, censored for specific sensitive scenes, and dubbed by local producers, which can be viewed by the 
average Chinese. Those in luxury residential compounds or install illegal/grey satellite or devices may have 
access to additional foreign channels. Later on, new technologies such as file sharing and Internet Protocol 
Television allowed foreign media to be downloaded, supported by fan-groups who record, decrypt, subtitle, 
and share those content (Lee et al., 2013: 46–47). The consumption of Western culture is still quite 
accessible through informal and illegal means to those with the knowledge and agency to seek out for them, 
resulting in a stratified consumption.  
Similarly on music, the government has been hesitant about the influence of foreign culture, generally 
opening up the market to foreign musicians, yet censoring certain music or artists deemed inappropriate to 
maintain control (Brace and Friedlander, 1992; Kraus, 2004; Rupke and Blank, 2009). In earlier decades, 
pop concerts were rare events that draw a large crowd in China and are therefore viewed as risks to be 
controlled. Early concerts in the 1990s, described were treated as collective national events, with anchors 
who delivered formal, prewritten text that emphasized nationalism and patriotism, while musicians were 
instructed “to avoid talking to the audience, not to try to stir them, just to sing and get off stage” 
(Baranovitch, 2003: 207). The censorship of songs, lyrics, and certain artists are opaque, unwritten, and 
negotiated boundaries which tighten or loosen depending on the sentiment of government officials at the 
time. Metal and rock had been sensitive in China, with rock experiencing a band in the 1990s. Tang Dynasty 
(metal band) and Cui Jian (rock singer) had concert tours terminated early, believed to be for violations such 
as speaking to the audience, getting off stage and stirring up the crowd, as official explanations are not 
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always given (Baranovitch, 2003: 217). Hong Kong and Taiwan singers performing in China felt the need to 
show patriotism to the motherland (Ho, 2000). Artists who acted against the interest of the party have been 
banned from China. Justin Bieber’s misdemeanors caused him to be banned in 2017 to “purify” the nation 
(Phillips, 2017; White, 2017). Lady Gaga was banned in 2011 for “being vulgar,” and again in 2016 after 
meeting the Dalai Lama, whom Beijing considers to be a separatist (Lynch, 2016; Lynskey, 2011; Phillips, 
2016). A more recent example was the government’s ban on hip-hop (Quackenbush and Chen, 2018). 
Therefore, heavily influenced by party ideology, parental party membership influenced the stronger 
preference for classical highbrow, which primarily consists of traditional Chinese music, but not emerging 
cultural capital, which consists of both old and new foreign music. This also reflects the change in political 
ideology since reform and opening. Political capital in China has diverged from traditional Communist 
principles under Mao that oppose classical highbrow art as signs of bourgeoise and capitalist culture, 
favoring austerity and communal bonds over conspicuous consumption (EJ Croll, 2006: 23). Instead, 
political capital is a sign of high social status, associated with the consecration of traditional highbrow culture 
as national heritages and a sign of national pride, reflecting the shift in ideology since Reform and Opening.  
(5)  Summary—compelling evidence for the influence of parental privilege on cultural capital 
Looking at all four indicators of cultural capital, we see that they can be strongly traced to parental privileges. 
Part of this effect is direct, while part of this is mediated through the respondent. Classical highbrow cultural 
capital most strongly relates to parental and respondents’ party membership. Emerging cultural capital, 
which is displayed through newer forms of music, is primarily related to the respondents’ own education. 
However, parental influences are strongest in instilling what they should not like—the distastes used for 
symbolic exclusion. Finally, cultural engagement seems to be related to all forms of privileges of the parents 
and respondents. 
The influence of childhood privileges on cultural capital 
After looking at parental inequalities, this section focuses on two main inequalities experienced by the child, 
which are the hukou background, and the level of educational attainment. 
(1)  Hukou 
The figure below compares the cultural capital scores of people depending on their childhood hukou at age 
18. The results show that having an urban hukou in the past is linked with having higher cultural capital. 
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Figure 6-6. Differences in cultural capital by childhood hukou 
 
 
ANOVA is again used to examine the results for statistical significance after controlling for age, gender, and 
city. The results are in the table below. The differences in cultural capital are significant between people with 
or without childhood urban hukou, which are highly significant at 0.01% for all four cultural capital 
indicators (the childhood hukou term in model 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A). To examine whether the influence on taste 
from childhood hukou is mediated by the respondent’s own educational attainment, education is added to 
the models. The result indicates that the childhood hukou remains highly significant for all cultural capital 
indicators (model 2B, 3B, 4B) except for Classical highbrow (model 1B).  
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Table 6-13. ANOVA results for hukou  
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) 
  Classical highbrow Emerging cc 
Childhood 
Hukou 
12.28 *** 2.94 . 31.50 *** 9.56 *** 
(12.75)  (3.11) 
 
(33.59)  (10.56) 
 
Edu -  18.43 *** -  35.1 *** 
   (19.48) 
 
   (38.79) 
 
Age 18.24 *** 23.77 *** 3.63 . 0.96 
 
(18.94)  (25.12) 
 
(3.87)  (1.06) 
 
Gender 1.42  0.93 
 
30.93 *** 27.44 *** 
(1.48)  (0.98) 
 
(32.98)  (30.32) 
 
City 5.08  4.97 
 
3.83  4.36 
 
(1.76)  (1.75) 
 
(1.36)  (1.61) 
 
Residuals 1002.72   984.29   976.2   941.1   
 
(3A) (3B) (4A) (4B) 
  Symbolic exclusion Cultural engagement 
Childhood 
Hukou 
30.36 *** 12.14 *** 37.02 *** 15.8 *** 
(33.71)  (13.78) 
 
(1.00)  (1.00)  
Edu -  20.9 *** -  34.15 *** 
   (23.72) 
 
   (1.00)  
Age 41.3 *** 31.97 *** 2.07  0.54  
(45.86)  (36.27) 
 
(1.00)  (1.00)  
Gender 4.57 * 3.58 * 0.01  0.12  
(5.07)  (4.06) 
 
(1.00)  (1.00)  
City 30.13 *** 30.23 *** 1.73  2.01  
(11.15)  (11.43) 
 
(3.00)  (3.00)  
Residuals 937.61   916.71   37.02   15.8   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
In model 4, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
Thus, hukou influences all four indicators of cultural capital directly. After controlling for education, all but 
the score for classical highbrow cultural capital remain highly significant. The effects of urban background 
remain strong even after accounting for education, showing that primary socialization in the formative years 
indeed leaves an imprint on cultural capital. This demonstrates that cultural capital is significantly 
influenced by earlier childhood experiences in the habitus, a deficit which can be ameliorated but not 
completely overcome through education attainment later in life. The widely documented discrimination 
against the rural migrants can be ameliorated through education, but the influence from the past remains. 
One’s rural background leaves an imprint on taste that is hard to overcome by education or income—an 
imprint can be drawn for stigmatization. 
Chapter 6. The sources of taste in China—intergenerational endowment or individual attainment?  
 164 
(2)  Music lessons 
The figure below compares the amounts of cultural capital between people who learned to play musical 
instruments and those who did not. The results show that those who had music lessons have higher scores 
for classical highbrow, emerging cultural capital, and cultural engagement, but the influence on symbolic 
exclusion is not significant. Thus, they are more likely to prefer highbrow music, but unlike other privileges, 
the influence on symbolic exclusion is not obvious. 
Figure 6-7. Differences in cultural capital by learning to play an instrument when young 
 
 
The ANOVA model confirms the interpretation above. Model 1A, 2A, 4A shows that music lessons 
significantly influence classical highbrow cultural capital, emerging cultural capital, and cultural 
engagement. Symbolic exclusion has no statistically significant change (model 2B). Adding respondents’ own 
level of education to the model shows that the influence of childhood music lessons continues to influence 
classical highbrow cultural capital and cultural engagement.  
Having music lessons is most heavily related to classical highbrow cultural capital and cultural engagement, 
which is unsurprising because instrument lessons tend to be classical highbrow instruments, then enjoyed in 
live concerts, and weakly linked to popular music. Thus, playing instruments relates to all cultural capital 
indicators except for symbolic exclusion—which is possibly because increased interests in music overall 
mitigates any influences of distaste from other factors. 
Table 6-14. ANOVA results for music lessons 
 (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (4A) (4B) 
  Classical highbrow Emerging cc 
Symbolic 
exclusion Cultural engagement 
Instru- 28.07 *** 18.44 *** 7.60 *** 0.38  0.49  59.48 *** 41.87 *** 
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ments (29.61)  (19.80)  (7.92)  (0.43)  (0.52)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
Edu 
-  18.14 *** -  39.02 *** -  -  38.55 *** 
   (19.48)     (43.71)        (1.00)  
Age 
23.27 *** 27.21 *** 1.34  26.22 *** 33.13 *** 0.45  0.04  
(24.55)  (29.21)  (1.40)  (29.37)  (35.65)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
Gender 
1.28  0.75  33.1 *** 4.15 * 5.88 * 0.07  0.27  
(1.35)  (0.81)  (34.45)  (4.64)  (6.33)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
City 
4.45  4.58  5.04  30.23 *** 31.42 *** 1.04  1.42  
(1.56)  (1.64)  (1.75)  (11.29)  (11.27)  (3.00)  (3.00)  
Residuals 986.93   968.79   1000.1   928.47   967.48   59.48   41.87   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
In model 4, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
The influence of adulthood privileges on cultural capital 
(1)  Educational attainment 
Education is the factor that most heavily relates to cultural capital. The figure below compares cultural 
capital scores between people with different levels of education. The charts show a clear rise in classical 
highbrow cultural capital, emerging cultural capital, and cultural engagement, and lower symbolic exclusion, 
as the educational level increases.  
Figure 6-8. Differences in cultural capital by education 
 
 
The ANOVA results also confirm the high significance of the interpretation, with the education term highly 
significant at 0.01% on all four cultural capital indicators. This result is unsurprising, demonstrating that 
education is the best indicator of cultural capital. Education is also used as a control in models to examine 
whether the influence was direct or indirect, therefore the difference in taste by education is again presented 
here to demonstrate its high significance in influencing cultural capital. The residual influences of other 
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factors have indicated how influence from parental and childhood privileges have developed cultural capital 
by shaping the person’s habitus and influencing the opportunities for higher education. 
Table 6-15. ANOVA results for educational attainment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Classical 






27.77 *** 57.05 *** 39.12 *** 55.93 *** 
(29.29)  (62.47)  (43.85)  (1.00)  
Age 
27.61 *** 0.20  26.28 *** 0.00  
(29.11)  (0.22)  (29.45)  (1.00)  
Gender 
1.05  28.62 *** 4.06 * 0.09  
(1.11)  (31.34)  (4.55)  (1.00)  
City 
4.84  4.97  30.98 *** 2.66  
(1.70)  (1.82)  (11.58)  (3.00)  
Residuals 987.23   950.65   928.85   55.93   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
In model 4, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
(2)  Foreign living experience 
The last variable to examine is whether the person has lived abroad. The figure below shows the differences 
in cultural capital between people who have and the people who have not. While the result also confirms the 
increase of classical highbrow cultural capital, emerging cultural capital, cultural engagement, and the 
decrease in symbolic exclusion, the influence of foreign experience is strongest for cultural engagement. The 
influence on the other three indicators of cultural capital is not as strong. 
Figure 6-9. Differences in cultural capital by foreign experience 
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The interpretation above is verified with ANOVA. Model 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A show that having lived abroad 
mostly influences cultural engagement, with the term highly significant at 0.01% (model 4A). The influence 
on emerging cultural capital is also significant, but at a weaker 5% level (model 2B). The influences on 
classical highbrow and symbolic exclusion are not significant (model 1A and 3A). Adding education to the 
models in which lived-abroad is significant, the influence on emerging cultural capital is no longer significant 
(model 2B), whereas the influence on cultural engagement continues to be highly significant at 0.01% (model 
4B). Therefore, the influence of foreign experience on cultural capital is limited to cultural engagement only. 
The slight influence on emerging cultural capital is fully explained by the higher levels of education of those 
who have lived abroad. The result suggests that the foreign living experience, which likely occurred later in 
life such as through higher education or work placement, has a relatively weak influence on cultural capital, 
which is molded earlier in life as Bourdieu described.  
Table 6-16. ANOVA results for foreign experience 
 (1A) (2A)   (2B)   (3A) (4A) (4B) 
  
Classical 






2.27  4.16 * 0.14  2    20.25 *** 9.09 *** 
(2.33)  (4.32)  (0.16)  (2.56)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
Edu 
-  -  53.03 *** -  -  44.17 *** 
      (58.02)        (1.00)  
Age 
20.86 *** 1.99  0.25  34.81 *** 1.49  0.28  
(21.44)  (2.06)  (0.27)  (37.52)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
Gender 
2.08  35.45 *** 28.75 *** 6.28 * 0.01  0.13  
(2.14)  (36.77)  (31.45)  (6.77)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
City 
4.17  4.12  4.9  31.5 *** 2.73  2.94  
(1.43)  (1.42)  (1.79)  (11.32)  (3.00)  (3.00)  
Residuals 1012.74   1003.54   950.51   965.59   20.25   9.09   
In model 1-3, cells indicate the sum of squared (F-value), and the level of significance. 
In model 4, the cells indicate Chi-squared likelihood and the level of significance. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
 Discussion 
Table 6-17. Summary of the significance of the variables from the previous models 
 












































































Privileges Father’s EGP class . *** *** ***   * *** 
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Father’s Edu * *** *** ***   *** *** 
Father’s State 
Job * * * *** .   *** 
Party Parents ***   *** ***   *** 
Childhood 
Privileges Childhood Urban Hukou *** *** *** *** . *** *** *** 
Music Lessons *** ***  *** ***   *** 
Adulthood 
Privileges Education *** *** *** ***     
Foreign living 
experience  *  ***    *** 
The model A columns show the significance of the term; the model B column shows the significance of 
the term after controlling for education, an adulthood privilege. The cells with a slash indicate the model 
was not tested as it is expected to be insignificant. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
Parental privileges have a strong direct influence on individuals’ cultural engagement, symbolic exclusion, 
and classical highbrow cultural capital. Parental privileges include the father’s occupational class, social 
capital, as well as political capital, which strongly influences the environment of upbringing and childhood 
privileges enjoyed by the respondents. Being brought to live events and raised as active cultural participants 
at an early age strongly influence the level of cultural engagement later in life, as this required 
comprehensive parental privileges, in both having the income to support such activities (reflected through 
parental class), as well as the parental cultural capital (reflected through parental education) to recognize the 
value in cultural engagement. The notion of symbolic exclusion—distaste for the cultures of the 
underclasses—is also planted early in individual’s lives. The act of distancing from local culture can be traced 
to the exposure to foreign and Hk/Taiwan culture occurred since the early days of the Reform and Opening 
of China (Carrier, 1995; Davis, 2000b; Tsang, 2014; Yan, 2000) and thus was a taste rooted in parental 
privileges. Interest in classical highbrow is also rooted in the parental privileges of parental party 
membership, which conferred powerful advantages during the early years of Reform and opening, as well as 
for the ideological promotion of patriotic national culture, described in the earlier section. 
Childhood privileges are inculcated into the habitus during upbringing, influencing the development of 
cultural capital. Childhood privileges include urban hukou and music lessons during childhood. This 
research asks for respondents’ hukou at age 18 to reflect the hukou during the person’s upbringing, before 
any potential conversion of hukou through the person’s own achievements later in life. Learning how to play 
an instrument during childhood also reflects the parental emphasis on culture and parental wealth. 
Childhood urban hukou is directly influential on emerging cultural capital, symbolic exclusion, and cultural 
engagement, further supporting Bourdieu that cultural capital is inculcated during upbringing. Emerging 
cultural capital is not traceable to parental privileges but is strongly associated with childhood urban hukou. 
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This is potentially because emerging cultural capital had been rare in the parental generation. Historically, 
legitimate culture had been an institutionalized and educated culture, without an emphasis on individual 
critique as the basis of quality (Yan, 2010). The shift toward emerging cultural capital, therefore, occurred 
during the privileged childhood of the current generation of Chinese, during which quality education and the 
promotion of individual sushi (cultivating internal qualities) started to gain traction (Jacka, 2009; Lin, 2011). 
The influence of childhood music lesson on traditional highbrow and cultural engagement is unsurprising 
because having parents with the cultural capital to be interested in music and the ability to afford music 
lessons are both signs of privileges in upbringing, while learning music instruments is strongly associated 
with traditional music and the habit of attending music concerts. 
The level of education is also a strong indicator of cultural capital, not necessarily because of the extent that 
cultural knowledge is “taught” in universities, but because all forms of parental and childhood privileges 
which promote the development cultural capital also lead to higher chances of receiving higher education, as 
the educational opportunities in China have become increasingly narrow for underprivileged children 
(Walder, 2006; Woronov, 2013; Zhou et al., 1998). The fact that parental and childhood privileges are 
influential on cultural capital even after controlling for education illustrates the extent of parental 
endowments. The rapid expansion of opportunities for higher education in the 1990s has offered those 
without a privileged primary socialization the chance to catch up, but parental and childhood privileges have 
been influential even after controlling for education, therefore education alone is not able to overcome the 
deficit. Furthermore, people from privileged families are more likely to receive higher education themselves. 
Education opportunities are better for top-tier cities over secondary cities, and for urban over the rural, 
through different admission quotas as well as educational fees. The result is that educational opportunity is 
slanted toward those from privileged families—those with a better family social origin, in higher-tier cities 
over lower-tier cities, as well as urban households (Wu and Zhang, 2010; Zhou et al., 1998). The direct effect 
of parental education on children’s years of education is found to be salient in many studies using large scale 
data (Sato and Shi, 2007; Walder and Hu, 2009; Xiang and Shen, 2009; Zhou et al., 1998). Education 
attainment is also found to encompass other forms of inequality in China, such as parental socioeconomic 
status and the urban-rural divide (Wu, 2010; Wu and Zhang, 2010; Zhou et al., 1998), and the province-
based quota system in university admissions which favors urban residents particularly those in big 
metropolises (Liu et al., 2009). There are also differences in the quality and reputation of institutions within 
the same level of education which favors privileged groups (Du, 2013, pp. 168–169). 
Finally, experience living abroad does not influence classical highbrow cultural capital or symbolic exclusion, 
which points to the limited influence of adulthood experiences in influencing cultural taste.  Experience 
living abroad only increases cultural engagement, but this is due to higher income, and the bias that those 
who are culturally engaged enough to seek a foreign experience are unlikely to be culturally disengaged.  
Overall, these findings provide convincing evidence on the existence of cultural capital which is consistent 
with Bourdieu’s theory. Intergenerational inequality—privileges from parents and during childhood—has led 
to clear differences in music taste. Symbolic exclusion and cultural engagement are particularly traceable to 
parental influence. Traditional cultural capital is influenced by parental party membership, which in the past 
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was as important as political capital. Emerging cultural capital is traced to childhood privileges. All of these 
demonstrate that inequality in China has led to divergences in the cultures of those raised in different 
environments.  
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Chapter 7. The habitus of the new generation—the formation of cultural capital in 
China 
 Rise of social distinction in Chinese society 
Amidst the widely researched social inequality and the prevalence of social stigma against the underclasses in 
China, inequalities in cultural capital have largely been overlooked in China. This chapter takes on a 
historical perspective to argue how cultural capital developed in China from non-existence to its current 
prevalence in the 40 years of Reform and Opening.  
Rapid economic growth after Reform and Opening has led to the rise of economic inequalities and 
differences in lifestyle, which have been widely researched. However, the existing accounts have overlooked 
the influences of those inequalities on the development of the child. Those in privileged families had better 
physical access to foreign media, better equipped to consume foreign media with their English education, 
better opportunity for music literacy, and better opportunities for higher education, which itself further 
solidifies a highbrow taste. My argument is that intensifying inequalities in the four decades since Reform 
and Opening has not only enabled social distinction based on economic and status, but has also allowed a 
generation of Chinese to grow up in divergent environments, giving rise to a new generation of Chinese with 
increasingly distinguishable tastes—the rise of cultural capital. 
Cultural capital is a concept that has been theorized by Bourdieu to be a structuring mechanism that 
perpetuates intergenerational inequality through culture (Bourdieu, 1984). Many pieces of research have 
discussed its relevance in various countries. However, most studies are based in Western societies (e.g. 
Bennett et al., 2009; Coulangeon, 2015; Harrits et al., 2010; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Prieur et al., 2008). It 
is questionable how cultural capital differs in other societies. Inequality and cultural capital in its current 
form developed from ground zero since Reform and Opening, providing a rare case that allows us to see the 
process of formation of cultural capital. Existing research has described the rise of high art, particularly when 
it spread from Europe to America, from the perspective of institutionalization and consecration of the art 
forms (DiMaggio, 1982b; Gans, 1974). This research describes the rise of cultural capital in the Chinese local 
context. 
This research draws from the review of existing literature as well as 20 interviews in Shanghai and Beijing on 
the formation of music taste with people from various backgrounds. The semi-structured interviews lasted an 
average of one hour. Interviewees were recruited broadly from people willing to participate in a study on 
their music preferences. Those from privileged backgrounds are over-sampled because those with highest 
levels of cultural capital are most revealing of distinction in practice, but they comprise of only small 
percentages in the society to be picked up in representative surveys. Interviews present an opportunity to 
understand them. 
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(1)  Distinction and cultural consumption prior to Reform and Opening 
The first wave of modern consumerism started in the late Qing dynastic from the 1800s till the 1940s. The 
end of the imperial dynasty, along with the demise of the traditional path and symbols of power, saw 
consumerism becoming the site of competition for social status and nationalism during the Republican 
period (Gerth, 2003). After the Communist revolution in 1949, the state socialist order was created which 
pursued egalitarian policies to eliminate class. Private ownership in the means of production was abolished, 
removing economic inequalities in the population. Prior to Reform and Opening, Chinese society was 
egalitarian for the vast majority of the population. A pillar stone of equality and the lack of distinction is the 
replacement of free market with the danwei system—self-contained work units which provided full benefits 
including pensions, insurance, housing, medical care, education, and recreational facilities. The danwei, 
assigned by the state and essentially permanent, had enormous control over individuals (Andreas, 2016; Lu 
and Perry, 1997; Walder, 1986). Wages were low but social equality was for high for most people, due to the 
lack of private property and limited cultural consumption. Professionals and blue-collars had similar homes, 
mode of transportation, apparel, and leisure activities. Any residual differences were more attributed to 
allocated resources of the particular danwei than to personal wealth (Davis, 2000a: 5). Culturally, the 
government had tight control of media, forbidding the consumption of popular music and resulted in largely 
uniform tastes for everyone (Ho and Law, 2012: 403). This culminated in the Cultural Revolution when those 
with higher education or higher ranking professions were “leveled down” to eliminate distinctions, through 
efforts such as sending intellectuals into agricultural labor, and the promotion of a unisex style of dress that 
obscures status (Parish, 1984; Whyte, 1981, 2010: 21). 
(2)  From basic necessities to material distinctions 
After Reform and Opening, inequality in economic wealth widened. The first wave of distinction was largely 
based on objectified consumption—the rise of consumerist distinction. The early rich used their increased 
income on spending on material goods (Chao and Myers, 1998). At the onset of Reform and Opening, 
television was a luxury beyond the reach of most families. By the 1990s, television was common in main 
cities and penetrating the rural (Xiaoping, 1991). Along with increasing television penetration, the number of 
channels also greatly expanded. Differentiation expanded from consumer durables to a greater diversity of 
consumer goods. Electronics expanded to VCD players, pagers, and fax machines. The ownership of 
consumer durables was the first way for people to show off their achievement and status, famously the “four 
goods” of color televisions, washing machines, refrigerators, and stereos (Latham et al., 2006: 1).  
Economic capital enables distinction through conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 2007). Material ownership 
upgraded from household appliances, electronics, to motorcycles, then automobiles. Automobile ownership 
is a widespread aspiration—automobile ownership increases with income whereas motorcycle ownership 
decreases (Cartier, 2013: 36). Ownership of real estate also started to become a status symbol of successes in 
life. Homeownership reached 80% for natives in Shanghai which is higher than the US average (Davis, 2005: 
705). Whether through the purchase of extravagant goods or cultural objects, the display demonstrates one’s 
position in society. For Bourdieu, economic capital differs from cultural capital in relation to cultural 
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consumption, as it is associated with exuberance but lacking in the refined tastes of the cultured class. 
Economic capital also relates to objectified cultural capital for display (Bourdieu, 1986). 
(3)  Distinction through “middle class” and showy lifestyles 
Although differentiation first started in material ownership, where ownership of certain material goods is a 
sign of status and achievement, the differences soon spread to more cultural realms. The sustained level of 
economic inequality led to the emergence of increased differences in lifestyles. Popular entertainment and 
consumer society gradually penetrated China, providing the cultural material that enables cultural 
distinction to be drawn based on differentiated lifestyles (Davis, 2005; Latham et al., 2006; Tsang, 2014). 
The affluent started to experience distinctions in lifestyle and leisure (Chao and Myers, 1998). The washing 
machines and fridges reduced time on chores, and television provided a new form of media exposure. Leisure 
activities also expanded to movie theaters, snooker, dancing, bowling, and dining out (Davis, 2000a: 20). 
Economic-based distinctions expanded to observable immaterial differences in lifestyles. The exorbitant 
price of bowling alley became an example enclave of luxury for entrepreneurs to lubricate relationship with 
bureaucrats—where elites restrict access to items through law or prices to maintain identity (Appadurai, 
1988; Gan, 2000). A campaign in Beijing called “Civilization Contract with Residents” promoted cultural 
activities such as visiting museums, libraries, and concerts, and taking driving and computer lessons to 
“become a modern and civilized” Beijinger, which promoted high-cultures for those with the time and 
income (Wang, 2001). The participation in “high-culture,” however, was initially dominated by the new rich 
as a new fashion to be consumed. Compared to the historical high culture which was legitimized by elite 
gentry and through government institutions, high-culture was at risk of being commercialized by the new 
rich, with state opera houses renamed after rich sponsors, and a prominent bookstore being merged with a 
high-end restaurant (Wang, 2001: 86). 
Mobility and the demand for traveling also increased rapidly since Reform and Opening. Traveling in the 
1980s was rare, restricted to visiting relatives in Hong Kong and Macau under supervised tours. Outbound 
tourism only began in 1995 with a formal tourism policy that allowed people to travel to approved countries 
in organized groups (Lee et al., 2013: 21–22). Tourism from China has grown rapidly over the decades to 
allow Chinese tourists to become the top outbound spenders in 2018 at US $277 billion, compared to 
American tourists in the second place with $144.2 billion and German tourists in the third place with $94.2 
billion (UNWTO, 2019). Yet 53% of the people in the top 8 cities in China have never traveled by air before in 
2004 (50%, 53%, 37%, 51% in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu respectively), and only 6% of 
those who have had ever flown outside of mainland China (Garner, 2005: 245–246). Although the dated data 
prevent an exact comparison, there’s a glaring disparity in mobility and spending in China with little sign 
that the inequality has narrowed since then. 
The emergence of a consumerist lifestyle is described by some as the rise of the “middle class,” an increasing 
number of people in cities whose aspirations are clearly differentiated from the have-nots in China. The rise 
of consumer identity replaced the traditional Communist identity based on occupation (Tsang, 2014: 28). 
The life of the consumerist Chinese shifted “from production, work and comrade-worker to consumption, 
lifestyle, and the consumer” (EJ Croll, 2006: 23). The distinction by lifestyle emerged with the rise of 
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disposable income, the official encouragement of the shift toward market individualism by Deng Xiaoping’s 
famous line “to get rich was glorious” and associated policies like the reduction of workweek to 5 days in 1995 
and what to do for leisure in the “double-leisure day” (shuang xiu ri) (Davis, 2000a: 12; Wang, 2001: 74). 
The disparity in material spending became visible in many areas. Those in poverty were deficient in protein, 
depending on grain for 15.45% of diet but only 4.7% for the rich (Solinger, 2013: 63–64). Meanwhile, the rich 
are buying from imported supermarkets, gorging and wasting food in restaurants, and consuming exotic 
delicacies such as ostriches, snakes, and porcupines as symbols of diet-sophistication (Hanser, 2008; Veeck, 
2000; Veeck et al., 2010; Veeck and Burns, 2005; Veeck and Veeck, 2000; Zhan, 2005, 2008). “If you want 
to be regarded as middle class, you must own and do these things, which, constructed as they may be, 
become objectified as hallmarks of the middle class” (Guo, 2008: 47). 
On top of that are the new rich in China, described by terms such as xingui (the new rich), xinfu (new 
wealth), dakuan (big spender), baofahu (parvenu: the nouveau riche, for the unrefined rich people), furen 
jieceng (the rich stratum), and shangliu shehui (“high society”) (Goodman, 2008b; Lei, 2003; Miao, 2016: 
24; Osburg, 2013: 11). Osburg studied the new rich in China to discover their exuberant consumption. Their 
activities include “entertaining spaces (such as nightclubs and saunas) and participating in activities 
(drinking, gambling, and sex consumption)” (Osburg, 2013: 38). “the whole purpose of consumption is to 
make one’s economic, social, and cultural capital as transparent and legible as possible to the widest 
audience… the primary goal of consumption for the new rich—to let everyone know they’re wealthy and well-
connected (even if they’re not).” (Osburg, 2013: 118). 
 The development of cultural capital through privileged upbringing 
The previous section traced the rise of social distinction since Reform and Opening. Although social 
boundary was growing between adults, driven by diverging differences in wealth, people in that era were 
more homogenous in terms of cultural capital. Respondents’ parents had modest levels of education, 
typically no more than high school. Respondents typically recall a childhood with parents who liked the 
popular music of their era. For the parents of older interviewees, it was typically traditional opera, 
Communist singers, and some popular singers from HK or Taiwan. Pop music did not exist in Mao’s period 
in China, when music was tightly controlled, and people listened to revolutionary music. Parents of younger 
interviewees typically preferred HK or Taiwan singers. Although not a formal comparison in this study, the 
degree of distinction in their parents appears far weaker than the sophisticated distinctions today. While 
there were early signs of stratification in their parents’ tastes—particularly the degree of interest music from 
HK or Taiwan—the number of artists in that era was more limited, compared to the endless number of 
selective music items in their playlists. More importantly, the parents of the respondents represent inequality 
across China—spread among urban and rural parts of China, whereas the wider differences in music taste 
between the respondents are based on interviewees within Beijing and Shanghai, the most developed regions 
in China.  
Even though the disparity in cultural and economic capital was much narrower in the early years of Reform 
and Opening, an even bigger chasm was developing between children from different social backgrounds. The 
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passage of music taste from parents to children was not direct—many of the respondents’ favorite music 
items are contemporary fashions, and they rarely like the same songs as their parents. What the parents 
passed on were not direct music preferences, but cultural resources and exposures which influenced their 
interests in pop culture as well as traditional music. The parents of today’s HCCs were willing and able to 
spend increasing divergent amounts of money on their children’s cultural education, and to ensure that they 
inherit a privileged social position. This is the point of divergence in my argument, which is that while 
inequality and distinction were growing between the adults, a generation of Chinese has grown up under 
increasing differences in upbringing which developed into cultural capital. Cultural capital in China consists 
of higher interest in traditional highbrow music, higher engagement in live music, as well as the attitude 
toward pop-culture—the preference for selective foreign music and the distaste for local music (see Chapter 
6). Each of these will be discussed in a separate section below. 
Aspirations toward foreign culture since Reform and Opening 
Ever since Reform and Opening, Chinese people have looked to Western culture as signs of modernity. 
Consumption of Western culture carries symbolic values of status. The rise of the middle-class, centered on 
the idealized images of Western consumerism, as they look for standards of proper fashion and taste. The 
main point of contact with the imagined West is through China’s economic entry into international trade, 
where the influx of foreign investment since Reform and Opening brought many Western brands and 
products to Chinese consumers (Pun, 2005). In this period, items started to be consumed beyond their 
material values but for their symbolic values (Featherstone, 1990). As much of the new lifestyles was 
introduced from foreign companies, in the 80s and 90s a modern taste was directly equated with 
foreignness. In the first 10 years of reform, the sudden portrayal of the West of plentiful, color, variety, 
style—of superiority. Foreignness was attributed positively such as haokan (better looking), you yisi (novel), 
and xiandai (modern) compared to Chinese counterparts (Bayne, 2006: 157). Foreign brands entered China 
to attract Chinese consumers, who aspire for foreign brands over local brands to distinguish from the bad 
taste “the rest of the Chinese have in the eyes of foreigners – and the undertone of ‘village provincialism’ 
(tuganjue) (Tsang, 2014: 96). Urbanization, modernization, Westernization, and globalization became 
aspirations and symbols of distinction in Chinese cities (Ma, 2011; Ma and Wu, 2005; Tsang, 2014: 86). 
“Consumption is the easiest indicator for the new class to represent its status, its wealth and its social 
reputation in post-reform China. Consumption is deliberately used as a contrasting device to distinguish the 
present day from pre-reform times, when only production existed but no consumption” (Tsang, 2014: 14). 
Western festivals were increasingly celebrated with Christmas lights, cards, and Easter rabbits, along with 
cultural consumptions from Barbies to NBA superstars (EJ Croll, 2006: 23; Rosen, 2003) Luxury and 
imported retail also entered China in the 1990s with apparel, perfume, and jewelry, opening shops in 
metropolises and spreading to other middle-tiered cities (EJ Croll, 2006: 97; Garner, 2005: 209). Aside from 
material consumption, Western lifestyles of golf, night clubs, and gyms also spread among the privileged in 
China (EJ Croll, 2006; Davis, 2000b; Solinger, 2013: 66). The class dimension of this is increasingly evident, 
as those who can reach Western aspirations are the middle classes with the affluence for a consumerist 
lifestyle. This has also been reflected in consumption, where middle-class families “opt out” of local products 
to practice gated consumption (Hanser and Li, 2015).  
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Scholars are keen to point out that the aspirations for the West in China reflect imaginaries of the West—a 
phenomenon called occidentalism, the counterpart of orientalism—rather than an accurate representation of 
the West (Carrier, 1995; Chen, 1992, 2002). One example was the initial high-status of fast-food restaurants, 
which did not have a high-status in the West. KFC opened in China on October 6, 1987, followed by 
McDonald’s on April 23, 1992, in the most upscale part of Beijing, which became an attraction for Chinese 
tourists to have a taste of American culture (Yan, 2000: 204). Fast food restaurants attained celebrity status, 
for their nutritious ingredients and scientific cooking (Yan, 2000: 212). “Eating something interesting’ 
became synonymous with eating Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonalds’ hamburgers” (EJ Croll, 2006: 32). 
With an increasing number of Western restaurants accessible and affordable by Chinese consumers, KFC and 
McDonald’s are no longer “highbrow” today, but this demonstrates how highbrow in China could differ from 
that in the West. Similarly, the image of modernity is not exclusive to the geographic “West” but also includes 
association with the modernity of Hong Kong and Taiwan (Gangtai). Because of a shared Sinic culture, the 
cultural influence from Hong Kong and Taiwan is much more influential in the realm of popular culture such 
as TV dramas and music (Gold, 1993), which was seen as an approximation of the Western world (Fung, 
2008). 
Fostering interest in selective foreign music and “upgrading” their tastes 
In a society of popular culture, distinction is not a relatively clear division between classical snobs and slobs, 
but are more drawn through a complex web of selective niche items. While it is easy to understand the simple 
contour that foreign music is higher status than local music, actual distinction on the ground is a far from 
straightforward—an entangled complexity understood by HCCs but not LCCs. It is the high degree of internal 
stratification within music categories that enables the HCCs to use music for social distinction. HCCs are able 
to discern the quality of music, because of their embodied cultural capital. HCC draws on their discerning 
appreciation to research, critique, and appreciate which is deployed through selective, non-mainstream 
items. This is further demonstrated in the “upgrading” tastes. 
Although popular music is heavily marked by differences in age, the changes in popularity and the 
differences in music across generations mask the stratification that continues to occur in every age group. 
Studies have found age to be a strong distinction in popular culture (Bennett et al., 2009; Savage, 2006; Van 
Eijck and Knulst, 2005). Yet underlying different trends across age groups, researchers have found a 
distinction between tastes for old and contemporary styles across the division between highbrow and 
lowbrow (Bellavance, 2008; Berghman and van Eijck, 2009). This has been argued to be attempts by the new 
generation to both conform to existing standards of distinction, yet also stake their own claim to aesthetic 
uniqueness by accruing “optimal distinctiveness” (Lizardo and Skiles, 2015). In China, “old” does not 
necessarily mean highbrow and new does not necessarily mean lowbrow, due to its rapid development and 
the recent rise in access to higher education, which sometimes links the taste of the old with backwardness 
and low levels of education. I argue that HCCs in China navigate through the changing popularity by 
“upgrading” their tastes in popular culture. In contrast to the highbrow status of classical music, which 
remains timelessly highbrow for long periods, popularity in pop music is elusive and changing. Trendy music 
is always changing, with music entering from the West, Japan, and Korea, as well as new artists and new 
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content-delivery platforms. HCCs responded by constantly “upgrading” their tastes as music become 
mainstream as they continue to seek out selective music, as they continue to gain knowledge and critical 
judgment. 
HCCs describe of themselves moving from mainstream Hong Kong and Taiwan music, toward Western pop, 
and then toward selective indies music as Western pop became mainstream in China. Music from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan carried symbols of “foreignness” in the 1980s but increasingly penetrated the market to become 
mainstream. In the 90s, pop music from the West was preferred by selective listeners, but as they too become 
mainstream, HCCs continued to seek more selective music such as indies. The status hierarchy continues to 
get updated as new music enters the field. The same goes for low-status music, as new artists and 
technologies emerge—such as the “popular Internet songs”—they are drawn into the flight for distinction. A 
cohort effect can be seen depending on what was popular and selective in the period. 
(1)  Foreign exposure through parental privileges  
All the parents of HCCs have helped them attain high fluency in English. This emphasis on the English 
language has been widespread in China for many years. English has become an international language of the 
world due to British and American hegemony in the globalizing world (Pennycook, 2017). The dominance of 
Western languages and cultural practices as global standards are well recognized by privileged parents, who 
strived for their children to align with the global standard as much as possible, ultimately attaining a degree 
abroad. Adherent inequality exists because the “local” educations of those who grew up in the West “are 
simultaneously regarded to be global by people in the non-West…Thus, due to the hierarchical structure of 
the global field, people in the West can begin to accrue their advantages over people in the non-West already 
at the levels of primary and secondary education, prior to their entry into higher education.” (Igarashi and 
Saito, 2014: 228). The better ability of privileged children to pursue quality education in order to embrace 
the desirable foreign lifestyle and enhance class position resulted in the reproduction of global hegemony in 
China (Kim, 2011). Since Reform and Opening, English language education has become again a key in 
modernization and development as it enables access to Western advances for national revitalization (Hu, 
2005). Beijing, for example, had been pushing children to learn English in anticipation of the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics (Ho, 2016b: 159). English proficiency is recognized to be a cultural capital that leads to better 
education and career opportunities. Due to differences in parental and educational resources, proficiency in 
English is unequal in China, skewing to more affluent areas and more affluent parents (Lee et al., 2013: 27). 
Therefore, proficiency in English is an important sign of being raised in privilege family in contemporary 
China.  
Aspiring parents emphasize English instruction for their children, which in turn removes a barrier in their 
children’s access to foreign culture. HCC’s developing fluency in English opened them to a different world. 
Their interest in foreign culture is enabled by a stronger emphasis on international exposure including 
English fluency, preparation for foreign education, and general openness to foreign culture. Learning English 
also exposed them to English pop songs, films and dramas early in life (see also Rupke and Blank, 2009). 
Wenju (CC6) remembers having interesting English classes which watched the “Cats” musical—which 
kindled her lifelong interest in musical and live theatre. She remembers a very Westernized teacher who 
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played music and movies in class, explaining the stories behind each piece of art, which introduced her to the 
discerning consumption of Western culture. Dingjiao’s (CC6) English proficiency allowed her to consume 
Western movies, music, and TV series from an early age. HCCs have a much stronger a habit of consuming 
foreign culture, as their parents encouraged and empowered their children to have more exposure to foreign 
culture, which led to their higher interest and tastes in culture. In contrast, LCCs and often MCCs say they 
struggled with English and did not independently access Western culture, often consuming local culture and 
the voiced-over Western culture over mainstream media. 
Affluent parents provided children other resources which had the effect of influencing exposure to foreign 
music and culture. This includes physical access to imported music, purchasing music and magazines in 
stores, and earlier access to foreign media and the Internet. Chenyue (CC7) remembers that when she was in 
kindergarten, her parents brought home a vinyl player from Russia and classical music and music from 
Taiwan and the West. The vinyl age had already passed when popular music appeared in China after Reform 
and Opening, therefore vinyl records were imported and a sign of rarity. Dingjiao (CC6) was able to go 
Xinhua bookstore weekly to buy books and music. She remembered buying cassettes of Stefanie Sun 
(Singaporean singer, songwriter) and Backstreet Boys (American vocal group), and later CDs of pop music. 
This is notable because media at Xinhua bookstore are legitimate copies, whereas most Chinese were still 
buying pirated music off the street. She also subscribed to music magazines, which introduces readers to the 
latest foreign music trends as well as music critiques.  
HCCs speak of being initially exposed to foreign media through education and at their homes, including 
foreign records, access to foreign stations such as HBO through satellite dishes. These childhood privileges 
were not available to the ordinary Chinese. As they enter high school and university, online access to foreign 
media became more prevalent. The lack of copyright enforcement in China has fostered the popularity of 
Western media, giving agency to those with the ability and eagerness to seek out Western culture. The rise of 
the Internet in China since the 2000s allowed users to download foreign media from the Internet. Nowadays, 
consumption of foreign media is more accessible due to teams of volunteer fans who organized themselves to 
subtitle and distribute pirated foreign movies and sitcoms (Gao, 2018; Liu and de Seta, 2014; Meng, 2012). 
However, the HCCs I interviewed did not benefit from the later rise of subtitled pirated media from these fan 
groups, as they can consume them without the need for subtitles. In fact, the HCCs interviewed have the 
ability to subtitle foreign media themselves, but by today their passion in mainstream media has already 
passed. The availability of subtitled media has turned them into mainstream culture, whereas HCCs are 
interested in live musicals, selective independent music, or turned away from pop culture altogether. 
For “middlebrow” forms, one respondent also speaks of his university period as a time when he formed a 
rock band with others and performed. Although opportunities for music development in universities were 
open to all students, they primarily benefit students who were already have pre-established interest in those 
types of music in childhood. Those from underprivileged backgrounds with little exposure to music are 
unaware and uninterested in taking part in these opportunities. The university provided the setting to 
develop the interest into deeper knowledge for more selective appreciation. 
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Whereas LCCs consume from local broadcasts and later local media and music apps, which foster their 
interest primarily in mainstream, trendy and local music, HCCs have long been accessing foreign media 
through grey channels—satellite TV, downloading, or expensive direct imports, through their own agency. 
These introduced them to foreign music before they have become more accessible in mainstream media, 
fostering their interest and enabling their access to Hk/Taiwan and then upgrading to selective foreign music 
(see Chapter 5), as well as distancing them from mainstream and local music (see Chapter 6). Their parents 
are also more likely to have taken them to live music events during childhood, fostering their interest in live 
music. 
(2)  Upgrading through Hk/Taiwan music 
Hk/Taiwan music was the early favorites of the HCCs before it became so popular that the HCCs “upgraded” 
toward Western pop to further differentiate themselves. Currently it is the mainstream music generally liked 
by everyone except the LCCs. Music from Hong Kong and Taiwan was the first “foreign” music to enter 
Mainland China. Many HCCs engaged with Hk/Taiwan music since the early teens. All but the youngest 
HCCs recall liking pop singers from Hong Kong and Taiwan at a young age as one of their earliest exposure 
to pop music. Chenyue (CC6) listened to the Hong Kong “Four Heavenly Kings” when young (a term coined 
in 1992 to refer to 4 male Hong Kong superstars—Jacky Cheung (M13), Andy Lau, Aaron Kwok, and Leon 
Lai), and Yiyin (CC6) remembers purchasing cassette tapes of Jay Chou (Pop singer from Taiwan).  
However, with their increased exposure and resources to access Western media, HCCs’ preferences 
progressed from the Hong Kong Taiwan pop toward more selective Western pop, particularly those in coastal 
regions. The torch of selective “foreignness” has passed to foreign pop-music. As some Western pop started 
to become mainstream in China, the HCCs further distanced away from the mass Western pop and favored 
increasingly selective and selective Western pop. Hk/Taiwan music is still generally well-liked by the HCCs, 
particularly the slighter older ones. Their retained their interest in the Hk/Taiwan songs in their collection 
but ceased to follow new artists in that category, shifting to Western pop instead. Because of the early 
influence of Hk/Taiwan music, HCCs also refer to them as “classic oldies” (经典音乐). Because LCC’s 
understanding of different types of music is vague and are generally unaware of the music hierarchy, their 
perception of music will be discussed together in a later section. 
(3)  Upgrading through foreign music 
The path taken by foreign music is quite similar to the earlier trajectory of Hk/Taiwan music—foreign music 
used to be the music for the HCC, but as it gained popularity, HCCs increasingly upgraded to selective types, 
leaving trendy foreign as the mainstream variant. Notably, LCCs are unable to differentiate the two, exposing 
themselves to cultural distinction. HCCs from the coastal regions are rather Westernized in their tastes, often 
following Western pop since their teenage years, thanks to their early access to Western culture through 
English learning, schooling, and media access. The Hk/Taiwan music liked by HCC tends to concentrate 
around a few artists such as the frequently mentioned Jay Chou (Taiwanese singer and songwriter born in 
1979), their favorites in Western pop is more diverse. Since high-status pop music is selective, this increases 
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the difficulty for high-status pop music to be picked up in large scale surveys. Western pop liked by the HCCs 
includes a diversity of genres, which includes R&B, musicals, alternative and independent music.  
The path toward increasing selective Western pop can be seen in the music trajectory of Dingjiao (CC6). She 
started watching American movies and drama series since her teenage years, through set-top boxes at home 
which included foreign channels like HBO and pirate online streaming. During middle school, already liked 
foreign pop such as Radiohead (British rock band formed in 1985), Amy Winehouse (British singer 1983-
2011), and Cold Play (formed in 1996). HCC’s taste for Western pop is driven by a desire for selective quality, 
rather than mainstream popularity. Dingjiao (CC6) says she preferred what is today’s mainstream Western 
pop when it was still non-mainstream. As Western pop spread to China, Dingjiao shifted to what she calls 
alternative Western pop, such as Amy Winehouse (British singer 1983-2011) and Karen Ann (singer and 
songwriter based in Paris, Tel Aviv, and New York City, born 1974) to distant from the mainstream. Western 
music that became increasingly recognized in China is shunned by HCCs. 
(4)  Decreased interest in pop as mature adults, but the persistence of high culture 
The teenage years are strongly linked with interest in the trendy music of the period. Before the university 
period, HCCs generally also follow the latest popular songs of that era, just like their cohort of youths, except 
that they also pursue their high-status music in addition, whereas those with low cultural capital only follow 
popular music. However, after the university period, those with high cultural capital lack the time and energy 
to be omnivorous in music acquisition and listening—by which they predominantly consume high-status 
music. Those who like foreign pop follows the new songs of only selected artists; for the traditional lovers, 
they continue to uncover selective pieces. 
The linkage between teenage and pop culture has also been explained as transitional and compensatory 
“secondary attachments” as part of the process in the transition from parental identification toward 
autonomy (Giles and Maltby, 2004; Greene and Adams-Price, 1990; Raviv et al., 1996; Stever, 2011; Yue and 
Cheung, 2000). Interests in traditional music, however, do not stop with age. Some HCCs lost the passion for 
the latest pop music quite early, after their teenage years, but continue to develop an interest in highbrow 
traditional art forms such as Western classical or certain Chinese traditional music, whereas LCCs continued 
with mainstream tastes. In both cases, they continue to pursue high-status music as a lifelong interest and 
wish their children can also learn to distinguish the art from the vulgar. This is also witnessed in quantitative 
finding in the older mean age of those who like the operas. 
The complexity of the scene gives the impression of the freedom of people to consume as they please and the 
lack of rigid structure. However, the HCCs navigate those changes to maintain their “high-status” tastes, 
whereas LCCs continued to follow a different path. For many of the respondents interviewed, the peak of the 
fervor in pop was in their teenage years. Respondents’ interest in pop culture is heavily related to age—most 
active during their teenage years, but declined after graduating from the university and starting work, when 
work then family life occupy their attention. The favorite pop music of the respondents also readily gives 
away their age. Many stopped following new artists, only listening to the old songs they were already familiar 
with and passively following new songs from their favorite artists. However, a visible distinction for HCCs is 
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that their love for traditional music sustains or even grows with age, while their interest in pop music 
subdued. HCCs tends to be introduced to highbrow music no later than their teenage years. The favorite 
music of HCCs who have left their teenage years is usually traditional music, which they still actively research 
and consume in concert halls, theatres, or videos, compared to the relatively passive listening of pop music. 
Developing interest and knowledge in traditional highbrow culture 
(1)  The environment for cultural education 
Wealthier parents place importance in extra-curricular lessons such as calligraphy, martial arts, swimming, 
and music lessons (Davis and Sensenbrenner, 2000). A clear sign of affluence in childhood is to have had 
parents who encouraged children to learn a musical instrument, of which piano has been the most 
recognized symbol of “middle-class ambition” (Kraus, 1989). It is revered in China as the pillar of Western 
music, an instrument which requires money and space. The high status of the piano has a long history in 
China, with the English company Moutrie establishing a branch in China in 1843 and later produced pianos 
in Shanghai (Lau, 2008: 94–97). The idea that foreign music and foreign culture as superior have been 
ingrained since childhood. Those who learned a Western instrument develops a clear taste for classical music 
and the habit of attending concerts later in life. They recall parents who know little about music, but believed 
that music is a fancy and cultured thing that they want their children to learn. The parents relied on exams as 
a way of gauging the children’s musical development. The level of proficiency falls in extremes—while there 
are some who learned several instruments for several months, quite a number of respondents learned and 
passed exams all the way to grade-10 the highest level. Dingjiao’s (CC6) father sent her to take piano lessons 
when she was about 5 years old. She remembered that it was a Korean teacher who gave lessons through an 
interpreter, quite a fancy way to take music lessons. Similarly, Changti’s (CC5) parents made her learn the 
electronic keyboard when she was 5. “My father wished that his child can play music. The electronic 
keyboard was considered cultured and fashionable at the time.” Music lesson is a sign of both cultural 
interest as well as affluence, as instrument and lessons are not afforded by every family. This is not to say 
that all the HCCs become accomplished musicians. Chenyue (CC7), for example, says she lacked the talent to 
stay with her piano lessons till grade 10. But nonetheless, the exposure to music helped the HCCs understand 
and appreciate Western classical music, allowing it to become an important distinction among the HCCs. 
(2)  The influence of formal education on highbrow music 
In turn, the improved access to quality education and higher education of children in privileged families, in 
turn, reinforces their highbrow tastes and erected barriers against children from underprivileged families. As 
the qualities in education across China are different, better schools also better prepare children in various 
cultural lessons, which introduced HCCs to legitimate culture. The HCCs recall music lessons in pianos, 
learning “music appreciation” in a diversity of music forms, including Western classical music. Wenju (CC6) 
enrolled in private middle and high-schools, the top 2 schools in her city, which differentiated themselves 
through comprehensive development of children and interest-based learning over the rote-memorization 
and exam-focused education of typical schools. She was introduced to Western music and musicals through 
her English class, learning dances like Rumba, Cha-cha, Samba, and Waltz which she fell in love with. In her 
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music class, she listened to symphonies, learned about pieces, troupes, and identified instruments. These 
experiences shaped her strong interest in Western culture—classical music, musicals, and Western-pop. 
Similarly, Dingjiao (CC6) had been introduced to music appreciation during high school in the Northeast, 
when her teacher introduced her to Italian opera Turandot by Giacomo Puccini, which encouraged her 
further interest in Western high culture. She attended classes on classical music, studied composers and 
conductors online, and followed music critics on weibo (Twitter equivalent in China). 
For those with rural childhood, music classes are drastically different. Puchao (CC1), for example, only 
learned some patriotic songs from cassette players in his middle school in rural China. He never learned any 
English songs throughout his schooling. Furthermore, he never attended any music class after primary 
school, as his middle school lack resources for holistic development, and focused on memorization and exam 
prep. Ironically, his chances of admittance to high school and subsequently university are low under those 
educational tracks. 
University is a further enabler of engagement with high-status music. For those with the most critical music 
tastes, the period at the university was the period in which their taste matured. In a top university in China, 
posters promoted interests in various “highbrow elegant art” (高雅艺) (figure 1-4), effectively legitimizing 
those cultural forms. University provided classes to further develop their knowledge, and clubs to engage 
with others with shared hobbies (figure 6). Many speak of attending “music appreciation” classes as a general 
elective. Prestigious universities also organize student performances as well as invite troupes to perform on 
campus (figure 5). Dongkun (CC5) and Ziguo (CC5) both joined university’s clubs and classes on Chinese 
opera, where they further deepened their knowledge and taste in those art forms. Unsurprisingly, these 
activities surround traditional highbrow music and exclude pop music, so the university is an enabler of 
tastes for what eventually becomes highbrow music forms.  
Figure 7-1. Promotion of high culture in an elite university 
Billboard 1 - “How to appreciate Chinese 
painting“ 
 
Billboard 2 - “How to appreciate traditional 
folk music” 
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Billboard 3 - “How to appreciate Chinese 
painting“ 
 
Billboard 4 - “How to appreciate traditional 
folk music” 
 
Billboard 5 - “Swan Lake” to be performed in 
the university 
 
Billboard 6 - Promoting Peking Opera 
appreciation in the university 
 
 
The consumption of highbrow music 
HCCs describe their process of learning and “upgrading” from mainstream pop music consumers who are 
novices on highbrow, to become more confident critics of highbrow music. HCCs preference for highbrow art 
is built upon years of effort in researching, studying, and understanding the deepness of the art form. Items 
of culture are stratified because cultural content has educational requirements for appreciation, such as the 
range from comic strip to poetry, where aesthetic standards need to be taught at home and school (Gans, 
1974: 95). This applies to HCC’s discerning appreciation as it requires extensive cultivation to develop into 
the habitus (Bourdieu, 1984). Many of them have specifically taken lessons on highbrow art. HCC’s 
discerning appreciation and the music they like exist in a symbiotic relationship. They prefer music that can 
be appreciated critically, and the music they are the ones that allow them to deploy their embodied cultural 
capital. This similarity is shared by lovers of both Western and Chinese highbrow music. This section 
illustrates the highbrow music liked by the HCCs. 
The preferences for different types of traditional highbrow music is largely separated by two main 
dimensions: those who like Western highbrow versus Chinese highbrow, and those who like instrumentals 
versus theatrical music drama. Based on the intensity and frequency of respondents’ interest expressed 
during the interviews, the Western traditional music liked by HCCs tends to be classical music rather than 
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opera, whereas for Chinese traditional music it tends to be Jingkun. The difference is largely due to personal 
preferences for pure music or dramatic music and the investment needed to appreciate those art forms, 
rather than any expressed difference in status. Western opera is seldom mentioned, due to a language barrier 
in understanding non-English opera, as foreign language education in China is primarily English. In place of 
Western opera, Western musicals are also often mentioned by the HCCs who enjoy theatrical music drama.  
Table 7-1. Types of highbrow music 
 Western Chinese 
Instrumentals Western classical Chinese instrumentals 
Theatrical music drama Western opera 
Musical 
Jingkun 
(Peking or Kunqu opera) 
The highbrow music most favored by the interviewees are in bold 
The difference between HCC’s preference for Western or Chinese is more related to geographic origin and 
family influence, although the impression that Western is highbrow is stronger among those interviewed. 
However, mutual respect is seen by the lovers of each side. Dingjiao (CC6), a lover of Western classical, says 
she sees Peking opera as a respectable form of art, just that she does not understand it, due to the lack of 
contact with it and the lack of knowledgeable friends who can introduce her to it. Similarly, the Beijinger 
Chenyue (CC7) says even her parents are lovers of Western classical, so she had never had contact with 
Peking opera when growing up, which is quite distant for her. It would have to be her grandparents born 
before the Communist revolution who like Chinese operas. On the opposite side, Ziguo (CC5) had contacts 
with Chinese operas rather than Western classical since young. He respects and has attended Western 
classical concerts to breadthen his knowledge, though his interest is still in Peking opera. Yiyin (CC6) is an 
HCC who is a fan of theatrical music who crosses the East-West boundary to appreciate the artistry in both 
Western musical and Kunqu opera.  
Although mutual respect is seen between HCCs from the two camps, those who favor Western classical tend 
to have higher socioeconomic standing. Fans of Western traditional tend to be raised in coastal regions, 
which is a privilege in itself, due to the higher level of economic development. Those with the privilege of 
living abroad also tend to favor Westernized tastes. Chinese traditional is also tarnished by the often-
mentioned association with the older population and older family members. Chinese traditional used to be 
popular entertainment for the older generation, whereas Western classical and opera were never popular 
entertainment and more distinctively highbrow. Yet the government has been keen to promote traditional 
culture to foster national pride, so traditional Chinese opera is also generally well respected. The global 
standard of Western classical, in fact, Western culture more broadly, is more dominating among the HCCs 
who were raised in megacities more closely connected to the international world. 
(1)  Western classical  
Enjoyment of Western classical displays a combination of knowledge as well as a disinterested emotional 
connection. Emotionally, a disinterested disposition is often engaged in HCC’s description of their favorite 
music. They describe of response from the music that should not be spontaneous ephemeral emotions, but 
with emotional distance, which creates deeper meanings that persist. HCCs look down upon music that 
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provides instant gratification but lacking in meaning or depth. Dingjiao (CC6) plays the piano at home and 
used to read the Philharmonic magazine (see image below). She used to be more fervent about foreign pop, 
but is now more into Western classical, regularly attending live classical performances such as the China 
Philharmonic Orchestra (中国爱乐乐团) as well as many other performances of Western orchestras that tours 
in Beijing, though she is quite selective about what she attends. Before performances, Dingjiao would 
research about the pieces, conductors, compositions to prepare herself for the performance. “My favorites are 
Seiji Ozawa, Mitsuko Uchida, and Claudio Abbado, and the London, Berlin, and San Francisco Philharmonic 
Orchestra. Frankly, I prefer works or renditions that are more classical, with a grand narrative, more rational 
and less romantic, neat and crisp, with high vitality and exuberance.” She describes of a recent concert in 
Nov 2018 conducted by Daniel Barenboim (born in 1942), which excited her as it was a rare and might be the 
last time to see the aging conductor in Beijing, “I like Barenboim’s rendering because it is more German and 
Austrian, with less Romanticism and emotionality—more colloquially this means it’s more rational and 
philosophical,” she explains. 
Chenyue (CC7) listens for skillful musical techniques of the performer, and the personal emotions of the 
composer embedded into the music. “Every music movement reminds me of the emotions of the composer 
when the music was created.” She’d listen to good music repeatedly to immerse herself in music 
appreciation. A similar discerning appreciation is also seen in Wenju (CC6), who says “I care about the 
conductor. In a concert, I need to understand the composers’ emotions which they embed into the music, and 
interpret the emotions they are trying to convey. In contrast, I cannot find the aesthetic value in some 
students’ recitals.” She listens carefully during classical music concerts. A quality performance to her is one 
that is seamlessly coherent and like the sound of nature, whereas poorer ones show bugs that she can 
discern. While she considers the critical opinion of others, she is confident of her own aesthetic judgment, as 
everyone has their own interpretations. 
Figure 7-2. A respondent’s exposure to highbrow music 
 
The Philharmonic magazine 
 
Daniel Barenboim in Beijing Nov 2018 
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(2)  Kunqu and Peking opera 
A similar discerning appreciation can be seen with the Chinese highbrows. Compared to the elusive 
emotional appreciation of classical music, Dongkun’s (CC5) appreciation of Kunqu draws on his hefty 
knowledge of classical Chinese poetry, linguistics, and phonetics. He thinks “Kunqu is a holistic form of art—
one needs to appreciate the beauty of classical poetry, understand the allusions in the ancient text, and hear 
the beauty in pronunciations and articulation of the language.” He elaborates that authentic Kunqu is based 
on Suzhou speech, and he considers the Shanghai Kunqu troupe less authentic in the articulation, as they 
adjusted the pronunciation. He says he can tell minute differences in pronunciation from his understanding 
of ancient Chinese phonology, as authentic Suzhou dialect has 8 tones. Also, traditional Kunqu songs only 
denote the main contours in the music composition, and the singers can flexibly decorate the tunes (修饰小
腔). He watches different actors perform the same opera to appreciate the differences in interpretation. Some 
of his favorite Kunqu artists are Gong Yinlei (龚隐雷) of the Jiangsu Kunqu Opera Troupe, as well as the 
masters Liang Guyin (梁谷音) and Zhang Jiqing (张继青). When he listens to Kunqu, he “evaluates whether 
the singing is authentic. Kunqu has a slower tempo but is full of emotions. Peking opera is faster, but Kunqu 
is more elegant (文雅).”  
Ziguo (CC5) has taken opera appreciation classes and singing lessons during his bachelor's and master’s. He 
finds traditional opera particularly touching. An example he mentioned was the 1956 Peking opera film 
“Barren Tears” (荒山泪) by Cheng Yanqiu. Even though the master actor has aged and was filmed 2 years 
before his death, he can truly appreciate the beautiful and touching singing. He says that “Appreciating xiqu 
requires a threshold—you either get it or you don’t. Those who don’t get it thinks the facial make-up is like 
phantoms in horror films, with stiff sculpture-like movements, and singing that sounds the same. Those who 
get it can appreciate the intricate skills of the art form (看门道) rather than merely following the plot.” He 
thinks traditional opera is “higher” and more beautiful, with an aesthetic that is more abstracted from reality, 
which demonstrates the disinterested appreciation that HCCs displays in their consumption of highbrow art.  
The appreciation of live music 
Another aspect that demonstrates the discerning appreciation of HCCs is their consecration of live music. 
This is especially relevant for traditional highbrow art forms including Chinese operas and Western classical 
but also musicals, in which live performance is a core of the art form. Interest in live music is related to 
childhood experiences in attending concerts or theatre performances, which in the past was limited to those 
from more affluent families in coastal megacities, as they used to be less common in smaller cities. Those 
grown up in the most developed cities, particularly Beijing or Shanghai, had the advantage of having parents 
who have brought them to live concerts, which led to a lifelong habit of valuing and attending live 
performances. Live concerts were also rare in the past, and available only in the largest cities. Dingjiao (CC6) 
and Chenyue (CC7) had parents who brought them to live music concerts, Western symphony, ballets, or 
galas that included a variety of patriotic songs. Chenyue vividly remembers attending a classical concert 
conducted by the conductor Yang Hongnian (杨鸿年, born 1934) and being asked to present flowers. For 
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Yiyin, her experiences attending lots of live concerts shaped her discerning interest in “live” music later in 
life.  
HCCs described how a live performance truly distinguishes a top orchestra from a mediocre one, which 
makes the presence in live fundamentally different from listening to recordings. Many HCCs describe that a 
quality live performance must add its own interpretations to the original creation. They have the habit of 
watching multiple renditions of the same piece of music or opera by different troupes or artists, and speak of 
the ability to discern differences in the renditions. Dingjiao (CC6), for example, attends and holds high 
expectations for classical concerts. “Many performances are just popular music, scrambling together the 
most popular pieces, lacking musical merit. There is no room for the conductors to add or showcase their 
own understanding of the piece.” She prefers performances with some novelty and freshness compared to 
music recordings, such as performing music that is more niche and less popular, new arrangements, by 
world-renowned orchestras or conductors, and ideally in intimate settings with a smaller audience. Similarly, 
Yiyin (CC6) is a fan of theatrical musical drama, which includes both Western musicals, Kunqu opera, and 
Peking opera. She thinks only live music allows the emotions to be conveyed from the actor to the audience 
directly in the performance. She first saw live Kunqu prior to high school and was hugely impressed. She has 
already seen the performances of many different actors, so now she only attends those by the best actors, 
such as Wang Peiyu (王佩瑜). She believes that the judgment of music resides inside her, and is made from 
her accumulated judgment over the years. She does a lot of research on the performances and says that “the 
way to improve artistic appreciation is to attend a lot of performances. Then you develop the sense to judge 
what is good or bad.” She thinks many local musical actors are quite bad, singing songs that do not fit them, 
or lacking stage experience. Many HCCs also speak of the copious amounts of low-quality orchestras from 
the West trying to sell expensive tickets to undiscerning audiences, as they have been disappointed by my 
many poor performances in China sold to undiscerning audiences. 
In contrast, those with LCC never thought of attending live events. LCCs have no interest in live music and 
seeing no difference between live and recordings, preferring to consume on mobile phones. Affordability is 
not the main issue, as their concern is their lack of interest in live, given the extra time, transportation cost, 
and energy required, and rely on mobile phones as their source of music. Unable to recognize the aesthetics 
of a live performance described by the HCCs, LCCs do not see the merit of live to worth the hassle of 
attending. Mining (CC1) says, “I don’t see the difference between listening to live and listening from the 
mobile phone.” She recalls the only time she attended a symphony which she fell asleep with a friend, saying 
she would not attend again. The same attitude is shared by Puchao (CC1), who also has never attended live 
performances or concerts. “I wouldn’t go even if they were free. What a hassle. I prefer to lie in my bed at 
home and play with my mobile phone.” Thus, in terms of participation, the LCCs are indeed disengaged 
relative to the HCCs and MCCs. 
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 Solidifying cultural differences into cultural capital 
Intergenerational transfer of privileges 
I have described how cultural tastes diverged between children in privileged and underprivileged families. 
For the taste of privileged children to turn into cultural capital, they must also remain in a relatively 
advantaged position in society, which is far from guaranteed. For example, the children of landlords had 
tastes for traditional high culture, but as the landlords fell in power after the Communist revolution, their 
tastes were denigrated as bourgeoise and subject to persecution—hardly a form of cultural capital that confer 
advantages. But in contemporary China, privileged parents were able to provide their children with exposure 
to a cultural environment with more exposure to foreign and musical culture, which is expensive, and 
difficult to access. That culture becomes the “high culture” of the privileged class because their children can 
continue to attain a high social standing.  
As the entry into university is highly competitive, the pathway is to get into the best schools at each level of 
the educational funnel. Quite typical of HCCs, Dingjiao’s (CC6) parents afforded after school private tutoring 
for her on subjects such as English and math (奥数). These helped her gain admission into the best high 
school in her city. She said about 500 students were admitted through merit-based examination, but also 
roughly 50 students paid their way in through rich parents. Getting into a key school is important in rising 
chances to enter the university. Changti (CC5) observed that most classmates from her elementary school 
had average backgrounds and mostly stayed behind, whereas many of her classmates from the key schools—
many of whom came from privileged families such as cadres, small business owners, intellectuals, or work in 
government-affiliated institutions (事业单位)—were on an upward trajectory that ended up in Beijing, just as 
she eventually did. The ranking of the city is also an influential factor in the chances of getting into higher 
education, due to quotas that advantage students from affluent cities. Overall, more advantaged parents are 
better able to help their children obtain a higher education through the competitive educational funnel. 
Many parents of HCCs prepared them to study abroad eventually, which offered them a different educational 
track compared to most of the Chinese. The opportunity to study abroad became at least a backstop which 
frees the students from the cutthroat competition in China, as even if they can continue an education in the 
West even if they fail to achieve the best grades (Waters, 2005, 2006). Many affluent parents aspired or even 
anticipated sending their children for foreign education. In 2018, students from China comprise the largest 
group of international students in the US, Canada, the UK, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan 
(Institute of International Education, 2018). Dingjiao’s (CC6) parents sent her to take lessons in English 
schools which used foreign textbooks, as they long planned to send her abroad for education. She eventually 
obtained a master's education in the UK. Even more privileged is Chenyue (CC7), a native of Beijing—a city 
tremendously advantaged in educational opportunities. Her parents were able to send her abroad to New 
Zealand in her second year of high school. A foreign education helps institutionalize a cosmopolitan outlook 
as cultural capital, such as providing instruction in a “world language,” enabling exposure to a “cosmopolitan 
education” outside their home countries (Igarashi and Saito, 2014). Foreign education is an expression of the 
parental agency to prepare their children for a globalizing world (Weenink, 2008). 
Distinction in China—the rise of taste in cultural consumption   
 189 
Educational opportunities in China are stratified and advantages wealthier parents, who can afford tutoring 
lessons, using connections and donations to get into key schools, purchase homes in areas with better 
schools, or even a foreign education (E Croll, 2006; Solinger, 2013; Tang, 2013). Privileges parents are also 
better positioned to feed their children into better education and higher education, in some cases a foreign 
education abroad (Du, 2013). The better ability of privileged children to pursue higher education in order to 
enhance their class position and embrace the desirable foreign lifestyle resulted in the reproduction of global 
hegemony in China through internalizing it into the habitus of privileged children (Kim, 2011). The 
intergenerational transfer of privileges has already been supported by many pieces of research. 
Intensifying hierarchy in the next generation 
Although the interviews were conducted with people age 23-44, from the discussions of their parents, 
themselves, and their children, cultural capital is increasingly important from generation to generation. The 
older respondents interviewed had less interest in music, with high similarities in music taste in their teenage 
years, generally liking Hong Kong and Taiwan popular music. The taste of younger respondents had already 
started to diversify, with the HCCs “upgrading” from popular Hong Kong and Taiwan to selective Western 
pop, and seeking knowledge in traditional music. Many HCCs have friends or relatives who are highly 
concerned with developing taste in their children.  
The increasing stratification of music taste from generation to generation can be seen in Muyao, who plays 
rocks music but hope his children can upgrade to classical. Muyao (CC4), a fan of rock and metal in his 
teenage years, also respects the higher status and sophistication of Western classical, admiring that “classical 
is impressive (厉害) because of the sheer number of instruments, with instruments that are difficult to play, 
the intricate relationship between the musical parts, and the skillful use of notes and tones to create 
emotions.” He admits to not understanding and not listening to Western classical or Chinese traditional 
music and hopes his children will have higher aspirations than his interest in rock, mentioning the self-
deprecating humor that “Those who don’t work hard when young are the ones who grow up playing rock 
music” (“少壮不努力，长大玩摇滚”). 
Another example can be seen from the story of Yeqin. Yeqin (CC5) is particularly worried about the bad 
influence of popular music on her daughter. “There are many saliva songs out there, which I don’t know how 
to appreciate. There are many adult saliva songs like ‘Small Apple’ and Phoenix Legend (M22), which is not 
real music. I am quite worried about my child’s ability to discern and appreciate music.” Since she is 
knowledgeable about the piano, she is making her daughter learn the piano so that she can share with her 
how to appreciate music. She hopes that music will not just be a technical exam to pass, which is her 
experience from her parents, but instead she hopes her daughter will develop a “lifelong appreciation of 
music.” When she travels with Airbnb, she tries to book rooms with a piano so that her daughter can keep on 
practicing. “I hope music will become a part of her daily life. She can play the piano when she is having a bad 
day, or to listen to music concerts.” She deliberates whether her daughter should also learn the violin, 
because it can be easily carried every day as they travel, so her daughter can continue to practice. She brings 
her to music summer camps, where she learned about classical guitars, with a teacher who attempts to 
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modernize classical guitar with new compositions. She also brings her daughter to attend many live 
performances, such as to listen to Ave Maria composed by Franz Schubert in 1825, and to discuss their 
impressions. She also brought her daughter to watch Flamingo, and dress her up in Flamingo dresses to give 
her deeper involvement with a “sense of ritual.”  
 Discussion 
After more than 40 years after Reform and Opening, a whole generation has grown up under diverging 
upbringing. Cultural capital developed from the new generation of Chinese that was raised in increasingly 
divergent environments since Reform and Opening. In this chapter, I developed my argument is that social 
distinction in China today is not only based on current inequalities in wealth or achievement of the 
individual, but is increasingly based on cultural differences rooted in the past—i.e. cultural capital. 
Upbringing in privileged conditions shapes the habitus and leads to differentiated taste, attitudes, and 
dispositions, which is drawn for distinction and discrimination. Cultural capital is displayed through 
differences in attitudes and behaviors, some of which include the prejudiced stereotypes of smell, 
appearance, or behavior, but a more useful angle to examine cultural capital is music taste. Bourdieu 
demonstrated how elites’ penchant for highbrow art like Western classical music and Western opera is used 
toward social distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). Recent studies in various countries continue to discover the 
stratification of cultural taste along social lines (Bennett et al., 2009; Van Eijck, 1997), and culture is seen as 
an important basis of divisions between social strata (Atkinson, 2016; Crompton, 2008; Devine et al., 2005; 
Savage et al., 2013). In China, music taste is used as a sign of high culture as well as to stigmatize the “vulgar” 
tastes of the underclass in China. The previous chapters have shown a sophisticated hierarchy and method of 
taste distinction through various types of music. Those with high cultural capital prefers highbrow traditional 
music as well as selective, non-mainstream Western popular music. In turn, they, along with the MCCs, look 
down upon the local tastes of the LCCs. However, those tastes were formed much earlier in life, and the 
people with high cultural capital benefitted from a privileged background. 
Whereas the previous chapters argued for the existence of distinction in China, this chapter argues that the 
rise of cultural capital can be traced back to inequalities in earlier times. Cultural distinction in China is 
frequently described from the economic perspective—as a distinction based on the rise in economic 
inequality and Middle-class consumption. Many pieces of research have described how rising economic 
inequality led to the rise of the middle class and consumerist distinction. My research accepts that argument 
but further argues that inequality in contemporary China has led to a new generation of Chinese who grew up 
with segregated privileges that led to the creation of deeper distinctions in the form of cultural capital. This 
research demonstrates that cultural capital has been re-created in society, which resulted in distinction in 
tastes between social groups, rigidifying social boundaries.  
Economic stratification ended after the Communist takeover. Prior to Reform and Opening, the homology 
between socioeconomic status and cultural taste was weak under socialist planning with full government 
control of media. The earlier generation who grew up in Mao’s times had similar upbringings, and early 
periods of Reform and Opening had a high level of social mobility. In the 1980s, early signs of consumerism 
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reemerged in China. The stratification of Chinese society was initially observed economically and gradually 
spread into other realms. People who grew up in the 80s and 90s were the first generation who grew up in 
diverging family environments, demarcating the first generation of Chinese with the opportunity to 
accumulate different amounts of cultural capital. Parents with marginally better resources were able to 
provide their children with additional cultural resources. These differences were magnified in the generation 
who spent their childhood after Reform and Opening, creating differences that now constitute cultural 
capital. Cultural capital—consisting of various forms of knowledge, attitude, and preferences, and studied 
through music taste in this study—was created in the respondents through exposure and the opportunity to 
seek and learn of foreign culture and music, opportunities which were not available in non-privileged 
families. Privileged parents fostered high aspirations for foreign culture, promoted the consumption of 
foreign culture, and inculcated knowledge in music and culture for their children. This group of privileged 
children, with their distinctive cultural preferences, benefitted from inequalities in educational attainment. 
They leveraged their better quality of education, easier access to key schools, and lower barrier to higher 
education, to attain high educational status, causing their distinctive culture to be the culture of the elites. 
HCCs navigate the increasingly subtle distinction by “upgrading” their tastes through the change, consuming 
selective items at the fringes of the popular mainstream. By the time they enter the university, the difference 
between HCC and LCC have widened considerably. Furthermore, the university is also an institution that 
continued to promote tastes in high culture. This entire process is the creation of cultural capital. By 
comparing the experiences of the culture of the interviewee with their parents and their children, the 
inequality in cultural capital is shown to be rising.  
The significance of the finding is not only relevant to music, but also in its ramifications for social 
stratification in China. Many pieces of research have raised the extent of stigmatization of the underclass in 
China. Frequently targeted are the migrant workers and those from underprivileged backgrounds frequently 
who face discrimination in the cities. However, those accounts have not fully addressed how social exclusion 
is rooted in inequalities in the past. For example, distinctions based on consumerism can be afforded by 
anyone with higher income, but distinctions based on taste cannot be bridged by money alone. The 
differences in the cultural tastes of the interviewees are rooted in differences in their circumstances of 
upbringing. To address the increasing boundaries between social groups requires an understanding of the 
causes of the formation of symbolic violence. The concept of a lack of suzhi prevalent in China is shown to 
intricately connect with Bourdieu’s notion of an upbringing inculcating in the habitus. By drawing from 
Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, this chapter shows how social stigmatization is rooted in more 
intrinsic differences, providing an explanation of the cultural distinction described in earlier chapters--the 
causes and process of the formation of cultural capital.  
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Part IV. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 8. Distinction and cultural capital in China 
 Introduction 
The core theoretical debate engaged by my thesis is the issue of distinction in contemporary societies. The 
debates in cultural capital have been divided into advocates for cultural capital and the persistence of social 
distinction (see Bennett et al., 2009; Hanquinet and Savage, 2015; Holt, 1997; Prieur and Savage, 2013) as 
well as their strongest critics (see Chan, 2019; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b; Goldthorpe, 2007). One side 
supports a cultural hierarchy based on highbrow and lowbrow forms of art (Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio, 
1982a; Gans, 2008; Veblen, 2007). Pierre Bourdieu is the most notable proponent, with his comprehensive 
theory of cultural capital that describes the inequality based on cultural distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). But 
with the rise of contemporary cultural forms, other scholars have argued instead for the rise of cultural 
omnivores – individuals who consume a diversity of music, beyond those exclusive to their social positions 
(Peterson and Kern, 1996). Similar findings have been found across different countries, such as the US 
(Lamont, 1992), Scandinavian countries (Prieur et al., 2008), in the UK (Bennett et al., 2009; Chan and 
Goldthorpe, 2007b) and Australia (Bennett et al., 1999). Peterson and Kern, however, did not advocate the 
omnivores as a refutation of Bourdieu or the end of cultural distinction, but instead discussed multiple 
possibilities which include the rise of tolerance and a change in social norms (Peterson and Kern, 1996). In 
response to theories of the cultural omnivore, other researchers argued that quantitative research might have 
overlooked cultural distinction with their broad labels of cultural types, and drew attention to Bourdieu’s 
notion of embodied cultural capital—as distinction is not only based on what is consumed but also how they 
are consumed (Coulangeon, 2017; Friedman, 2011; Holt, 1997; Ollivier, 2008; Warde et al., 2007). Scholars 
have also advocated new divisions in popular culture as emerging forms of cultural capital, replacing the 
traditional highbrow and lowbrow division, as Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital can persist under 
different forms of culture (Coulangeon, 2017; Prieur and Savage, 2013).  
I will offer my responses to this debate by using the case of China. Firstly, I argue that although cultural 
omnivores are observed on the surface through mainstream pop music, it overlooks distinction that is 
occurring through more specific forms of music. Furthermore, the view that sees cultural omnivores as a sign 
of tolerance is problematic due to the flaws in its definition. Instead, I argue how emerging forms of cultural 
capital represent a new form of cultural capital under globalized cultural consumption. Finally, I explore the 
meaning of cultural capital in China, particularly its development and the development of the habitus in the 
current generation of privileged Chinese. 
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 The issues with cultural omnivores  
On the surface, the evidence of cultural omnivores as found in other studies is also observed in my study. The 
elites are indeed more eclectic in their consumption, even under a very detailed questionnaire on music. The 
eclecticism of the elites is verified to a large extent by various definitions. Various definitions of elites—
consumers of Western highbrow, consumers of both Chinese and Western highbrow, those with high 
education, party membership, and high income, and various definitions of eclecticism—by the number of 
items aware, liked, and the number of live music events participated in the past year, all point to the taste 
eclectism of the elites. In fact, my qualitative research also appears to support the tolerance of elites on the 
surface. While speaking with me—a privileged individual studying in the West with extensive years of living 
in the West, none of the respondents openly denigrate others’ poor tastes. Elites also mention social 
connections with people from different backgrounds and the need to maintain cordial relations, despite not 
agreeing with their tastes. In that shallow sense of taste eclecticism and tolerance, cultural omnivores seem 
to be observed in Chinese megacities. 
The tolerance of cultural omnivores? 
While the division of music is China is clearly not one only based on a legitimate highbrow vs lowbrow, there 
are issues with the interpretation that cultural eclecticism means tolerance and the end of distinction. Firstly, 
the operationalization of the concept of cultural omnivores is contingent on the type of cultural items asked. 
Many pieces of research that find cultural omnivores used only a very limited number of items, which are 
broad cultural labels that overlook subtype distinctions. For example, Chan and Goldthorpe claim cultural 
omnivores based on the 4 music types of opera, classical, jazz and pop/rock (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b). 
This operationalization of the concept of cultural omnivores only means the privileged are more eclectic 
about those specific genres, rather than more omnivorous in “cultural consumption.” Using a limited number 
of cultural items risks overlooking the actual cultural hierarchy—which in the West has been shown to be 
distinctions in cultural subcategories and the attitudes of consumption rather than objects of consumption—
jumping to a premature conclusion of cultural tolerance. 
We must also be aware of the limitation of the concept of cultural omnivores and claims of tolerance. The 
discovery of cultural omnivores is taken to mean that “elites” are consuming both high-status culture as well 
as low-status culture, whereas those with lower status are confined within low-status culture (Peterson and 
Kern, 1996). However, the very concept of cultural omnivore is presumes a preexisting hierarchy. The 
concept of “elites” rests on a preexisting stratification of people. The concept of “high-status” and “low-
status” culture also assumes a preexisting stratification—either an a priori definition provided by the 
researcher explicitly, or a hierarchy assumed by the researcher unknowingly. With an a priori definition of 
highbrow and lowbrow, cultural omnivores became a narrow examination of whether elites are crossing from 
classical to pop music. Without that a priori definition, the concept of eclecticism would be dependent on the 
set of items asked by the researcher. The operationalization of cultural omnivores is heavily dependent on a 
priori definitions and item choice. If the researcher asked a set of items in which half cater to the privileged 
and half cater to the underprivileged, neither group would be more omnivorous than the other. It is even 
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possible to flip the argument by considering a set of cultural items for which the underprivileged consume 
more widely, claiming it is they who are now climbing upward and toward-middlebrow art. My research 
shows that the underprivileged like more items of local music whereas the privileged like more items of 
foreign music. In the case of China, the underprivileged can be claimed to be consuming a “diversity” of 
Chinese (local) pop, folk music, dance music, Internet songs, Communist and revolutionary music, along 
with Western genres like rock and techno. If the questionnaire contains more items of music from China—a 
seemingly innocuous decision focus on “Chinese music” for “Chinese respondents”—the underprivileged 
would actually appear to be cultural omnivores.  
It is not meaningful to say that elites are consuming more items of “culture” in the abstract, as without 
certain presumptions about the hierarchy, the concept fails to stand alone. The claims of omnivore cannot 
escape researchers’ a priori definitions—either definitions of highbrow and lowbrow, or the researcher’s 
imagination of the “cultural space” that predefined the set of items necessary to be considered eclectic. To 
view cultural omnivores as benign tolerance already presupposes a hierarchy of culture, or, an elitist 
presumption on the standard of cultural knowledge. In both cases, the concept of cultural omnivores 
assumes an elitist viewpoint. The claims of tolerance have been challenged by many pieces of research 
(Coulangeon, 2017; Ollivier, 2008; Warde et al., 2007).  
Cultural omnivores as repertoire of the elites 
Although the evidence from my research could have been used to support the cultural omnivore thesis (as 
other researchers have), I do not endorse that approach because of the heavily problematic and presumptive 
nature of the concept. Instead, I argue that it is more meaningful to abandon the concept to examine the 
pattern of consumption more carefully, to understand what “cultural eclecticism” entails. I argue that, once 
stripped of assumptions of hierarchy, eclectic consumption implies neither the boundary-crossing nor the 
tolerance of “cultural omnivores,” but the “repertoire of the elites.” The appearance of taste eclecticism 
reflects the elites’ command of a range of cultural repertoires that can be used toward distinction. 
As it is problematic to apply the Western definition of highbrow and lowbrow in China, the study of music 
hierarchy in China precludes the application of a priori definitions of highbrow and lowbrow, which forces 
the concept to examination in China. Based on the 6 music types from MIRT, which represent the main 
divisions in the music scene, the privileged are more likely to have a taste for traditional music (traditional 
legitimate cultural capital), selective foreign music (emerging cultural capital), as well as higher attendance 
in live music events (cultural engagement). By not presuming what is “highbrow”, it is no longer possible to 
apply the cultural omnivore explanation that elites have crossed over from “highbrow” to popular art. The 
argument for tolerance is also untenable, as none of those can be considered music of the mass in the past. 
Instead, I offer the opposite explanation that there are multiple types of music in which the elites can utilize 
as signals of status, using mechanisms that have been explained in previous researches. The higher taste for 
traditional music is the penchant for legitimate culture described by Bourdieu. Selective foreign music 
represents an emerging form of cultural capital (Prieur and Savage, 2013, 2014). The higher participation in 
music events demonstrates the divide between cultural engagement versus cultural disengagement (Bennett 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, the strong distaste for local music represents a symbolic exclusion of the culture 
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of the underclasses (Bryson, 1996; Lizardo and Skiles, 2015). Different music tastes are thus music 
repertoires of which the elites are more equipped to leverage for distinction. 
The claims of openness and tolerance, however, is indeed observed through a main group of mainstream 
trendy music. Popular trendy music is widely consumed across social divides. When questionnaires focus on 
a limited number of items consisting of broad categories, they merely reveal the unstratified nature of 
mainstream pop music—which is consumed by both the privileged and underprivileged. Here again, it is the 
questionnaire design that determines the extent of tolerance in the findings. The cultural omnivore's 
argument only shows that elites are consuming mainstream culture in addition to the many items that can be 
drawn for distinction. Cultural omnivore is an artifact of researcher’s music selection, and the exclusion of 
LCCs from various forms of high-status music.  
Thus, the conception of cultural omnivore is tautological and self-contradicting. The claim that elites are 
consuming both high-status culture as well as low-status culture (Peterson and Kern, 1996) questions the 
definition of cultural status. If the elites are consuming lower-status culture, how is it lower-status (aside 
from the a priori definition that is slipped in)? If the eclecticism of elites is a sign of tolerance (Chan, 2019), 
toward which low-status music are they tolerant (aside from a pre-defined lowbrow)? Alternatively, by 
showing the large number of music types that are stratified, I argue they are music repertoires that have the 
potential for status signaling. The more eclectically the elites consume items that are stratified, the more 
repertoires that can be used as signals.  Mainstream trendy music is not stratified, and thus is not part of the 
repertoires for elite distinction. 
 The changing forms of cultural capital 
In the classic study by Pierre Bourdieu, he identified that the key dimension of cultural inequality is 
differences in the volumes of economic and cultural capital—based on a society divided between the new rich 
and the cultured elites (Bourdieu, 1984). A major contribution of Bourdieu is his conception that social 
inequality is not only economic, but also includes inequality in other forms of capital, a central one being 
cultural capital. Cultural capital, like economic capital, can be passed from privileged families to their 
children, and is a currency which can be converted back to economic capital. However, critics say Bourdieu’s 
theory is French-centric, and might have lost relevance in contemporary societies under the profusion of 
popular culture. My research responds to the debate demonstrating how cultural capital has taken form in 
China. First, I outline the methodological contributions of this research on cultural capital. Secondly, I show 
how cultural capital in traditional highbrow forms is relevant in China. Then I argue how emerging forms of 
cultural capital developed in China as a result of the differential penetration of the globalization of culture, 
and how it differs from traditional institutionalized forms of cultural capital. Finally, I explain how selective 
foreign music emerging forms of cultural capital is enabled by the development embodied cultural capital in 
China. 
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Methodological contributions to quantitative research on cultural capital 
My research also makes methodological contributions to the study of distinction. Quantitative research has 
increasingly found evidence for cultural omnivores, which led to calls for qualitative or mixed-methods 
researches (Coulangeon, 2017; Friedman, 2011; Holt, 1997; Ollivier, 2008; Warde et al., 2007). Distinction 
is more readily found in sub-genre segmentation and niche subtypes of cultural activities, which are typically 
missed by mainstream quantitative researches (Friedman, 2011; Hanquinet et al., 2019). Holt in his article 
titled “Recovering Bourdieu’s theory of tastes from its critics” criticizes the primarily quantitative approach 
of omnivore-studies for overlooking embodied forms of taste, arguing for measuring cultural objects specific 
enough to measure embodied tastes (1997). Quantitative approaches are traditionally limited by the 
specificity of the questions, lacking the depth and open-ended inquiry of qualitative researches. Surveys have 
been criticized to be constrained in the range of music to favor art forms of dominant groups, while 
overlooking how cultural values are meaningfully engaged in practice (Miles, 2013).  
This research, although also based on mixed methods, demonstrates how an improved questionnaire design 
and analysis can overcome these shortcomings to uncover the underlying dimensions of taste and the 
hierarchy in cultural consumption. This research innovates in the use of a detailed questionnaire and MIRT 
which reveals the hierarchy of cultural consumption that would be overlooked by traditional quantitative 
techniques. In China, distinction is drawn not by mainstream genres, but is drawn through music subtypes—
such as region of origin and even more specific subtypes. I have shown that different types of music play 
different roles in social distinctions. Starting from the 6 latent traits on music, this dissertation used ANOVA 
to examine how individuals in different social subgroups differ. Popular music is found to be stratified 
according to its regional origin. I have demonstrated the distinction between stratifying and trendy types of 
music. Stratifying music, which includes traditional, and selective foreign, have reemerged as cultural capital 
today. Furthermore, popular music does not necessarily occupy middlebrow or lowbrow positions, as 
selective foreign music has been elevated to become the new highbrow of popular music. My findings 
demonstrate that the most popular music types are less stratifying, whereas stratifying music types are all 
relatively niche. This allows me to show the persistence of distinction, the subtleties of distinction, and how 
the elites can draw from their eclectic repertoire of music for distinction, yet also navigate social relations 
through shared interests in mainstream popular music. 
My research reaches these conclusions through innovations that resolve some of the methodological 
shortcomings in existing research. Music hierarchy is more easily obscured by typical surveys that only ask a 
limited number of items, consisting of broad, generic, and mainstream labels, as “past research into musical 
preferences has been constrained because it has conceptualized preferences into broad and illusive genres or 
styles” (Greenberg et al., 2016: 597). My research demonstrates how quantitative research can be improved 
to cover a larger set of 53 items, more specific items, and less recognizable items. Asking less recognizable 
items presents a problem for traditional quantitative methods, as respondents generate plenty of non-
responses. This is resolved through MIRT, which treats the “unaware” responses as an actual response which 
also reveals information on taste. 
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The persistence of traditional highbrows 
Although China has a different trajectory of development that led to the denigration of traditional legitimate 
culture, the high status of traditional highbrow is still observed today. This is supported by the stratified 
consumption of traditional highbrow music, which parallels the high status of traditional music in 
Bourdieusian France. However, legitimate culture takes on different meanings in China, where its recent rise 
differs from the society which forms Bourdieu’s theory on cultural capital. Unlike European societies where 
legitimate culture has remained within the Western classical and opera canon, China has redefined 
legitimate culture repeatedly in history, changing from “elegant music,” Kunqu opera, Peking opera, and Red 
music, and most recently Western classical. Particularly under the cultural revolution, traditional culture of 
all types was purged for their “feudal” and “bourgeois” nature, incompatible with the goals of Communism, 
leading to the torture and death of many artists and performers. This demonstrates a strong linkage between 
power and the use of changing legitimate culture to subvert the power of old elites. The status of traditional 
culture was revived after Reform and Opening. Rising wealth and the revival of inequality has led to the 
reestablishment of cultural institutions and the rise of high culture. Within a generation, traditional 
highbrows have regained their status as high art in China.  
My data shows that traditional music is favored by the educated in the megacities, particularly so for specific 
highbrow forms. Traditional music encompasses Western and Chinese variants, with a hierarchy of status 
contained within the variants of Chinese traditional music. While Western classical has taken hold among the 
educated in the most affluent coastal regions in China, Chinese traditional music is declining in popularity 
particularly among the young in coastal regions (Ho, 2016b: 159), yet it is attaining highbrow status, with 
Jingkun opera favored by the educated but more strongly by those who were raised in the non-coastal 
regions. The HCCs accumulated their knowledge in traditional highbrow music through many years of 
learning. Many of them are also favorable about pop but some of them abstained from popular culture. All of 
them demonstrate a discerning mode of appreciation through the way they discuss and enjoy the highbrow 
arts. Distinction is vividly seen through the attitudes and dispositions of the HCCs, demonstrating a clear 
difference from the LCCs. 
High culture, rather than in decline as in the West, is being reinstated in China. Traditional highbrow music, 
encompassing Chinese and the more recent Western tradition, has been promoted institutionally through 
state funding of performances, the educational curriculum, along with the construction of highbrow symbols 
such as grandiose performing venues. The global highbrow music of Western classical has become influential 
in China, and traditional operas have been re-legitimized as worthy cultural heritages. The competition 
between the different forms of highbrow is still ongoing, but at the moment Western classical—the symbol of 
Westernization and the carrier of the global standard of cultural capital—is leading the race. The rise of a new 
group of highly educated privileged who benefitted from the economic development and educational 
opportunities of the era, coincided with the rise of Western classical as a form of cultural capital. 
Chapter 8. Distinction and cultural capital in China  
 198 
Pop culture—the development of emerging cultural capital under cultural globalization 
This research also further supports the theories of emerging cultural capital, as China shows how cultural 
globalization is received differently by different segments of society, turning foreign culture into a form of 
cultural capital (Prieur and Savage, 2013, 2014). The argument for emerging forms of cultural capital came 
from the argument that Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital does not limit itself to certain forms of culture. 
Despite the decline of legitimate culture, new forms of culture have risen to become high-status, which are 
news forms of cultural capital in the contemporary world. Scholars point to the increasing distinction 
between global and local, as well as “knowing” forms of appreciation as new forms of cultural capital. The 
global and local distinction is particularly relevant to China, as the music hierarchy places foreign music in 
the highest position, music from Hong Kong and Taiwan in the middle, and local culture in the lowest 
position. This relates to the relative hierarchy of dominance in the regions of origin under the globalization of 
culture. Western popular culture entered developing countries in positions of dominance. Instead of popular 
music eroding the dominance of elite highbrow culture, the entry of Western music into China has found the 
opposite effect of increasing segregation between the “modern” Western tastes against the “backward” local 
tastes of the underclasses. Cultural globalization is mediated by local inequalities, which allows globally 
dominant forms of culture to become an emerging cultural capital in different countries. 
Emerging cultural capital needs to be understood alongside the process of cultural globalization. Several 
theories on the globalization of culture highlight the homogenization effects of globalization, but they all 
studied at the level of nations which overlook inequalities within nations. Following the end of 
colonialization and building on the critical postcolonial work of the time, observers recognized the end of 
imperialism and colonialism, but argued that they reemerged in a postcolonial empire based on the economic 
and cultural influence of the West. Wallerstein describes a world system where the core sustained its 
advantage through underdevelopment of the peripheries, as surplus from trade was pocketed by the core 
instead of being reinvested into local development (Wallerstein, 2004). Schiller’s work on cultural 
imperialism can be seen as part of the movement on global inequality, which sees the spread of Western 
culture as the of spread pro-Western values such as capitalism, consumerism, and lifestyle which duped the 
periphery into accepting underdevelopment (Laing, 1986; Schiller, 1976). Related theories include media 
imperialism, Westernization, Americanization, and cultural homogenization. Media imperialism focuses 
more specifically on the dominance of Western mass media, arguing how the export US media in 
broadcasting, film, and music was unidirectional and had a dominating influence on the cultures and values 
of the world (Boyd-Barrett, 2014). The Westernization thesis claims that Western ideology and values—such 
as language, capitalism, and consumerist culture—are dominating global culture(Latouche, 1996). It argues 
that cities around the world are increasingly similar, dominated by the same global brands and 
entertainment from the same media companies. The small number of multinational giants is feared to be 
leading to homogenized viewing patterns across the world, eroding local cultures and traditions around the 
world (Mirrlees, 2013). Albrow also offered a view of globalization that highlights the effect of 
homogenization— “globalisation refers to all those processes by which the peoples of the world are 
incorporated into a single world society, global society,” (Albrow, 1990: 9). However, the problem with those 
accounts is that they overlook that people in different countries do not act as a single unit, but are internally 
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stratified. Those accounts evaluate the influence on global culture on other countries at the unit of nation-
states, treating nations as if they are homogenous within, emphasizing international inequalities but 
overlooks intranational inequalities. The impact of global culture can be sharply different on different 
segments of society. The theory of cultural capital is very helpful in understanding the relationship between 
culture and the inequalities that exist between segments of society. 
 The deployment of global culture as cultural capital has been discussed in recent studies (Bühlmann et al., 
2013; Igarashi and Saito, 2014; Prieur and Savage, 2013, 2014; Weenink, 2008). It is crucial to examine 
existing inequalities within societies to understand the influence of cultural encroachment on the localities—
where the unequal adoption of foreign culture turns it into a signal of distinction and a form of cultural 
capital. The entry of global culture is not uniform across the recipient country, as it concentrates among the 
privileged classes. My study on cultural capital in China presents a case that shows that rather than being 
homogenized in the Western culture uniformly, the adoption of foreign culture is uneven in China, 
penetrating the privileged youths but not the underprivileged. This includes the high-status of selective 
foreign music, as well as Western classical and opera which has a higher status than traditional Chinese 
music. This was seen even in Europe with the rise of a local versus global distinction, where upper strata are 
drawn toward foreign culture while those in the lower strata prefer primarily local art (Heikkilä and 
Rahkonen, 2011; Kahma and Toikka, 2012; Meuleman and Lubbers, 2014; Meuleman and Savage, 2013; 
Prieur et al., 2008; Rössel and Schroedter, 2015; Woodward et al., 2008). Cultural globalization cannot be 
explained simply as the “local culture” in the singular being homogenized by global culture, but rather, 
globalization provides new cultural objects for cultural stratification locally, producing a stratification of local 
cultures that reflects the global cultural hegemony. Global culture has taken on new meanings as a form of 
cultural capital, where its status in recipient countries is in homology with the global cultural hegemony. 
Global culture is shaped by local inequalities as it spreads, and is weaponized in competition for hierarchy 
and distinction. The cause of this transformation of global culture into a cultural capital is strongly linked to 
the differential access to foreign culture which advantaged those who grew up in privileged families.  
This demonstrates how the form of cultural capital in each country is not fixed but is mediated by local 
inequalities—which are different in different societies. In Bourdieusian French society of the 1960s and 
1970s, a relatively rigid elite culture with popular culture in the nascent is reflected in the exclusive 
consumption of highbrow by the elites (snobs) and the lack of consumption by the dominated groups (slobs) 
(using the vocabulary of Peterson and Kern, 1996). In the USA, without an entrenched and exclusionary elite 
art culture, race has been a more contentious division in the US as “symbolic racism” has been identified as a 
basis for divisions in taste (Bryson, 1996). More recent studies in other countries also point to the weakening 
of legitimate cultures, such as a pattern of engagement versus disengagement, and the opposition between 
emergent and established cultural forms in the UK (Le Roux et al., 2008). In Communist and post-
Communist countries, political status has been a structuring force of inequality (Bukodi, 2007a). The 
influence of political capital is observed in China, but we also see the large unequal opportunities between 
the rural and the urban reflected in tastes (Goodman, 2014). These differences in underlying social inequality 
give rise to different structures of taste patterns, therefore Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital based on 
traditional highbrow culture does not necessarily apply across social contexts. 
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Researchers should avoid blindly testing whether the patterns that Bourdieu discovered is replicated in other 
countries because cultural capital depends on the local cultural context and existing inequalities in societies. 
Bourdieu showed us a particular form of inequality in the society he studied, but his insight is still useful in 
helping us understand social inequality in other countries, which is not fixed in the pattern of culture nor in 
the pattern of social hierarchy.  
Consecration of popular culture is not formally institutionalized 
Aside from the differences in music type, emerging cultural capital also differs in the sources of hierarchy. 
Traditional highbrow cultural capital has traditionally been regarded to be a project of institutionalized 
effort—consecration by the government, legitimized through education, and other institutions of dominating 
social groups. The emerging form of cultural capital (Prieur and Savage, 2013) defies the traditional 
understanding of cultural capital because they are not legitimized from the top-down institutionally. This 
also speaks to the weakness of traditional accounts of cultural capital that has trouble explaining the 
hierarchy in popular music, as they are fleeting and not rigidly institutionalized by the government or in 
education, unlike traditional classical music. 
In China, the pursuit of selective foreign music by the privileged was not formally institutionalized. There are 
no foreign pop music academics, troupes, concert halls, museums, or music classes. In the early years, 
foreign pop culture was not even promoted by resourceful record labels nor was it profit-driven. Institutions 
play more indirect roles, such as in the increased emphasis on English language learning in well-resourced 
schools. Interests in selective foreign music were enabled through embodied cultural capital of the elites. The 
status came from the effort of fans with high fluency and interest in foreign culture to seek out selective 
Western artists. They were driven by demands from the bottom-up rather than promoted top-down (Gans, 
2008: 13–21). Those with privileged childhood were encouraged and empowered to pursue Western culture, 
with a disposition for non-mainstream foreign music. The consecration of selective Western music was led by 
the agency of young individuals who, with the resources and ability to consume foreign culture, reach out for 
music of distinction and contributed to the spread and distribution of foreign music in China, rather than the 
traditional globalization accounts of imperial powers entering to promote their hegemonic music.  
The “glocalization” theory says “globalization has involved the reconstruction of ‘home’, ’community’, and 
‘locality’” (Robertson, 1995: 30). The status of music also takes on new meaning in China, following a process 
of simultaneous globalization with indigenization. The status of foreign popular music became redefined as it 
entered China, rather than imposed top-down by the globally dominant. The most popular music in the West 
weakly relates to the most popular Western music in China (Rupke and Blank, 2009). Western pop culture, 
which might not be high-status in the West, picked up new local values and status as cultural capital as they 
become adopted by the privileged in China. Selective foreign music, not necessarily highbrow in their nations 
of origin, are received as high status in China when interpreted by local elites pursuing the non-mainstream 
for differentiation. The unequal adoption of global culture, concentrated in the privileged segments of 
society, has turned it into a local form of cultural capital—an emerging form of cultural capital. 
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Objectified and embodied form of cultural capital 
As a response to criticisms that Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital has become irrelevant under the decline 
of high culture (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b; Goldthorpe, 2007; Peterson and Kern, 1996), some scholars 
turn to the distinction between objectified and embodied forms of capital, which suggests that distinction can 
also be drawn through the attitudes and modes of consumption, rather than only through the objects of 
consumption (Bourdieu, 1986; Friedman, 2011; Holt, 1997). My survey attempts to understand attitudes and 
more subtle differences in consumption. The questionnaire does so by asking preferences in music—a 
reflection of internal attitude—rather than the objectified ownership of cultural objects or participation. It 
used a latent trait method to derive the tastes that underlie and explain the surfaced differences in music 
preference, which is another attempt to examine more deeply beyond the objectified display of status signals. 
The quantitative findings discover differences in the stratification within foreign music, and to a lesser 
extent, in Chinese music as well. Selective foreign music, but not trendy foreign music, is an emerging form 
of cultural capital in China. They are specific items of foreign music that are not the most popular but are 
heavily stratified by cultural capital. The differences between selective foreign music and trendy foreign 
music are not obvious, and Western scholars have noted the popularity of foreign songs in China can be 
unrelated to their popularity in the West (Rupke and Blank, 2009). The surprising finding of a division 
within foreign music, and the ability of those with cultural capital to distinguish them while others cannot, is 
a distinction that relies on embodied forms of cultural capital in China to tell distinguish “quality.” It is not 
enough to simply claim to like all kinds of foreign music—the privileged distinguish between the superior 
selective music and the inferior mass.  
Qualitative interviews further explain how embodied cultural capital enables differentiation within the 
different subtypes foreign music, which is due to the different attitudes toward music between the HCCs and 
LCCs. The HCCs show a discerning appreciation of quality which is based on research, knowledge, and 
judgment. They pursue the non-mainstream items of their era, and “upgraded” their repertoire to 
increasingly selective items as the mainstream landscape shifted toward Hk/Taiwan and eventually 
mainstream Western pop. In contrast, the LCCs primarily pursue popularity—regarding popularity to be 
likable. Lowbrow music, or sometimes even popular music in general, is looked down upon by the HCCs as 
tasteless and undesirable. Embodied cultural capital is relevant not only to how culture is consumed, but also 
turns around to influence what specific items are consumed. Those with embodied cultural capital claim to 
be able to discern what specific music is of high quality, and this is reflected in what they consume—provided 
that the questionnaire has the granularity to discern them. 
 The meaning of cultural capital in China 
The development of cultural capital 
The concept of habitus is central to Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital, as it describes how differences in 
cultural capital are rooted in early upbringings and relatively fixed later in life. Habitus is defined as “a 
system of durably acquired schemes of perception, thought and action, engendered by objective conditions 
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but tending to persist even after an alteration of those conditions” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: 12). It 
refers to dispositions that are inculcated by the social environment, which influences values, behavior, and 
taste (Bourdieu, 1984). My research affirms that view, as differences in taste are heavily influenced by 
differences in upbringings in the past. 
The quantitative part of my research shows that taste—analyzed as classical highbrow, emerging cultural 
capital, symbolic exclusion, and cultural engagement—is related not only to the measurement of privileges in 
adulthood such as education and foreign living experiences, but also privileges during childhood—such as the 
hukou during childhood, music lesson, as well as parental privileges. This strongly supports that taste is not 
only a reflection of today’s status but arises from knowledge and values developed from the past. This view is 
also supported by my qualitative research, where respondents describe their past from which we can observe 
the sources of their taste. Their interest in highbrow music relates to the childhood concerts attended, early 
music lessons, and an education system that introduced them to such music. The LCCs describe their lack of 
such extracurricular development in their upbringing, but instead an education that emphasizes rote 
learning and exams (which ironically, despite the educational focus on college and university entrance 
exams, still failed to allow them to gain entry into better-ranked universities). This resulted in differences in 
the level of interest in the different forms of music, and their different criteria for what is considered quality 
music—one pursues the popular and the hit, while the other strives for selectivity and intrinsic quality. The 
influence of their background leaves an unmistakable influence on their taste. 
Their differences, however, can be traced to the inequalities in earlier periods of China. Inequality in China 
can be viewed in terms of inequalities in economic, cultural, and political capital—which can be explained 
through the social development in recent Chinese history that sharply differed from that in the West. In the 
past century, the Chinese social structure experienced abrupt changes every generation. Traditional high art 
and the old gentry class fell along with the fall of the imperial Qing dynasty in 1911, suffering brutal 
treatment particularly during the Cultural revolution. The Communist revolution in 1949 established 
socialism, with the purge of traditional and popular music for Red music. Cultural capital as elite 
reproduction as portrayed by Bourdieu is not evident given the discontinuous social hierarchy in modern 
China. Cultural capital, portrayed as the distinctive traits of the French aristocracy—the style, eloquence, 
gestures, and mentality passed down in elite families, is hard to be found in modern China. The old Chinese 
imperial elites, with their taste for classical high culture, had their properties confiscated and status deprived 
after the socialist revolution. Political capital was the only capital during socialist China and the dominant 
form of social hierarchy in that period. Under socialism, the new elites were the party members and cadres, 
who were often able to privilege themselves and their family members in access to resources by holding 
government positions themselves, or through their connection with other party members who do.  
Reform and opening in 1978 led to the current market economy, rising inequality, along with the influx of 
music from outside of mainland China. Much of the current social hierarchy today is built only after reform 
and opening. Political capital was converted into economic and cultural capital but soon declined in the 
market economy, aside from the most elite bureaucrat families who remain in the top echelon of power 
(Goodman, 2014). Yet the privilege of party membership is still observable, as they and their children are 
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more likely to have a better education or to have played an instrument when young. Economic inequality rose 
after Reform and Opening as the country shifts from socialist to market economy, but economic income is 
found to have comparatively less influence on taste. The influence of economic capital is limited to cultural 
engagement in live events. 
Unlike the multigenerational transfer of privileges described by Bourdieu, cultural capital in today’s form—
selective foreign music and traditional highbrow—is less rigid and more recent in China, arising from 
divergent childhood environments since Reform and Opening. The past generation experienced tremendous 
opportunity from political reforms, economic development, and massive expansion of opportunities for 
higher education—resulting in a fluid society with an expansion of opportunities for different segments for 
society. However, Chinese society is also marked by widening divisions. The initial inequalities enlarged from 
differences in ownership of material goods to differences in lifestyles. Differences in cultural capital, which 
includes mentalities and attitudes, started to be planted in the diverging environments of people raised in 
different families. Cultural capital developed from the seeds of intergenerational inequality that were planted 
during the early years of Reform and Opening, through the slight but enlarging inequality in that period. 
This research has shown that people’s tastes are influenced by parental, childhood, as well as adulthood 
privileges. Parental privileges such as parental occupational class, cultural and political capital all exert 
influences in children’s music taste. Growing up in rural versus urban China also leaves differences in taste 
that are visible despite the level of education. Because different forms of privileges reinforce each other, those 
with privileged parents and childhood are also more likely to attain high levels of education. However, 
advantages from early in life continue to leave influences even after controlling for education. Furthermore, 
qualitative interviews also traced the development of cultural capital from the interviewees to show how 
those from privileged families had higher aspirations for Western culture, and had much better access to 
education, music education, and foreign media—which led to their discerning tastes and their ability to 
differentiate the tasteful from the distasteful. 
The habitus and suzhi 
Various notions related to internal development can be observed in China. Bourdieu’s view that distinction 
draws on differences in internalized resources residing in the habitus can help us understand those notions 
in China, where there is a culture that focuses on education and internal aspects of development. Bourdieu 
attributes having proper taste to his theories on cultural capital. The notion of “taste” (品味 pinwei) is also 
used in China, but there several related terms that are frequently used to denigrate those with lower social 
standings in China. “Lacking culture” (meiyou wenhua) has a traditional context that education brings 
knowledge and proper behavior necessary to become a cultured person (Goodman, 2013: 205). Lacking qizhi 
can be described as a deficiency in “disposition – the air with which one holds one-self” (Miao, 2016: 24). 
Suzhi (quality) is perhaps the best example of a discourse that discriminates against the lack of internal 
quality. 
Suzhi means internal qualities, akin to the lack of culture, which is frequently used to “measure” and berate 
others (Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004). In everyday usage, suzhi is frequently used as a stigmatizing discourse 
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against lower social groups. The discourse frequently employed in China is the lack of suzhi—the lack of 
“culture” or literally the lack of innate qualities of those below them. Low suzhi is used against the underclass 
to disparage a range of “deficiencies” such as lack of education, low literacy, poor hygiene, and manners, or 
poor taste (Anagnost, 2008; Jacka, 2009; Kipnis, 2006, 2007; Sun, 2009b). Those with low suzhi are 
portrayed in popular media with anxiety, fascination, and fear, with a need to be controlled and undergo 
further civilizing (Sun, 2009a; Zhao, 2002). The suzhi discourse is used to label, justify, and discriminate 
different social groups as if the differences are innate. “Suzhi enables transcoding of economic value into a 
system of social distinctions that achieves its fullest expression in the newly interiorized space of civilized 
urban domesticity and its production of affective value” (Anagnost, 2004: 192). “Using the language of 
lacking suzhi becomes a natural form of insulting those whom one wishes to castigate, especially if they 
appear to be poor, of a rural background or have relatively low levels of education… The term “suzhi” is often 
taken to imply a ranked form of overall human quality and potential, a type of quality that is totalizing 
measure of one’s intellect, morality, physical conditioning and character…suzhi discourse justifies social and 
political hierarchies in China. A person who is insulted by insinuations that his or her suzhi is low is 
castigated in a number of ways. His or her moral, intellectual and physical qualities are simultaneously 
questioned. Moreover, because suzhi is understood as a form of potential, she or he is considered beyond 
hope—without the potential for future development and not worthy of the effort of investing additional 
training resources” (Kipnis, 2013: 119) 
The logic of suzhi has been traced to Confucian value-judgments (Jacka, 2009; Sun, 2013). Confucian values 
believe that to be fully a human requires a lifelong process of self-cultivation that aims to achieve ren, the 
state of supreme virtue (Tu, 1985). Suzhi justifies inequality through the notion that one is socially 
marginalized due to lack of suzhi; to improve oneself, one needs to improve suzhi through self-development 
such as education. Similarly, Confucian morality places importance on cultivation, though not necessarily 
education for the sake of certificate, but rather for the self-cultivation that leads to changes in suzhi. The 
cultivated individuals can be trusted to lead, and education is the path to upward status. The belief in the 
internal change in behavior and manner has Confucian roots in li, the proper conduct of society, and what it 
means to be a junzi (gentleman). Confucianism has long valued scholars above merchants and education 
above wealth, valuing contributions to others over private gains. Superior social status comes from a holistic 
internal change which “requires also substantial changes in one’s cognitive outlook” (Miao, 2016: 24).  
In China, it is the privileged who are doing whatever they can to improve their and their children’s suzhi. In 
contrast, there is little that the disadvantaged can do to “improve” their suzhi. The deficit of education, 
development, and employment opportunities prevent the disadvantaged from “improving themselves.” 
Scholars have criticized the suzhi discourse as a justification for the deprived outcome of certain social 
groups as their personal deficiency in intrinsic “quality,” which reinforces and reproduces their social 
exclusion (Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004). The privileged, for fear of their child falling behind, increasingly 
putting their children through musical and other extra-curricular education to improve their internal 
dispositions. The focus on children’s education had both roots on the Confucian emphasis on education, and 
also the one-child policy since 1979 that caused 2 parents and 4 grandparents to devote all their resources 
and anxieties onto the development of the “little emperor” or “empress” (Davis and Sensenbrenner, 2000: 
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59). Privileged parents believe “the norm for someone with their socioeconomic status is to rectify the 
inadequacies in the official school system by providing supplementary education using their socioeconomic 
and cultural capital,” otherwise, as a parent says, “your child ends up looking around and realizing that 
everyone can do this puzzle while he can’t, it will undermine him.” (Miao, 2016: 114). On the top, resourceful 
parents educate their children to be competitive in globalizing China. Children of the privileged strata are 
proficient in English and hope to pursue education abroad to see the world (Miao, 2016: 114; Tsang, 2014: 
85).  
Bourdieu attributes social distinction to underlying cultural inequality in the social hierarchy, which he 
conceptualizes as cultural capital. He believes that the privileged distinguish themselves through legitimate 
culture, which includes not only knowledge but also mindset and dispositions inculcated into the habitus. 
Both suzhi and Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus view internal dispositions as fundamental to differences in 
personal cultivation. Habitus enables people to have an instinctive grasp of the “rules of the game,” whereas 
Confucianism similarly attributes human development as an internal quality which is reflected in behavior. 
The theory of taste and suzhi both attribute social differences to internals, which is reflected in outward 
behavior, and used as a justification for exclusion. Although the development of economic inequality in 
China is only recent, the notion of cultural distinction has traditional roots that need no reinvention. Social 
distinction has been attributed to indicators that “is often ‘felt’ more than ‘seen’, a sense of belonging and 
accordant behavior rather than a checklist.” A quote from a respondent illustrates this succinctly: “I would 
never identify with another person, or think of them as middle class, simply because of their occupation or 
income. That has to come from something else – the way they behave, their mannerisms, their ways of 
thought.” (Miao, 2016: 24). The perception of internalized differences has reemerged to draw social 
boundaries in China. 
Despite the different cultural contexts between China and the Western societies where Bourdieu formulated 
his theories, there are coherences in Bourdieu’s concepts and social distinction in China in the attribution to 
internal characteristics for distinction. However, the use of suzhi in China is frequently normative—to call for 
the need to further develop oneself, which in social contexts is applied as a negative label to discredit others 
and justify discriminating outcomes (Anagnost, 2008; Jacka, 2009; Kipnis, 2006, 2007; Sun, 2009b). As 
such, its use is frequently a form of symbolic violence, but habitus is used only as an academic term to 
describe the concept neutrally. One can say that “someone lacks suzhi” but not for habitus, as suzhi is a unit 
of measurement. The use of  suzhi in China literally means “quality,” a more unapologetic word for the 
notion of “taste” or “level of culture.” 
Conceptually, while both suzhi and habitus refer to intrinsic cultivation, in the context of his theory of taste, 
habitus is used by Bourdieu to describe the undesirable mechanism for elites to apply symbolic violence to 
advantage themselves. The context of the suzhi discourse in China—which also applies to the Confucian 
notion of cultivation—sees it positively as desirable. The suzhi discourse is used by the state as a neo-liberal 
discourse to urge the disadvantaged to improve their own suzhi, a transformation that helps the migrant 
workers adapt to the city and improve the quality of the population. However, it is the privileged who are 
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benefitting from this strive to improve themselves, which is well described by Bourdieu’s view that cultural 
capital is an intergenerational inequality. 
Under Bourdieu’s account, the castigation of bad tastes is openly done between social groups, whereas the 
appearance of natural talent due to childhood inculcation is beneath the surface—unknown to the oppressed. 
In China, pointing out others’ lack of suzhi is more open and acceptable, in fact publicly used in educational 
and government discourse, perhaps because the concept of using education to strive for inner cultivation of 
virtues is deeply rooted in Confucian culture (Thrasher, 1981; Tu, 1985). The ideals of increasing openness 
and tolerance described by many accounts in the West are not readily seen in China (Beck, 2006; Peterson 
and Kern, 1996). The underprivileged are both criticized based on taste and behavior, but also directly on the 
lack of suzhi. The underprivileged have themselves been so convinced that they “lack suzhi” that they 
sometimes believe they deserve the hardship they are facing, attributing their experience of “eating 
bitterness” (hardship)—such as hardship, humiliations, and loneliness—to their lack of suzhi (Sun, 2013). 
Thus, the suzhi discourse also justifies unequal outcome based on an innate deficiency, and functions as a 
preserver of an unequal social structure like cultural capital (Anagnost, 2004; Jacka, 2009; Kipnis, 2006, 
2007; Lin, 2011; Sun, 2009b; Yan, 2003). 
The implications for cultural inequality 
Firstly, my research is one of the few that examines cultural consumption and cultural capital in China. My 
research shows that distinction in cultural consumption exists in contemporary Chinese megacities. In 
contrast to existing research in China that covered various aspects of cultural distinction as a sub-cultural 
phenomenon or isolated instances of symbolic violence (BBC News, 2018; Li, 2018; Quackenbush and 
Chen, 2018; Shen, 2018; Zuo, 2018), I have comprehensively examined distinction in music to analyze the 
patterns of division. My research shows that not only is distinction observed, it can be traced to the 
circumstance of the individual and also their upbringing. Thus, the deployment of taste for symbolic violence 
is systematic and widespread. Rather than the end of relevance of Bourdieu, the stratification of culture is 
present, and cannot be dismissed simply as tolerance of the individuals – which we know from other 
research in China that stigmatization of the underclasses is still prevalent (such as Chen, 2013; Chen et al., 
2011; Gan, 2014; Guan, 2011; Kuang and Liu, 2012; Li et al., 2007; Solinger, 1999; Zhang, 2001; Zhang et al., 
2009; Zhang and Wu, 2017). My research thus draws attention to the importance of cultural distinction in 
China as a cultural capital as a research topic, which has been overlooked in researches in China. 
Secondly, my research shows the importance of the cultural angle in understanding inequality in China, 
drawing attention to the often-overlooked relationship between cultural consumption, distinction, and 
inequality in China. Existing researches on inequalities in China have focused on economic inequality and 
the rural and urban divide, at the current point in time. My research shows that cultural dimensions and 
influences from the past also persist into inequalities today. While my case is on music, my research points to 
wider issues of the prevalence and the deeper causes of cultural distinction. Discrimination in China has been 
prevalent, both against the underclasses in absolute terms, and against anyone in a lower social position. In 
contrast to studies that address distinction based on current economic and status disparity, I investigated 
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cultural inequality through Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital. This research suggests that discrimination 
is far beyond objectifiable material differences. Distinction in China is based on internalized differences, 
rooted in inequalities of the past, seeded in decades of diverging upbringing. The differences are measurable 
not just in terms of material ownership, economic wealth, or even level of education. These differences can be 
measured in terms of cultural taste, which points to drastic cultural and perceptional differences in society. 
Furthermore, although differences in music taste are known to be influenced by many individual factors such 
as psychology, personality, or mood, they are found to be associated not only with differences in education, 
class, and cosmopolitanism, they were even traceable to parental factors.  
Bourdieu’s cultural capital is the best concept that can make sense of this linkage. Cultural capital helps 
reveal the deeper causes of discrimination through the lens of cultural inequality and intergenerational 
inequality. As we have seen, different trajectories of upbringing are deep causes of the different mentalities, 
perceptions, and attitudes that are recognizable and hard to change later in life. Scholars of inequality in 
China are encouraged to realize that, while economic differences and rural-urban differences in the current 
point in time is an important inequality, frequently the causes of differences are more deeply rooted, since 
childhood environment and parental inequalities. My research shows that cultural capital is a useful concept 
to understand how inequalities sustain itself through early upbringing. 
This research also uses the most developed megacities in China to glimpse into what the future of China may 
look like as it continues to urbanize and develop. Inequality in China has considerably widened since the 
early years of Reform and Opening—the childhood years of the respondents. Inequality in China is largely a 
recent phenomenon that escalated since the 1990s and the 2000s, with studies that point to decreasing social 
mobility. This thesis has examined, through the lens of music, the current state of cultural capital in China to 
understand its relevance in structuring taste. Cultural capital was examined through both the cultural side as 
the role of music types in stratification, as well as through the social side on how they were accumulated in 
certain social groups. By tracing the reemergence of cultural distinction from material ownership to lifestyle 
and then differentiation in taste, I argue that cultural capital is regaining importance in China. After four 
decades of unequal development, inequalities that have now reached beyond economic differences to see the 
emergence of intergenerational cultural differences.  
Yet, two aspects should be considered in interpreting this finding. Firstly, the quantitative data in this study 
is a snapshot in time, without the ability to isolate age from cohort effect, and thus not an evidence for 
trends. My argument for the rise of cultural capital is based on analysis of social development in China and 
reflections on intergenerational differences in the interviews, rather than empirical evidence based on 
longitudinal data on cultural preferences—a comparison which is more available in the West but essentially 
non-existent in China. Secondly, this data is based on megacities in China to show that high degrees of 
cultural inequality exists within the most developed regions of China. Megacities are where the most 
privileged individuals live in China. Nationally, the gaps between the taste of the privileged and 
underprivileged are expected to be even wider, as only the most fortunate individuals are able to reside in 
those megacities. Thus the degree that deficits in cultural capital can be overcome later in life is influenced by 
those who have successfully overcome it, who therefore reside in the city to be interviewed. Furthermore, if 
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societal inequality continues to increase and intergenerational mobility becomes stagnant, differences in 
cultural capital in the next generation of Chinese are expected to continue to enlarge. Since this is the first 
generation of widespread inequality in China, if upward opportunities become less plentiful in the future, the 
leverage of parental endowment, i.e. the influence of cultural capital, might become even more important in 
the future. 
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Part V. APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Supplementary Tables 
Table-1: Basic profile of artists/music groups in the questionnaire 
Questionnaire Attributes (not revealed to respondents) 
Music 
Item 
Artist Name Gender Year of 
Birth 
Approx. Age  
in 2017 
Region of origin 
M6 Teresa TENG F 1943 (Died 1995) Taiwan 
M7 Jonathan LEE M 1959 58 Taiwan 
M8 Coco LEE F 1975 42 Taiwan / HK 
M9 May Day 
(a band of 5) 
All M 1973-1977 40-44 Taiwan 
M10 Jolin TSAI F 1980 37 Taiwan 
M11 Alan TAM M 1950 67 Hong Kong 
M12 WONG Ka Kui M 1962 (Died 1993) Hong Kong 
M13 Jacky CHEUNG M 1961 56 Hong Kong 
M14 Eason CHAN M 1974 43 Hong Kong 
M15 G.E.M. F 1991 26 Hong Kong 
M16 LIU Huan M 1963 54 Mainland China 
M17 LU Han M 1990 27 Mainland China 
M18 CUI Jian M 1961 56 Mainland China 
M19 Faye WONG F 1969 48 Mainland China / HK 
M20 Dao Lang M 1961 56 Mainland China 
M21 Chopstick Brothers 
(a duo) 
All M 1969 & 
1980 
37 & 48 Mainland China 
M22 Phoenix Legend 
(a duo) 
M & F 1979 & 
1980 
37 & 38 Mainland China 
M23 QU Wanting F 1983 34 Mainland China 
M24 LI Yuchun F 1984 33 Mainland China 
M25 YAN Weiwen M 1957 60 Mainland China 
M26 HAN Hong F 1971 46 Mainland China 
M27 LI Yundi M 1982 35 Mainland China 
M28 Wulantuya F 1983 34 Mainland China 
M29 Mai KURAKI F 1982 35 Japan 
M30 Psy M 1977 40 Korea 
M31 Adele F 1988 29 UK 
M32 Justin BIEBER M 1994 24 Canada 
M33 Lady Gaga F 1986 31 US 
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Table-2. Welch T-test on differences in years of education between likes vs dislikes, and unaware vs 
aware 
Music Likes Dislikes t1 df1 p1 Unaware Aware t2 df2 p2 
M01.PopWest 0.55 -1.02 5.84 198 *** -0.78 0.07 -2.91 103 ** 
M02.PopJK 0.30 -0.05 1.67 450 . -0.64 0.08 -2.80 134 ** 
M03.PopCanto 0.13 -0.37 2.00 194 * -0.57 0.03 -1.62 63  
M04.PopHkTw 0.03 0.02 0.04 156  0.08 0.00 0.20 42  
M05.PopMainland -0.08 0.53 -2.36 102 * -0.96 0.01 -1.43 12  
M06.TeresaT -0.01 -0.06 0.15 95  -0.16 0.01 -0.39 40  
M07.JonLee 0.35 -0.74 4.29 187 *** -0.61 0.11 -3.24 205 ** 
M08.CocoLee -0.08 0.02 -0.43 434  -0.31 0.06 -1.74 220 . 
M09.MayDay 0.45 -0.40 4.11 368 *** -0.61 0.07 -2.60 134 * 
M10.JolinT 0.07 -0.08 0.69 432  0.19 -0.01 0.61 56  
M11.AlanT -0.16 0.12 -1.28 279  -0.21 0.03 -1.03 169  
M12.KKWong 0.13 -0.44 2.07 106 * -0.60 0.04 -1.93 78 . 
M13.JackyC 0.05 -0.13 0.50 58  -0.23 0.00 -0.38 21  
M14.EasonC 0.33 -0.81 3.73 81 *** -2.51 0.12 -6.68 48 *** 
M15.GEM -0.12 0.02 -0.67 455  -0.33 0.04 -1.29 118  
M16.LiuH -0.06 0.00 -0.31 504  -0.50 0.03 -1.35 53  
M17.LuH -0.27 0.08 -1.58 361  -0.08 0.03 -0.63 518  
M18.CuiJ 0.33 -0.15 2.12 412 * -0.39 0.10 -2.62 322 ** 
M19.FayeW 0.30 -0.43 2.99 172 ** -1.53 0.06 -3.12 38 ** 
M20.DaoL -0.52 0.61 -5.53 548 *** -0.54 0.05 -2.46 114 * 
M21.Chopstick -0.13 0.31 -2.06 399 * -0.67 0.04 -2.16 70 * 
M22.Phoenix -0.55 0.53 -5.46 549 *** -1.14 0.03 -2.39 29 * 
M23.QuWt 0.25 -0.08 1.31 236  -0.49 0.15 -3.34 354 *** 
M24.LiYc -0.24 0.07 -1.45 361  -0.56 0.06 -2.30 121 * 
M25.YanWw -0.37 0.04 -1.55 336  -0.14 0.09 -1.51 848  
M26.Hanh -0.25 0.32 -2.76 355 ** -0.38 0.01 -0.90 24  
M27.LiYd 0.32 -0.23 2.37 378 * -0.46 0.20 -4.00 561 *** 
M28.Wlty -0.67 0.18 -3.05 297 ** 0.16 -0.14 2.02 1031 * 
M29.MaiKuraki 0.30 0.05 0.84 177  -0.08 0.10 -1.17 996  
M30.Psy -0.08 0.27 -1.48 244  -0.69 0.12 -3.46 191 *** 
M31.Adele 0.87 -0.54 5.97 266 *** -0.61 0.38 -6.43 776 *** 
M32.Bieber 0.71 0.14 2.63 386 ** -0.81 0.39 -7.51 602 *** 
M33.Gaga 0.23 0.42 -0.95 506  -1.31 0.28 -7.44 241 *** 
M34.ClassicalWest 0.51 -0.67 4.86 323 *** -0.29 0.07 -1.87 309 . 
M35.OperaWest 0.73 -0.63 5.85 260 *** -0.10 0.04 -0.81 494  
M36.Hiphop 0.10 -0.01 0.56 548  -0.81 0.08 -2.77 105 ** 
M37.Techno -0.12 0.14 -1.22 487  -0.72 0.16 -4.11 249 *** 
M38.RnB 0.90 -0.62 7.05 389 *** -0.87 0.24 -5.78 330 *** 
M39.PlazaDance -0.78 0.34 -4.89 214 *** -0.93 0.05 -2.54 60 * 
M40.Rock 0.03 -0.31 1.50 310  -1.49 0.02 -1.95 14 . 
M41.NetMusic -0.56 0.57 -5.67 511 *** -0.20 0.01 -0.68 72  
M42.Red -0.32 0.18 -2.39 549 * -0.77 0.05 -2.33 65 * 
M43.Folk 0.01 -0.07 0.38 349  -0.33 0.01 -0.77 35  
M44.TraditCn 0.29 -0.61 4.19 320 *** -0.82 0.06 -2.70 81 ** 
M45.OperaKun 0.18 -0.40 2.33 230 * 0.06 -0.03 0.53 566  
M46.OperaPek 0.10 -0.40 2.30 364 * 0.12 -0.02 0.60 177  
M47.OperaHM -0.04 -0.23 0.91 549  0.14 -0.03 0.77 216  
M48.OperaLocal 0.08 -0.29 1.71 343 . 0.36 -0.10 2.53 350 * 
M49.Pingtan 0.20 -0.35 2.13 211 * 0.01 -0.01 0.10 754  
The years of education have been mean-centered. 
Significance: 10% ., 5% *, 1% **, 0.1% *** 
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire 
Screening criteria 
1. Your gender? Male / Female 
2. Your age? __ __ years  
Music 












3. Mandopop from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan 
a b c d e f 
4. Mandopop from Mainland China a b c d e f 
5. Cantopop from Hong Kong a b c d e f 
6. Japanese and Korean Pop music a b c d e f 
7. American and European Pop music a b c d e f 












8. Teresa Teng a b c d e f 
9. Jonathan Lee a b c d e f 
10. Coco Lee a b c d e f 
11. May Day a b c d e f 
12. Jolin Tsai a b c d e f 
13. Alan Tam a b c d e f 
14. Wong Ka Kui a b c d e f 
15. Jackie Cheung a b c d e f 
16. Eason Chan a b c d e f 
17. G.E.M. a b c d e f 
18. Liu Huan a b c d e f 
19. Lu Han a b c d e f 
20. Cui Jian a b c d e f 
21. Faye Wong a b c d e f 
22. Dao Lang a b c d e f 
23. Chopstick Brothers a b c d e f 
24. Phoenix Legend a b c d e f 
25. Qu Wanting a b c d e f 
26. Li Yuchun a b c d e f 
27. Yan Weiwen a b c d e f 
28. Han Hong a b c d e f 
29. Li Yundi a b c d e f 
30. Wulantuya a b c d e f 
31. Mai Kuraki a b c d e f 
32. Psy a b c d e f 
33. Adele a b c d e f 
34. Justin Bieber a b c d e f 
35. Lady Gaga a b c d e f 
(3)  How much do you like these types of music? 













36. Western classical a b c d e f 
37. Western opera a b c d e f 
38. Hip-hop & rap a b c d e f 
39. Techno a b c d e -f 
40. Rhythm & Blues (R&B) a b c d e f 
41. Plaza Dance Music a b c d e f 
42. Rock a b c d e f 
43. Trendy Net Music a b c d e f 
44. Red/Communist a b c d e f 
45. Chinese folk songs a b c d e f 
46. Guqin (Chinese instrument) a b c d e f 
47. Kunqu opera a b c d e f 
48. Peking opera a b c d e f 
49. Huangmei opera a b c d e f 
50. [local] opera 
Bangzi opera (asked in BJ) 
Sichuan opera (asked in CD) 
Canton opera (asked in GZ) 
Shanghai opera (asked in SH) 
a b c d e f 
51. Suzhou Pingtan a b c d e f 
(4)  Live venue attendance 
52. In the most recent year, how many 
times have you attended a live venue 
for popular concert, music concert, or 
opera performances? 
__ __ times 
Socio-demographics 
(5)  Basic 
53. How long have you lived in the 
current city? (accumulated) 
__ __ years 
54. How many cities have you lived in 
(for > 1 year)? 
__ __ 













55. Your level of education? a b c d e f 
56. Your father’s level of education? a b c d e f 
(7)  Occupation 
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57. What is your current (or last) 
occupation? 
i. Occupation: ________________ 
 
ii. Company type: a) state, b) state-affiliated, c) state-
owned, d) foreign-owned, e) private, f) self 
 
iii. Role: a) employee, b) manager, c) owner 
 
58. What is the current (or last) 
occupation of your farther? 
i.  Occupation: ________________ 
 
ii. Company type: a) state, b) state-affiliated, c) state-
owned, d) foreign-owned, e) private, f) self 
 
iii. Role: a) employee, b) manager, c) owner 
 
59. What is (or was) the company type of 
your mother? 
Company type: a) state, b) state-affiliated, c) state-
owned, d) foreign-owned, e) private, f) self 
(8)  Additional Questions 
 a) b) 
60. Have you learned to play instruments when young 
(learned for 1 year or more, under age 18)? 
Yes No 
61. Have you lived abroad for 6 months or more? 
(outside of Mainland China) 
Yes No 
62. Are you a member of the Communist Party? Yes No 
63. Do you have any parent who is a member of the 
party? 
Yes No 
64. What was your household registration (hukou) when 
you were 18? 
Urban Rural 













65.  a b c d e f 
(10)  How many properties in [the current city] do you have ownership under your name? (including those 
under mortgage payment)12 
 0 1 2 3-4 More than 4 
66.  a b c d e 
  
 
11 Household rather than personal income is used, because it accounts for those choose not to work for 
income and rely on the income of the household. 
12 Because of currency restrictions and the habit of accumulating savings in housing, the number of 
properties owned will be used as an indicator for wealth (Tomba, 2016). A numerical figure for asset is 
difficult to estimate and would be highly sensitive in China, especially from a call through random digit 
dialing. This is a way to get an indication of the level of assets one holds. Due to restrictions in property 
market, it is difficult for people to purchase property in a top tier city than their household registration 
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